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RAJPUT STUDIES

By the same author

PESHWA MADHAV RAO I

THE EASTERN FRONTIER
OF BRITISH INDIA

ANNEXATION OF BURMA

RAJPUT STUDIES

BY

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2, COLLEGE SQUARE,

CALCUTTA

accno 4602

FIRST EDITION

February, 1944

Price Rs 7/- only

Published by A. Mukherjee, 2, College Square, Calcutta, and
printed by J. C. Sarkhel at the Calcutta Oriental Press, Ltd.,
9, Panchanan Ghose Lane, Calcutta.

PREFACE

The papers printed in this volume are offered to the public as an humble contribution to the study of medieval and modern Indian history. "Early History of the Guhilots" was written in 1931 and published in *Indian Culture* (Vol. III, No. 4). In re-printing it in the present volume I have made certain verbal changes, omitted some passages, and incorporated some new materials, but the main conclusions have not been modified. "Struggle between Delhi and Mewar in the Thirteenth Century" was also written in 1931 and published in *D. R. Bhandarkar Volume* edited by Dr. B. C. Law. "Rana Sanga of Mewar" was written in 1938 and published in *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Allahabad Session, 1938*. The remaining papers, which deal with different aspects of Rajput History, are published for the first time in this volume, although some of the materials incorporated in them were utilised in two papers published in *Journal of Indian History*, April, 1943 ("Lord Minto and the Rajput States") and *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, March-June, 1943 ("British Alliance with Jaipur, 1818.").

The papers dealing with the relations between the Company and the Rajput States are based exclusively on unpublished official documents preserved in the Imperial Record Department. An attempt has been made, for the

first time, to give a connected account of the extension of British supremacy over Rajputana. In order to give the general reader a clear idea about the condition of the Rajput States towards the close of the eighteenth century I have thought it necessary to add brief accounts of the past history of those States, with special reference to the vicissitudes of the Rajput-Maratha relations, which drove them to the arms of the British Government. No originality is claimed for these prefatory surveys, as they are admittedly based on secondary sources. The paper dealing with the political and military organisation of the Rajputs has been incorporated in the hope that it will induce some student, to whom Rajput records may be available, to take up the study of Rajput institutions.

My grateful thanks are due to my teacher, Dr. Indubhusan Banerjee, M.A., PH.D., who encouraged me to publish this volume.

A. C. BANERJEE

TO

AMALENDU BANERJEE

who is yet

too young to read this book

CONTENTS

Subject	Page
Early History of the Guhilots	1
Struggle between Delhi and Mewar in the Thirteenth Century	41
Rana Sanga of Mewar	56
Political and Military Organisation of the Rajputs in the days of Tod	98
British Alliance with Mewar	142
British Alliance with Jaipur	188
British Alliance with Marwar	298
British Alliance with the Minor Rajput States ...	322

EARLY HISTORY OF THE GUHILOTS

Of all the Rajput clans the Guhilots of Mewar deserve the best attention of the historian. Tod very rightly observes that 'the Hindu tribes yield unanimous suffrage to the prince of Mewar' as 'the first of the thirty-six royal tribes'. and that it is almost the only state which has outlived eight centuries of foreign domination and in the very lands where it was founded in the eighth century. The glory of the Guhilots also consists in the long-continued and resolute resistance which they offered to the Muhammadans in spite of numerous reverses. 'In fact the heroism of this family and its sustained tenacious effort for the preservation of its independence and its religion are as stable as their fortune and dominion.'[1]

The reconstruction of the history of the Guhilots is, therefore, an unquestionable necessity, and much remains to be done in this sphere. The purpose of the present writer is to collect the necessary data, to discuss the more important views which have been so far advanced by various scholars, and to

1 Vaidya, *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. I, pp. 70-71.

make an attempt at preparing a coherent narrative of the early political history of the Guhilots. It is proposed here to deal with the period from the earliest times down to the close of the tenth century—the period of confusion and darkness, as a tolerably definite chronological survey of the political history of the later period may be found in Tod's work.

It is almost needless to mention that the greatest difficulty which confronts a student of the early history of the Guhilots is the paucity of materials. He finds few stones to lean upon and is bewildered when he goes through the endless series of speculations indulged in by various scholars. He can gather very little from Muhammadan sources which are so valuable for the succeeding period. He is even denied the help of Rajput chronicles to any considerable degree, because the chronicles composed in later periods, which were used by Tod, have been found to be absolutely unreliable. Very few indigenous records of real historical value have yet been discovered. But, fortunately, the discovery of some inscriptions has thrown a flood of light on this subject, and with their help it is now possible to arrive at certain definite conclusions. But until fresh materials are discovered a very large portion of the narrative must remain open to question, and necessarily, therefore, no dogmatic assertion can be made.

II

According to Tod, who followed the traditional account recorded in local chronicles, Kanak Sen, a descendant of Rāma, the famous epic hero belonging to the Solar dynasty, 'found his way into Saurashtra from Loh-kote' and established the kingdom of Valabhi in A.D. 144. In Kathiawar his descendants ruled for centuries, until the territory was sacked by invaders described as barbarians from the north (or Scythic), and the last chief, Śilāditya, was killed in 524 A.D. His son, Goha, established himself at Edur, where his successors, 'who were styled Gohilote, classically Grahilote, in time softened to Gehlote', continued to rule. Bappā was the son of Nagadit, the eighth prince of the line, who was killed by the Bhils.[1]

From the very nature of the sources on which Tod relied it follows that we must be very suspicious about the value of his account, particularly with reference to his genealogy and chronology. It is apparent that the bardic chronicles composed at a much later date, when the truth about the early days was clouded by mystery and tradition, may give us mere fragmen-

1 *Cf.* K. D. Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*. Vol. IIA, 1908, pp. 13-14.

tary legends, not authentic history, concerning this period.

In the first place, it has been established that the Maitraka princes of Valabhī were in no way connected with the legendary Solar race to which Rāma belonged. On the other hand, they can hardly be accepted as of Indian origin, and it has been very plausibly suggested by Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar that they were a foreign tribe allied with, if not a branch of, the Hūṇas.[1]

Secondly, Kanak Sen is an 'entirely mythical'[2] hero. It is now generally accepted that Bhaṭārka was the founder of the Maitraka ruling family.[3] In the genealogical list of the princes of Valabhī which has been prepared in accordance with epigraphic evidence, there is no mention of Kanak Sen, nor has he been identified with any other name in that list.[4]

1 D. R. Bhandarkar, 'Guhilots,' *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1909. *Cf.* N. Ray, 'The Maitrakas of Valabhi', *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, p. 457.

2 Crooke, Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. I, note.

3 N. Ray, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, p. 460. Smith, *Early History of India*, 1924, p. 332. C. M. Duff, *Chronology of India*, pp. 36, 67.

4 'It has been suggested that the name is a reminiscence of the connexion of.....Kanishka with Gujrat and Kathiawad.'

Thirdly, the dates of the establishment and destruction of the kingdom of Valabhī given by Tod must be rejected. Epigraphic evidence clearly shows that Bhaṭārka must have flourished in the last quarter of the fifth century A.D.[1] Buhler remarks, "The destruction of Valabhī is an event around which there hangs more than one mystery and the question when it happened is one of the most difficult to decide".[2] It has been ascertained, however, from epigraphic evidence that Śīlāditya VII, the last king of the dynasty, was alive in Gupta era 447 or A.D. 767. So the destruction of the kingdom may very probably be placed in the last quarter of the eighth century. It may be mentioned in this connection that the dynasty was probably overthrown by an expedition of the Arabs from Sind.[3]

Whether Bappā belonged to the family of the Maitrakas of Valabhī is an important and controversial problem. Mr. C. V. Vaidya believes that 'the Guhila family of Nagada in which Bappa was born was ... really connected with the Maitraka family of

(*Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 101). This suggestion seems to have no historical evidence in its support.

1 N. Ray, Smith and Duff, as cited on p. 4.

2 *Indian Antiquary*, 1872, Vol. I, p. 130.

3 Duff, p. 308. *Cf.* Crooke, Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I, p. 254, note. N. Ray, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, pp. 466-7.

Valabhī'.[1] But unfortunately he gives us no authority for this statement, except the implication that local tradition appears to him to be justified by historical parallels. At the same time, however, he seems to have a lurking suspicion that this connection may 'be looked upon as concocted by bards of the eighth and later centuries'.

'The traditional account given by Tod tracing the descent of the Rāṇā's family from Śīlāditya, the last prince of Valabhī, does not stand the test of modern epigraphic knowledge'.[2] The earliest available epigraph which refers to this traditional account is the Naralai inscription[3] of A.D. 1541. This testimony can hardly be accepted in preference to that of earlier inscriptions describing Bappā as a Brāhmaṇa.[4] Again, we have already seen that Śīlāditya VII, the last prince of Valabhī, was alive in A.D. 767. On the other hand, there is an inscription (found at Samoli on the Sirohi border) to show that Śīla, a king of the Guhilot dynasty, lived in V.S. 703 or A.D. 645. Mr. Vaidya admits this when he says that Śīla's inscription of the seventh century has been

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, p. 338.
2 Bhandarkar, 'Guhilots', *J.A.S.B.*, 1909.
3 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 141.
4 See below.

found.[1] The Atapura inscription of Saktikumāra, the earliest available epigraphic record regarding the genealogy of the Guhilot dynasty, shows that Śīla was the great-great-grand-son of Guhadatta or Guhila, the founder of the Guhilot dynasty. Guhadatta; therefore, must be carried to the middle of the sixth century, allowing roughly twenty years for each generation. Thus it was quite impossible for him to be descended from Śīlāditya VII.

It may be argued, however, that the Guhilot princes may have been descended from another Valabhī prince of an earlier date. Mr. Vaidya does not expressly say so; but it seems that he is somewhat inclined to favour such an idea when he speaks of the 'connection of Bappa's family with the royal family of Valabhī which was *then* ruling'.[2] But there is no evidence to substantiate such an assumption, and we are not justified in pushing a legend so far.

Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar expresses the view that 'the Mewar and Valabhī dynasties were somehow connected'. He holds that the Guhilots were Nāgar

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, p. 78.

2 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. III, p. 338. As we shall notice later on, Mr. Vaidya identifies Bappā with Guhadatta, and thinks that Śīla, whose date is referred to above, must be an *ancestor* of Bappā (pp. 342, 78).

Brāhmaṇas, and the Nāgar Brāhmaṇas were Maitrakas; and therefore the Mewar and Valabhī dynasties belonged to the same foreign tribe.[1] This theory will be noticed in detail later on. But it is clear that there is no evidence to prove that the Guhilot princes were descended from the Valabhī *princes*.

III

The next controversial question which demands our consideration is—Was Bappā a prince of foreign origin? The orthodox view of the Aryan origin of the Rajputs has been revived by Pandit G. H. Ojha and Mr. Vaidya. As they have employed historical arguments in support of their contention, it is necessary to examine them carefully.

Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar holds[2] that the Guhilots were originally Nāgar Brāhmaṇas, who were of foreign origin. This theory, indeed, now holds the ground, and it may be said that the great majority of scholars have accepted it.[3]

In the first place, certain verses in the Chitor and Achalesvara inscriptions (A.D. 1274 and 1285

1 'Guhilots', *J.A.S.B.*, 1909.
2 'Guhilots', *J.A.S.B.*, 1909.
3 Crooke, Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I, Introduction.

respectively)[1] and the Māmādeva *praśasti* distinctly show that Bappā was a Brāhmaṇa.

Secondly, the Chitor inscription calls Bappā a Brāhmaṇa who had come from Ānandapura. Now, 'the identification of Ānandapura with Vadnagar is based on irrefragable' grounds, because it is supported by the Vadnagar *praśasti* of the reign of Kumārapāla, the tradition current among Nāgar Brāhmaṇas, the Alina charters of A.D. 649 and 656, and many popular stories.[2]

Thirdly, the *Ekaliṅga-māhātmya* composed during the reign of Rānā Kumbhā says that Guhadatta, the founder of the Guhila race, was a Brāhmaṇa belonging to a Brāhmaṇa family emigrated from Ānandapura.[3] The same work again tells us that Vijayāditya, the ancestor of Guhadatta, was the ornament of the Nāgara race. These facts lend further support to the above argument, and prove that the Guhilots were known as Nāgar Brāhmaṇas in Rānā Kumbhā's reign.

1 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, pp. 75, 78, 85, 89. The Ekalingaji Inscription of A.D. 1489 describes Bappā as a *dvija*. (*Ibid.*, p. 118).

2 'Guhilots', *J.A.S.B.*, 1909.

3 The verse is quoted in *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 89.

Fourthly, we gather from the *Ekaliṅga-māhātmya*, the *Rasikapriyā* (a commentary by Rāṇā Kumbhā on Jayadeva's *Gīta-Govindam*) and a famous stanza often recited by the Brāhmaṇas of Mewar that the *gotra* of the Guhilots was *Vaijavāpa*. Now, 'that Vaijavāpa was one of the *gotras* amongst the Nāgaras as early as the thirteenth century can be proved by epigraphic evidence' including the *praśastis* of Nānāka found at Kodināra in the Amreli division of the Baroda State. 'There can be no reasonable doubt that Vaijavāpas are meant to be Nāgar Brāhmaṇas'.

Fifthly, the history of the tradition of the Brāhmaṇa origin of the Rāṇās' family is interesting. We have this tradition in the Atapura inscription of A.D. 977 and the Chatsu inscription of nearly the same period. It is clearly referred to in the Chitor inscription of A.D. 1274 and the Achalesvara inscription of A.D. 1285. The *Ekaliṅga-māhātmya* says that this tradition comes from 'the ancient poets' and thereby implies that it must have been current long before Rāṇā Kumbhā. Again, 'this origin was not forgotten by the people even to a late period'. Abul Fazl[1] and the *Khyāt* of Nensi (written in the seventeenth century) refer to this tradition and show that

1 *Ain-i-Akbari*, English translation, Jarrett, Vol. II, p. 269. This point has not been noticed by Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar.

as late as the middle of the seventeenth century it was alive in the memory of the people. A Persian work called *Ṭawārikh-Mālwa*, composed by Munsi Karim-ud-dīn in the middle of the nineteenth century, refers to this tradition.

It might seem that this is an invincible array of arguments, which solve the problem once for all. But there is a very wide difference of opinion with regard to the question. The theory of the Aryan descent of the Guhilots yet finds favour with some competent historians.

Pandit G. H. Ojha is of opinion that Bappā was a Kshatriya and not a Brāhmaṇa, and that he was a Solar race Kshatriya.[1] He relies, in the first place, on the disc of the sun found on the obverse of a golden coin which he ascribes to Bappā. Secondly, the expression *'Raghuvaṁśa-kīrtipiśunāh'* in Naravāhana's inscription of A.D. 971 is, according to him, a decisive proof that the Guhilots belonged to the Solar race.

These arguments, however, are not conclusive. With regard to the first point, Mr. S. C. Dutt has shown that it is very difficult to accept that particular coin as a genuine one issued by Bappā.[2] Even if we

1 *Cf.* Vaidya, *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 332-3.

2 *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, p. 797.

agree with Pandit Ojha in ascribing the coin to Bappā, it is clear that a mere disc of the sun found in only one coin cannot be accepted as a decisive proof in favour of the Solar descent of the Guhilots. The second point, however, is more important. We must agree with Mr. Vaidya[1] that 'Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar[2] has ... omitted to take into consideration the word *Raghuvaṁsa*'. We may even accept his interpretation of Naravāhana's inscription and hold with him that 'as early as the Naravāhana inscription ... the (Guhila) *vamsa* was ... known as *Raghuvaṁsa*'. But this only shows that in the later part of the tenth century A.D. the Guhilots had begun to advance the claim that they were Kshatriyas of the Solar race. Against this we know the fact that the tradition of their Brāhmaṇa origin was current during the whole period from 977 A.D. to the middle of the nineteenth century. Pandit Ojha has not been able to disprove the authenticity of the verses relating to this tradition in the Chitor and Achalesvara inscriptions and in the *Ekaliṅga-māhātmya*. It is, therefore, impossible to prefer Naravāhana's inscription to all other epigraphic, literary and traditional accounts.

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, p. 333.

2 *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XXII, p. 167.

Mr. Vaidya has tried to vanquish Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar's arguments with great skill and knowledge. He is a champion of the theory of the Solar Kshatriya origin of the Guhilots. It is necessary to examine his points in detail.

First, he holds that the Chitor and Achalesvara inscriptions must be rejected on the strength of the earlier inscription of Naravāhana and the gold coin attributed to Bappā.

Secondly, he does not accept Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar's interpretation of the Chatsu inscription. There he finds no implication to the effect that Bhatripatta (a Guhilot prince) was a Brāhmaṇa.

Thirdly, during that period the Brāhmaṇas could marry Kshatriya wives and their progeny was in that case treated as a Kshatriya. So even if Bappā was a Brāhmaṇa, that could not make the whole Guhilot family a Brāhmaṇa family.

Fourthly, he thinks that Ānandapura in the Atapura inscription means the town of Nagahrada and not Vadnagar. So a Brāhmaṇa coming from Ānandapura need not have been a Nāgar Brāhmaṇa. The word '*Mahīdeva*' in the same inscription means a king and not, as Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar says, a Brāhmaṇa.[1]

1 All these points are elaborated in *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 332-7.

Fifthly, 'there is no contemporary evidence to show that Bappā Rawal was a Nāgar Brahmin'.[1]

It is not very difficult to meet these arguments. With regard to the first point, we have already seen that Naravāhana's inscription does not deserve so much importance as Pandit Ojha and Mr. Vaidya attach to it. The value of the gold coin has also been examined. Secondly, it is true that if we take the Chatsu inscription as an isolated record, we do not find in it any distinct statement regarding the Brāhmaṇa origin of the Guhilots. But we have seen that there are other inscriptions which explicitly mention them as Brāhmaṇas, and it is clear that indirect references in the Chatsu inscription should be interpreted in conformity with those statements. Mr. Vaidya's third argument is a novel and interesting one. He has not given us any conclusive evidence to show that the issue of a Brāhmaṇa father and a Kshatriya mother was regarded as a Kshatriya. But, even if we concede this point, he does not point out definitely how this principle worked with regard to the Guhilot dynasty. Mr. Vaidya's contention harmonizes the two traditions which existed side by side—one about the Brāhmaṇa origin and another about the Kshatriya origin; but it is entirely based on supposition. More-

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, p. 84.

over, if Mr. Vaidya admits that Bappā was a Brāhmaṇa, he is led to admit the foreign origin of the Guhilots, because, as we shall see below, his arguments that Bappā was not a *Nāgar* Brāhmaṇa, and that *Nāgar* Brāhmaṇas were not foreigners, do not stand scrutiny. Fourthly, the evidences which Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar has adduced to justify the identification of Ānandapura with Vadnagar are decisive. Even Pandit Ojha agrees with him and holds that Ānandapura Brāhmaṇa means *Nāgar* Brāhmaṇa. The real meaning of the word *'Mahīdeva'* (that is, Brāhmaṇa) is clear from this. Lastly, it is true that 'there is no contemporary evidence to show that Bappā Rawal was a Nagar Brahmin.' But it is also true that there is no contemporary evidence to show that he was not a *Nāgar* Brāhmaṇa. When we have only later evidences at our disposal, it is better to accept the preponderance of views. It will be seen that Mr. Vaidya says nothing about Dr. Bhandarkar's remark on the *gotra* of the Guhilots.

From all these considerations we are led to the conclusion that the Guhilots were originally *Nāgar* Brāhmaṇas. It is necessary now to see whether they were really foreigners, that is, whether Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar's opinion that 'the *Nāgar* Brāhmaṇas were Maitrakas who...were a foreign race'[1] is correct. Mr.

1 'Guhilots', *J.A.S.B.*, 1909.

Vaidya says that 'nobody will agree with Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar in holding that Mitra is another name of Mihara and, therefore, of Mer, the well-known outcast people of Kathiawar.'[1] He considers it unnecessary 'to write a note on this subject refuting the flimsy arguments of Dr. Bhandarkar and show that Nāgars are not Mers.' It is true that Dr. Bhandarkar's arguments about this point are not very strong. But his suggestions are plausible, and considering the circumstantial facts and the cumulative effect of other evidences, we may tentatively adhere to his conclusion.

We may refer in passing to Tod's view about the 'alleged Persian extraction of the Ranas of Mewar.'[2] Abul Fazl, the only authority who mentions this point, says that the Rānā 'pretends a descent from Noshirwan the Just.'[3] Tod deems 'it morally impossible that the Rānās should have their lineage from any male branch of the Persian house,' but he 'would not equally assert' that the Rānās may not have been descended from a female branch of the Sassanians. Crooke says, 'There is no real evidence of the Persian descent of the Rānās.'[4]

1 *History of Medieval Hindu Indra*, Vol. II, p. 84.
2 Tod, Vol. I, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. III.
3 *Ain-i-Akbari*, English translation, Jarrett, Vol. II, p. 268.
4 Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I. p. 278, note.

IV

We are now concerned with the problem of chronology. The dates of Bappā's birth, accession and abdication must now be considered.

According to Tod, Bappā was born in V.S. 769 (A.D. 713), he occupied Chitor in V.S. 784 (A.D. 728) and abdicated in V.S. 820 (A.D. 764). The domestic annals give the year 191 as the date of Bappā's birth; and relying on certain Jain annals Tod has concluded that this date is counted from the year of the sack of Valabhī. Bappā is said to have been 15 years of age when he ascended the throne of Chitor; so his accession must be placed in 728 A.D. We have epigraphic evidence to show that the Mori dynasty was reigning in Chitor in V.S. 770 (A.D. 713). Tradition gives V.S. 820 (A.D. 764) as the date of Bappā's abdication.

It is superfluous to add that we must be very cautious about this account. The unreliability of the sources of Tod's information raises a suspicion about the historical value of his dates. It is absurd to say that Bappā ascended the throne of Chitor at the tender age of 15, for we know that his accession was an usurpation and most probably had violence at its back. We must, therefore, turn to other available pieces of evidence.

Pandit G. H. Ojha is of opinion that Bappā

abdicated in A.D. 753. The learned scholar infers that he could not have ascended the throne of Chitor earlier than A.D. 713, the date of the inscription of Raja Man, the Mori prince of Chitor. So Bappā's life may be held to have extended roughly over the first half of the eighth century. Pandit Ojha places his birth about A.D. 712 and his accession about A.D. 734.

This view has been criticized by Mr. Vaidya.[1] He tries to refute Pandit Ojha's arguments by various details, and finally takes shelter under the excuse that the dates given by him do not fit in with the tradition that Bappā ruled long and abdicated at old age.

We may now refer to Mr. Vaidya's own views. He holds that the traditional date of Bappā's abdication (V.S. 820 = A.D. 763) seems compatible with Raja Man Mori's inscription dated in V.S. 770 (A.D. 713). Bappā's accession is, therefore, to be placed between A.D. 763 and A.D. 713. He thinks that the Arab incursion on the Mori kingdom must have taken place sometime before the date of the Navasari inscription (738 A.D.). As Bappā fought as the general of the Mori prince during this event, his own accession to the throne of Chitor may be placed about

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 338-342, 75.

740 A.D., or even earlier, about 730 A.D. If Bappā was comparatively young at his accession, his birth may be placed about 700 A.D.

According to Dr. Bhandarkar,[1] two *Ekaliṅga-māhātmyas* composed during the reigns of Rāṇā Kumbhā and his son Rāṇā Rāyamalla give V.S. 810 as Bappā's date and indicate that 'this was the year of his bestowing the royalty on his son and becoming an ascetic.' The learned professor is of opinion that this date (V.S. 810 = A.D. 753) for Bappā 'deserves credence.'

It will be seen, therefore, that there is no substantial difference of opinion among these scholars about Bappā's dates. There is disagreement with regard to the dates of particular events; but it is agreed that Bappā's life may be taken to have roughly covered the first half of the eighth century A.D. This proposition must be taken as a tolerable background for the reconstruction of the early history of the Guhilots. We may only expect that some epigraphic or numismatic evidence will be discovered in future and will set at rest all uncertain controversies and vague speculations.

1 'Atpur Inscription of Saktikumara', *Indian Antiquary*, 1910.

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V

We now come to discuss the all-important question of Bappā's place in the genealogy of the Guhilots.

The word 'Bappā' requires an explanation. It is clear that it is not a proper name, though Mr. Vaidya takes it to be so.[1] Tod remarks, "Bappā is not a proper name, it signifies merely a 'child'." Crooke suggests that the word is the old Prakrit form of 'bāp' and means 'father'.[2] Mr. Vaidya himself admits that the word 'originally means father'. Pandit G. H. Ojha also thinks that the term and its variation originally signified 'father' and were later on used in a sense of reverence.[3]

The title 'Rāwal' is generally associated with Bappā. There is a considerable element of difficulty and uncertainty with regard to the true meaning of this term. The Rayasagar inscription of A.D. 1676 gives the fantastic explanation that it was "formed of the first letters of the words *rājyatipurnatva* (fullness of kingdom), *varatva* (supremacy) and *lakshmīmayatva* (opulence)."[4] Dr. Bhandarkar suggests that

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India,* Vol. II, p. 76.
2 Tod's *Rajasthan,* Vol. I, p. 261, note.
3 *Cf. Indian Historical Quarterly,* 1928, p. 797.
4 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar,* p. 151.

'Rāwal' means an ascetic of a particular sect and Bappā is so called because he belonged to that sect.[1] Mr. Vaidya accepts his proposition that 'Bappā sometimes means a Bava or recluse,' but holds that 'Rāwal' means a small Rāo or prince.[2] Crooke suggests that 'Rāwal' comes from the Sanskrit word '*rājakula*' which means royal family—a rather ingenious explanation.[3] Now, it is a fact that the earlier kings of Chitor were known as Rāwals and the later kings from Hāmir were called Rāṇās. Abul Fazl remarks, 'The chief of the state was formerly called Rawal, but for a long time past has been known as Rana.'[4] The Rayasagar inscription of A.D. 1676 says that Rāhapa, son of Karna, "went, by the order of king Karna...to Mandora, conquered Mokalasī and brought him (prisoner).....to his father. Karna, depriving him of his title of Rāṇā,.....transferred it to (his) dear Rāhapa."[5] This inscription is so inaccurate about Samara Simha, who is described as Rāhapa's grand-

1 *Indian Antiquary*, 1910.
2 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 72, 76.
3 Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I, p. 249, note.
4 *Ain-i-Akbari*, English Translation by Jarrett, Vol. II, p. 268.
5 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 154.

father, that the details it contains can hardly be accepted as authentic. Tod says that Rāhup, a Guhilot prince of the early thirteenth century, defeated the 'Purihar prince of Mundore' who was called Rāṇā, and himself assumed that title. But it is well-known that the Mewar family was divided into two branches towards the end of the twelfth century; the one with the title of Rāwal ruled at Chitor and the other with the title of Rāṇā ruled at Sesoda.[1] After 'Ala-ud-dīn's capture of Chitor the younger branch, the Rāṇās, became the head of the Guhilot clan. Mr. Vaidya remarks, 'The later kings were called Ranas as they came from a minor branch, Rana meaning a subordinate king as in Himalayan states. But the name Rana, being taken by the illustrious kings of Udepur, now bears a higher meaning in Rajputana.'[2]

Let us now turn to the question of Bappā's place in the genealogy of the Guhilots. We have seen that Bappā is not a proper name; it is only a title of honour. As Dr. Bhandarkar points out, 'Bappā does not appear to be the name of a merely legendary

1 The Rayasagar inscription of A.D. 1676 says that Rāhapa was called Sisodiya from his formerly residing in the city of Sisoda. (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 154).

2 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. III, p. 155, note.

or a later prince'.[1] With what early prince is he to be identified?

We have four very important inscriptions giving the early genealogy of the Guhilot princes. These are the Atapura inscription (V.S. 1034 = A.D. 977), the Chitor inscription (V.S. 1313 = A.D. 1274), the Achalesvara inscription (V.S. 1342 = A.D. 1285), and the Ranpur inscription (V.S. 1496 = A.D. 1439). Of these, the Atapura inscription of 977 A.D. (of a Guhilot prince named Saktikumāra) is the earliest and the completest record. It is, therefore, the most authoritative and useful source for our purpose. The genealogy of the Guhilots as given in these inscriptions is reproduced below.

	Atapura list	*Chitor list*	*Achalesvara list*	*Ranpur list*
		Bappā	Bappā	Bappā
1	Guhadatta	Guhila	Guhila	Guhila
2	Bhoja	Bhoja	Bhoja	Bhoja
3	Mahendra (1)	...	...	...
4	Nāga	...	...	...
5	Śīla	Śīla	Śīla	Śīla
6	Aparājita	...	...	...
7	Mahendra (2)	...	...	...
8	Kālabhoja	Kālabhoja	Kālabhoja	Kālabhoja
9	Khommāna (1)	...	...	...
10	Mattata	Manttata	...	...

1 'The Atpur Inscription of Saktikumara,' *Indian Antiquary*, 1910.

	Atapura list	*Chitor list*	*Achalesvara list*	*Ranpur list*
11	Bhartripatta (1)	Bhartribhata	Bhartribhata	Bhartribhata
12	Simha	Athasimha[1]	Simha	Simha
13	Khommāna (2)	...	...	...
14	Mahāyaka	Mahāyaka	Mahāyika	Mahāyaka
15	Khommāna (3)	Khumāna	Khummāna	Khummāna
16	Bhartripatta (2)	...	...	...
17	Allaṭa	Allaṭa	Allaṭa	Allaṭa
18	Naravāhana	Naravāhana	Naravāhana	Naravāhana
19	Śālivāhana	...	...	...
20	Śaktikumāra	Śaktikumāra	Śaktikumāra	Saktikumāra

Naravāhana's inscription[2] of 971 A.D. seems to have contained a list of Guhilot princes, but it is so defaced that only the names of Guhila, Bappā and Naravāhana can be read. Here Bappā is described as "the moon among the kings of the Guhila dynasty." Hence he should be identified with some one among the successors of Guhadatta.

We have already seen that Bappā's life covered the first half of the eighth century A.D. Now, we have a few dates from epigraphic evidence: Śīla, V.S. 703 (A.D. 646); Aparājita, V.S. 718 (A.D. 661); Allaṭa, V.S. 1008 and 1010 (A.D. 951, 953); Naravāhana, V.S. 1028 (A.D. 971); and Śakti-

1 The text gives Atha Simha, but the English translation gives Agha Simha. (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, pp. 76, 80).

2 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, pp. 70-72.

kumāra, V.S. 1034 (A.D. 977). These are the data on which our attempt at identifying Bappā with any of the princes named in the above lists must be based.

Dr. Bhandarkar identifies Bappā with Khommāna I and his arguments[1] may be thus summed up: The date for Aparājita being 661 A.D. and for Allaṭa 953 A.D.[2], we have 292 years for 12 generations. Thus we get an average of 24 1/3 years to each generation. The difference between 753 A.D., the date of Bappā, and 661 A.D., the date of Aparājita, is 92 years. Bappā may, therefore, be placed in the fourth generation from Aparājita. So he must be identified with Khommāna I.

Pandit G. H. Ojha identifies Bappā with Kālabhoja. He objects to Dr. Bhandarkar's view principally on two grounds: first, traditions in Mewar describe Khommāna as Bappā's son; secondly, Dr. Bhandarkar's average of 25 years for each reign is questionable.

Prof. S. Dutt,[3] however, points out the futility of these arguments. He shows that there are con-

1 *Indian Antiquary*, 1910.

2 Sarnesvar Inscription of Allaṭa, 953 A.D. (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, pp. 67-69).

3 *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, p. 797.

flicting traditions, some even identifying Bappā with Śīla. He also says that Dr. Bhandarkar's calculation of 24 years as an average is based upon an accurate examination of the period. Prof. Dutt further gives three good reasons in support of Dr. Bhandarkar's view. In the first place, Bappā having acquired celebrity by his conquest of Chitor, it was natural that later rulers should feel pride in describing themselves as his descendants.[1] In the Ekalinga inscription of A.D. 1489 the writer describes his theme as "the greatness of the Khumāna Kings."[2] The last king bearing the name Khommāna flourished about 600 years before the composition of this epigraph. It is clear, therefore, that if the greatness of Mewar had not been associated with a king of that name, our poet would not have utilised the name in designating the dynasty. Again, Tod observes, "At Oodipur, if you make a false step, or even sneeze, you hear the ejaculation of 'Khoman aid you.'"[3] This continuous tradi-

1 This may account for the fact that, while Naravāhana's inscription describes Bappā as a member of the Guhila family (and therefore, as one of Guhila's successors), the Chitor, Achalesvara and Ranpur inscriptions describe Guhila as Bappā's son.

2 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 123. Prof. Dutt has not noted this point.

3 *Rajasthan*, Annals of Mewar, Chap. IV.

tion undoubtedly proves Khommāna's greatness in the history of the family. Secondly, inscriptions of the fifteenth century (like the Ranpur inscription of 1439 A.D.) describe the Rāṇās as the descendants of Bappā, but in earlier inscriptions (like the Hastikundi inscription of 996 A.D. and the Abu inscription of 1285 A.D.) the rulers of Mewar often describe themselves as descendants of Khommāna. Thirdly, of the first twenty princes of the dynasty as many as three bore the name of Khommāna, and a big historical poem dealing with the exploits of the Guhilots is known as *Khommāna Rāsā*. The cumulative effect of all these evidences is to prove that Bappā is really to be identified with Khommāna I.

It remains to dispose of the contention of Mr. Vaidya that Bappā is to be identified with Guhadatta, the first name mentioned in the Atapura inscription.[1] Obviously Mr. Vaidya's zeal for supporting orthodox traditions has led him to ignore all epigraphic, literary and circumstantial evidences. We know that Śīla and Aparājita, the fifth and sixth descendants of

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 78, 86, 342-348.

Guhadatta, lived in 646 A.D. and 661 A.D. respectively. The date of Guhadatta must, therefore, lie in the earlier part of the sixth century. How, then, can he be identified with Bappā who, according to Mr. Vaidya himself, was born about 700 A.D.? The learned author tries to explain this difficulty by saying that 'the two kings Śīla and Aparājita whose inscriptions of the seventh century have been found must be considered to be Bappā's ancestors,' and that these names in the Atapura record refer to 'descendants having the same names.' This assertion, with no evidence to support it, will convince nobody. Again, if Bappā is identified with Guhadatta, we have twenty generations from him to Śaktikumāra. Then we get 277 years for 20 generations because Bappā, says Mr. Vaidya, was born about 700 A.D. and the date of the Atapura inscription of Śaktikumāra is 977 A.D. This gives us an average of about 14 years for each generation—an absurd estimate. Mr. Vaidya has tried to solve this difficulty by saying that 'it may be that this line of kings had a specially short average or it may be that the Atapura inscription repeats some kings wrongly or brings together kings of different branches who were

contemporaries.' But here he clearly transgresses the limits of possibility and. without adducing any concrete example, doubts the statements of the Ata-pura inscription, the authenticity of which has been confirmed by all the inscriptions hitherto discovered. Mr. Vaidya makes much of 'tradition'; but what does 'tradition' really mean? Pandit Ojha admits that there are many conflicting traditions, some identifying Bappā with Śīla and some with Kāla-bhoja, for example. This clearly shows that tradi-tions cannot be cited as decisive historical evidence in deciding this point. Mr. Vaidya remarks that if Bappā is not identified with Guhadatta. 'the memo-rable exploit of Bappā in founding an independent kingdom of Chitod goes not to the founder of the family but to a descendant many degrees below!' His meaning is not quite clear. The supporters of the identification of Bappā with Khommāna I believe that 'the memorable exploit of Bappā in founding an independent kingdom of Chitod' does go to Bappā and not to 'a descendant many degrees below.' According to them, the ancestors of Bappā, that is, Khommāna I, from Guhadatta down to Kālabhoja, were not princes of Chitor. The tradition that Bappā

was the founder of the family really means that he established the family in Chitor, not that he was the very first man in the family. He is the founder of the family in the same sense as Shivaji was the founder of his family. In a word, he was the founder of the greatness of the family. This is the most natural interpretation of the epithet *'Guhila-gotranarendrachandra'* in Naravāhana's inscription of 971 A.D. This explanation is supported by the fact that in earlier inscriptions the princes of Mewar describe themselves as descendants of Khommāna. Mr. Vaidya's view, therefore, is entirely based on misconceptions.

VI.

We have already given the genealogy of the Guhilot princes from the earliest times to almost the close of the tenth century A.D. We now proceed, therefore, to discuss the available data in order to reconstruct an outline of their history during this period.

From the difficulty in collecting the genealogy and chronology of this dynasty which we have experienced, it must have become apparent that the

enumeration of events and achievements must be more difficult still. According to Tod, there is only one central event of importance—the contest with the Muhammadans; and he gives us an account of this long-continued and fierce struggle.[1] Mr. Vaidya accepts Tod's story and observes, '.....the kings of this line, however diverse their fortune, were, each and all, chivalrous and virtuous, lovers of independence and supporters of their.....faith. Indeed we may say that the sublime character of the hero-god Rama, as a man and a king whom they look upon as their progenitor, still exercises its influence over the princes of this line...In fact...the Guhilot kings of Chitore fought hard-fought battles with foreigners, so much so that the whole country was strewn with flesh and the *meda* (fat) of the evil warriors slain and thus acquired the name Medapata[2] (undoubtedly a poetic fancy suggested by the name Medapata, Prakrita Mewad, but yet proving the terrible battles which the heroic Rajputs and the equally heroic

1 *Rajasthan,* Annals of Mewar, Chap. IV.

2 "This country which was, in battle, totally submerged in the dripping fat (*medas*) of wicked people by Bappaka.....bears the name of Sri Medapata."—Achalesvara Inscription of A.D. 1285. (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar,* pp. 88-89).

Arabs fought on this soil)'.[1] The paucity of materials prevents us from examining the historical value of these statements. It may be significant that, although the Chitor, Achalesvara and Ranpur inscriptions attribute many victories to Bappā and his successors, there is not a single reference to the Turushkas,[2] who are specifically mentioned in some later inscriptions in connection with later rulers of the dynasty.[3] In any case, it is difficult to agree with Mr. Vaidya in describing Bappā, a petty local ruler, as 'the Charles Martel of India against the rock of whose valour the eastern tide of Arab conquest was dashed to pieces in India'.[4]

Tod has recounted some of the strange legends which have gathered round the life and history of Bappā Rāwal.[5] It is natural that ancient literature and tradition should give us wonderful anecdotes about the

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India,* Vol. II, pp. 77, 79.

2 The Chitor Inscription says that Mattata was victorious over Malwa. The Achalesvara inscription attributes to Kālabhoja victories over Choda and Karnāta.

3 See, for instance, the Ranpur Inscription and the Ekalinga Inscription of A.D. 1489. (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar,* pp. 102, 108, 115).

4 *History of Medieval Hindu India,* Vol. II, p. 72.

5 *Rajasthan,* Vol. I, Annals of Mewar, Chap. II, IV.

achievements of this hero who is, according to all available versions, the founder of the 'regal splendour' and greatness of the Guhilot dynasty. But, as Hume remarks, 'poets, though they disfigure the most certain history by their fictions and use strange liberties with truth when they are the sole historians, have commonly some foundation for their wildest exaggeration'.

We hear that Bappā "had his capital at Nagada, about twelve miles to the north of the present city of Udaipur ... he ousted Man Singh (of Mori or Maurya clan of Rajputs ruling at Chitor) in 734 and ruled in his stead taking the title of Rawal. Bappa was the real founder of the state, for while his predecessors enjoyed limited possession in the wild region bordering on the Aravallis in the west and south-west, he extended his possessions to the east by seizing Chitor and the neighbouring territory".[1] This is the minimum uncontroversial estimate of Bappā Rāwal's achievements.

We may well believe that Bappā's predecessors were petty local princes. In his youth he was a

1 Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. 2A, p. 14.

'prince among Bhils with whom he freely associated and whom he disciplined and engaged in service for his own preferment'. The Navasari Chaulukya grant[1] (739-40 A.D.) tells us that the Arabs had attacked the Maurya, who may be identified with the Mori King of Chitor. An inscription of Man, a Mori prince of Chitor, is dated in 713 A.D. We may believe that the Arab invasion referred to in the above grant took place in his reign. We may accept Mr. Vaidya's suggestion that Bappā was probably a *Sāmanta* (vassal) of that King.[2] At any rate, it is likely that Bappā was the leader of the Mori forces opposed to the Arabs, and he distinguished himself by a victory. This exploit must have given him a great position in the court of the Mori King. Abul Fazl remarks that "his daring was so conspicuous that he became in favour with the Raja and a trusted minister of state".[3]

The next step was Bappā's accession to the throne of Chitor. How he occupied Chitor is almost an insoluble problem. According to Tod, the revolted

1 *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 465.
2 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, p. 73.
3 *Ain-i-Akbari*, Jarrett, Vol. II, p. 268.

sardārs of Chitor deposed the Mori King and placed the crown on Bappā's head. Mr. Vaidya does not believe in this tradition. He thinks that the then Mori King died childless and Bappā became the King of Chitor.[1] Abul Fazl's version is this: "On the death of the Raja, his four nephews disputed the succession, but they eventually decided to resign their pretensions in favour of Bappā and to acknowledge his authority. Bappā, however, declined their offer. It happened one day that the finger of one of these four brothers began to bleed, and he drew with the blood the ceremonial mark of installation on the forehead of Bappā and the others also concurred in accepting his elevation. He then assumed the sovereignty ... The ungrateful monarch put the four brothers to death".[2]

Strangely enough, these legends differ materially from epigraphic evidence in one material respect. According to the Achalesvara inscription of A.D. 1285, Bappā satisfied a sage named Hārita-rāsi by constant attendance and service, and received from him "the lustre of a Kshatriya" as well as "regal fortunes". This story is corroborated by the Ekaliṅga

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. II, pp. 73-74.
2 *Ain-i-Akbari*, Jarrett, Vol. II, pp. 268-269.

inscription of A.D. 1489 and the Rayasagar inscription[1] of A.D. 1676. This story is intimately connected with the question of Bappā's caste, and can hardly be overlooked. It is also significant that in early inscriptions Bappā is always associated with Nāgahrida; the earliest available epigraphic evidence of his connection with Chitor is found in the Rayasagar inscription. Nensi's *Khyāt*, composed in the seventeenth century, seems to imply that the city of Atapur, founded by Allaṭa, became the capital from his reign. If Bappā really occupied Chitor, why should his successors leave it in favour of an inferior strategic position? In the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding the establishment of Bappā's rule in Chitor.

Bappā 'had a numerous progeny'[2] and died at a very ripe old age, probably after abdicating his throne. Nothing else is definitely known about his political life.

1 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, pp. 89, 124, 152.

2 The Ekalingaji Inscription of A.D. 1489 says that he "married by force of his own power, daughters of many kings." (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 124).

"The close of Bappa's career", says Tod, "is the strangest part of the legend ... Advanced in years, he abandoned his children and his country, carried his arms west to Khorasan, and there established himself, and married new wives from among the 'barbarians', by whom he had a numerous offspring". It is impossible to accept this story. Crooke says, ' ... the whole story is a mere legend, a tale like that of the mysterious disappearance of Romulus and other kings'.[1] 'It has been suggested that this legend is mixed up with that of Bappa or Sila of Valabhi, the story of his retreat to Iran representing the latter being carried as a captive to Mansura on the fall of Valabhi ... '.[2] Tradition records that in his old age Bappā abdicated in favour of his son and became a Saivite recluse. The Ekaliṅga inscription of 971 A.D. supports the latter statement.[3]

1 Tod's *Rajasthan*, Vol. I, p. 268, note.
2 *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, Part I, p. 94, note 2.
3 D. R. Bhandarkar, *Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XXII.

VII

It is very probable that the Guhilots were vassals of the Gurjara-Pratihāras during the eighth and ninth centuries A.D.[1] Dr. R. C. Majumdar points out that a Guhilot prince named Harsharāja was a vassal of Bhhoja, the great Gurjara-Pratihāra emperor, and fought many times on his behalf.[2] We do not, however, find this name in any of the inscriptions which give genealogical information. But as Bhoja's reign extended from about 840 to 890 A.D.,[3] we may suppose that either Mahāyaka or Khommāna III might have been the Guhilot prince here referred to, although there is no positive evidence to support this assumption. The Nilgunda inscription of Amoghavarsha I (866 A.D.)[4] states that the Rāstrakuta monarch conquered the hill fort of Chitrakuta, which has been identified with Chitor by Mr. Vaidya and Dr. H. C. Ray (though Mr. R. D. Banerjee identified it with the ancient Chitrakuta referred to in the Rāmāyana).

1 S. Dutt, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, p. 798.
2 *Gurjara-Pratihāras.*
3 *Ibid.*, and Smith, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1909.
4 *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. VI, p. 100.

It was Bhatripaṭṭa II who probably shook off the allegiance to the Gurjara-Pratihāras. The Atapura inscription describes him as 'the ornament of the three worlds' and says that he married a princess named Mahālakshmī of the Rāstrakuta dynasty.[1] It is possible that this matrimonial alliance indicated the reconciliation of the former vassals of the Gurjara-Pratihāras with their hereditary enemies, the Rāstrakutas. From this time onward the history of the Guhilots is closely connected with that of other Rajput princes. Munja-rāja, the Paramāra king of Malwa (973-97 A.D.), is believed to have attacked Mewar and ruled it for a time.[2] The Guhilots were assisted by the Chaulukyas of Gujarat, and epigraphic evidence shows that matrimonial alliances were concluded between these two dynasties.[3] The Atapura inscription says that Allaṭa married Hariyadevī, daughter of a Hūṇa prince. From the same source we learn that Naravāhana's queen was of the Chāhamāna family and a daughter of Jejaya. The Chitorgadh inscription tells us that Śaktikumāra destroyed

1 *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. III, pp. 30 ff.
2 S. Dutt, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928, p. 798.
3 *Annual Report, Rajputana Museum*, 1914.

the enemies of religion, terrible like *daityas*. This, as Mr. Vaidya suggests,[1] is a plain reference to the Muhammadans. Śaktikumāra's known date is 977 A.D., the date of the Atapura inscription. It is quite possible, therefore, that he might have joined Jaipal, the Hindu Shahi ruler of the Punjab, against Sabuktigin.[2]

These facts clearly indicate that the Guhilots were no longer small local princes in the hilly regions of Rajputana. They had risen in power and prestige and had begun to play a part in the international politics of their age.

1 *History of Medieval Hindu India*, Vol. III, p. 154.

2 When Sabuktigin captured many towns in Lamaghān, "Jaipal in retaliation organised a league of Hindū rājās against Sabuktigin and marched on Ghazna at the head of a great host which is said to have been swelled to the enormous number of 100,000 cavalry and infantry by the contingents furnished by the rājās of Northern India."—Nazim, *Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna*, p. 30.

STRUGGLE BETWEEN DELHI AND MEWAR IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

With the opening of the eighth century of the Christian era commenced a long series of political crusades by the followers of the Arabian Prophet against the infidels of Hindustan. Six centuries elapsed before they penetrated into Southern India and a real Turkish empire was established in the country. The Muhammadan conquest of India was in no way an easy walk over; the broken fragments of Hindu power fought a strenuous fight against the aliens, with failures generally, but not as fruitlessly as is usually supposed. It was upon the Rajputs that the supremely difficult task of playing the champion of India fell; and every student of sober history and every lover of historical romance must be familiar with the story of their achievements.

Apart from all romantic flourishes, however, there is the hard historical interpretation of the conflicts between the Muhammadans and the Rajputs. When, after the defeat and death of Prithvīrāj, the

great Chāhamāna ruler, the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi came to be founded, the Sultāns at once began aggressive campaigns against the Rajputs, and this policy was so vitally important that rulers up to the time of Aurangzeb had to continue it. One of the central movements of medieval Indian History is the struggle between the Muhammadan rulers of Delhi and the princes of Rajputana. The continuity of the movement could not have been assured but for the pressure of certain essential and fundamental conflicts in the interests of these two groups of rulers; we cannot explain it only by referring to the ambition or caprice of individuals. No doubt the Muhammadan monarchs aimed at the expansion of their territory, and for this purpose conquests were necessary. But this can hardly be a sufficient explanation of their repeated expeditions against the Rajputs. Rajputana, covered by hills and desert and having too little of fertility, was not a very alluring object to any conqueror. Then, again, there was the factor of religion. The '*mlechchhas*' and the 'infidels' were too divergent to be reconciled at that time; while the Muhammadans wanted to spread the religion of the Prophet. the Hindus had to defend their gods and

temples. But this also is not by itself an adequate explanation. Alā-ud-dīn[1] and Akbar had banished the consideration of religious sentiments from the sphere of active politics, and yet they had to direct their special attention to Rajputana. It is clear, therefore, that while territorial ambition and religious considerations must have to a great extent influenced the policy pursued by the Muhammadan sovereigns of Delhi towards the Rajput princes, yet there must have been some other, and perhaps more important, reasons which led them to continue interminable hostilities against the desert princes.

The orthodox theory that the physical geography of a country exercises much influence upon its historical development has some truth in it. From the

1 Amir Khusrav says that Alā-ud-dīn's aim in sending Malik Kafur to Dvarasamudra and Ma'bar was 'to spread the light of the Muhammadan religion' in 'that distant country,' and the poet's eloquent description of the destruction of idols and temples and the slaughter of idolaters may appear to lend some support to this view. But Baranī, who was by no means less orthodox than the celebrated poet, does not say that the Sultān was inspired by crusading zeal. Alā-ud-dīn's real aim seems to have been secular rather than religious. (See the present writer's note in *Indian Culture*, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 351).

military point of view in particular, Geography is almost the very foundation of History, because political history is largely concerned with wars, and wars and Geography are very closely connected. The expansion of States very often assumes peculiar character owing to geographical considerations. On close analysis it will be found that the root of the conflicts between the Muhammadan rulers of Delhi and the Rajput princes lay really in the peculiar geographical position of Rajputana and its importance from the military point of view.

The centre of north-western India is occupied by Rajputana. Through Rajputana, diagonally from the south-west north-eastward, there runs the range of the Aravalli Hills for a distance of fully 300 miles. There are two main divisions, the north-west and the south-east of the Aravallis. The former stretches from Sind on the west, northward along the southern Punjab frontier, to near Delhi on the north-east. As a whole, this tract is sandy, ill-watered and unproductive. Within this division lies the great Indian desert, prolonged seaward by the salt, and partly tidal, marsh of the Rann of Cutch. The second division contains the higher and more fertile regions, intersected by exten-

sive hill ranges and traversed by considerable rivers. Within this division lies Mewar.

Delhi stands on the west bank of the Jumna at the northern extremity of the Aravallis, just where the invading forces from the north-west came one after another. If the invaders wanted to proceed to western India and the Deccan, they had to march through Rajputana. As the north-western side of the Aravallis was unfit for the march of armies, they had to proceed through the south-eastern portion of the country, within which was situated the territory of Mewar. When, therefore, the rulers of Delhi wanted to extend their power in Gujarat and in the Deccan, they had to encounter opposition from the Rajputs of Mewar, who, it is easy to see, would not allow them to pass through their State unmolested. It was also necessary for the rulers of Delhi to crush the Rajputs before trying to extend their authority over Gujarat and the Deccan, because it would have been extremely unsafe to leave in the rear such powerful princes who might attack them when they were engaged in southern campaigns. That this is not reading subtle modern meaning into crude medieval considerations is clear from various statements in Muslim historical

works.[1] Firishta[2] makes it clear that Alā-ud-dīn was inspired by similar strategical motives when he personally proceeded to conquer Chitor in 1303 for facilitating the progress of his army in the Deccan.

In the second place, we should not overlook the very important fact that Delhi lay within about 300 miles from Chitor, and as Ajmer was included within the Sultanate, the boundaries of the dominions of Delhi and the territories of the Guhilots ran side by side. It was not possible for the Muhammadan rulers of Delhi to tolerate the existence of powerful States along their own borders. We know that Sher Shāh had to crush Māldev of Jodhpur for this reason. Though Mewar was a small State, yet the strong fort of Chitor and the renowned valour of her sons as well as the tradition of the hostility of the Guhilots to the '*mlechchhas*' could not but give rise to serious appre-

1 Barani says that as early as 1298 A.D. Alā-ud-dīn kept before him the idea of conquering 'such places as Rantambhor, Chitor, Chanderi, Malwa, Dhar, and Ujjain.' All these places were strategically important for an intending conqueror of the Deccan. (See Prof. S. C. Dutt's article on 'The First Saka of Chitor' in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, June, 1931).

2 *Cf. Journal of Indian History*, December, 1929, pp. 369-72.

hension in the mind of the Muhammadan rulers of Delhi, and it was wise to crush the enemy at the earliest opportunity.

These, then, are the causes which explain the struggles of the Guhilots against the Muhammadan rulers of Delhi.

Three reigns approximately cover the history of Mewar in the thirteenth century. Jaitrasimha ruled at least from 1213 A.D. to 1256 A.D.; the former date is given in the earliest inscription of his reign,[1] and the latter is available from a manuscript written in his reign.[2] Then came Tejasimha, whose known records range from 1260 A.D.[3] to 1267 A.D.[4] The reign of his son and successor, Samarasimha, approximately covers the period from 1273 A.D.[5] to 1301 A.D.[6]

1 Ekalinga Stone Inscription, dated in V.S. 1270. (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 96).

2 *Paksika-Vritti.* G. H. Ojha, *History of Rajputana* (in Hindi), Vol. II, p. 471.

3 MS. of *Sravaka-pratikramana-sutra-churni.* Peterson, *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts*, p. 23.

4 Chitor Stone Inscription, dated in V.S. 1324. *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. LV, Part I, pp. 46-47.

5 Chirwa Stone Inscription, dated in V.S. 1330. *Vienna Oriental Journal*, 1907, pp. 142-162.

6 Chitor Stone Inscription, dated in V.S. 1358. *Rajputana*

During this period there were numerous conflicts between the Guhilot princes and the Sultāns of Delhi.

We have clear records of two direct struggles between the two parties during the reign of Jaitrasimha. Our authorities for the history of these struggles are, firstly, the Chirwa inscription of Samarasimha dated in 1273 A.D.; secondly, the Abu Stone inscription of Samarasimha dated in 1285 A.D.;[1] thirdly, a drama entitled *Hammīra-mada-mardanaṁ*[2] composed by Jayasimha Suri which was probably written between 1219 A.D. and 1229 A.D.; and, fourthly, Firishta's history.[3] It will be seen, therefore, that all the sources of our information with the exception of Firishta are contemporary.

The first conflict must have taken place before 1229 A.D., as the drama *Hammīra-mada-mardanam* refers to it and 1229 A.D. is, as we have seen, the last date that can be assigned to its composition. The third Act of the drama gives the following story:

Museum Report, 1921, p. 1. An inscription of Samarasimha's son and successor, Ratnasimha, is dated in V.S. 1359 (*c.* 1302 A.D.). *Rajputana Museum Report*, 1927, p. 3.

1 *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XVI, pp. 345-358.

2 Edited by C. D. Dalal in *Gaekwad Oriental Series*.

3 Briggs, Vol. I, p. 238.

King Vīradhavala of Gujarat is anxious to get the news about Hammīra[1] (that is, Amīr or Sultān of Delhi) who was to begin hostilities against the Mewar King Jayatāla (that is, Jaitrasimha) who, priding himself on the strength of his own sword, had not joined him (that is, Vīradhavala). Then enters the spy Kamalaka, who relates how the whole of Mewar was burnt by the soldiers of the enemy and how the people were filled with dismay by the entrance of ruthless *'mlechchha'* warriors into the capital and how the people through terror preferred to die at their own hands. Kamalaka further says that he, being unable to bear the sight, declared that Vīradhavala was coming to save the people; hearing this the *Turushka* warriors were seized with panic and fled away.

It is clear from this narrative that the Muslim army entered Mewar, devastated a part of the state

1 *Hammira* or *Hamvira* is a corruption of the Arabic word Amir. From the time of Muhammad of Ghur to the reign of Balban this epithet in various forms occurs as the regular designation of the Sultāns of Delhi in their coins and inscriptions. See Wright, *Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum*, Vol. II, pp. 17-33, and H. C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, pp. 681-682.

and even occupied the capital. It is perhaps with reference to this expedition that the Chirwa inscription says: 'In the war with the soldiers of the Sultān the city of Nagda[1] was destroyed and the Governor of that fort was killed in a battle which took place at Untala, a village near Nagda.' But the initial advantages of the Muslims did not prove lasting and soon they had to take recourse to flight. Kamalaka no doubt represents the brave repute of his own king as the factor that inspired terror in their heart; but we may be sure that this is merely a device of the author to secure his own promotion in royal favour.[2] We may believe that it was Jaitrasimha who opposed the enemies of his country and defeated them. The Chirwa inscription implies this by saying that even the Sultān could not humble him, and we read in the Abu Stone inscription that he was 'the sage Agastya of the Ocean-like armies of the *Turushkas*.'

1 Was it the capital of the Guhilots at that time?

2 "In this account Jayasimha characteristically gives all the credit to Viradhavala, the generous patron of his religion, and does not even mention 'Rai Karan' who, according to the Muslim writers, was the real leader of these campaigns." (H. C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 1021).

Who was this Sultān of Delhi who fought against Jaitrasimha but failed to humble him? Our authorities do not give his name. The Chirwa inscription calls him '*Suratrāna*' and the *Hammīra-madamardanam* refers to him as '*Milacchikāra.*' The second designation may give us a clue to the name. Pandit Gaurishankar Ojha[1] points out that the term '*Milacchikāra*' seems to be a Sanskritized form of the word '*Amir-i-shikār.*' We gather from the *Ṭabaqat-i-Nāsirī* that Qutb-ud-dīn had conferred this title upon Iltutmish.[2] Iltutmish was a contemporary of Jaitrasimha and his reign covered the period from 1211 A.D. to 1236 A.D. It is quite probable, therefore, that he was the '*Milacchikāra*' who had carried an expedition into Mewar before 1229 A.D. The Muhammadan writers do not refer to this expedition; but that seems to be no sufficient justification for disbelieving the contemporary accounts referred to above. The devout Muslims might not be unwilling to suppress the story of the defeat of the Sultān at the

1 *History of Rajputana* (in Hindi), Vol. II, p. 467. 'Dr. Barnett considers the identification as very improbable.' (H. C. Ray, *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. II, p. 1021).

2 Raverty, pp. 603-604.

hands of a petty prince. Whatever the explanation of the silence of the Muslim historians may be, an *argumentum ex silentio* is unacceptable in the face of contemporary statements to the contrary.

The second incursion of the Muhammadans into Mewar took place probably about the close of Jaitra-simha's reign. Firishta[1] says, "In 1247, Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud recalled his brother Jalaluddin from his government of Kanooj to Delhi, but, apprehensive of a design against his life, he fled to the hills of Chitor with all his adherents. The king pursued him; but, finding after eight months that he could not secure him, returned to Delhi." This story is vaguely worded, and does not tell us whether Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd came into direct conflict with the Guhilot prince. Firishta's account is not confirmed by any other literary or epigraphic evidence.

Firishta mentions a third struggle. During the reign of Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd, on the revolt of Qutlugh Khān, Governor of Oudh, the Wazir Ulugh Khān marched against him, but he escaped to Chitor. The Wazir destroyed the fort, but, being unable to

1 Briggs, Vol. I, p. 238.

find Qutlugh Khān, returned to Delhi. No other Muhammadan or Hindu account says anything about it. If the Sultān's army had really destroyed the fort of Chitor, there is no reason why the Muhammadan writers should be silent over it. It again appears to be somewhat improbable that no Rajput chronicle should mention this alleged destruction of their fort. Why, again, should the Guhilots give shelter to a rebel relative of the Sultān and invite new troubles?.

The next ruler of Mewar is Tejasimha. He must have reigned between 1256 A.D., the last known date of Jaitrasimha, and 1273 A.D., the first known date of Samarasimha, and for Tejasimha we have records ranging from 1260 A.D. to 1267 A.D. Muhammadan writers do not mention any expedition into Mewar during this period. It is probable, therefore, that there was no struggle between the Guhilots and Sultāns of Delhi during his reign.

During Samarasimha's reign there were two struggles again.

We read in the Abu Stone Inscription of 1285 A.D. that 'the munificent Samara ... the leader of kings, ... rescued, in an instant, the submerged land

of Gurjara from the Ocean-like *Turushkas'*. This apparently refers to an expedition of the Muslims against Gujarat in which he acted as the friend and saviour of that country. Here we find an important instance of the geographical and strategical significance of the position of Mewar. This trial of strength must have taken place early in his reign—before 1285 A.D. This must have happened during the regn of Ghiyās-ud-dın Balban (1266 A.D.—1287 A.D.). Neither Muslim writers nor Gujarat inscriptions or literary works mention any contest in Gujarat during this period; but the testimony of the contemporary inscription cannot be discarded. The ruler of Gujarat at this time was Sārangadeva who reigned from 1275 A.D. to 1295 A.D.

The second clash with the Sultān's army came at the close of Samarasimha's reign. An account of this struggle is given in a Jain manuscript named *Tirthakalpa*, written by Jinaprabha. From the Muslim point of view, however, there is no mention of this incident. The above work informs us that in 1299 A.D. Alā-ud-dīn Khalji sent his younger brother, Ulugh Khān, against Gujarat. On the way Samarasimha saved Mewar by doing homage to him.

Mewar records claim victory for the Rajputs. Here again the geographical and strategical importance of Mewar as covering the route to Gujarat explains the political events. We have an echo of this event in the Ranpur inscription of 1439 A.D.[1] which tells us that Bhuvanasimha was 'the conqueror of Sri Allavaddina Sultan'. Bhuvanasimha belonged to a junior branch of the ruling family of Mewar and was a contemporary of Samarasimha. It was not possible for him to fight independently with Alā-ud-dīn's army and win a victory. It is easy to see that he fought in the train of his overlord and relative, Samarasimha. This appears to be the only possible explanation of the statement in the inscription whose veracity we have no reason to deny.

We have seen, then, that the thirteenth century was an era of continued conflicts between the Sultāns of Delhi and the princes of Mewar. The climax was reached in 1303 A.D. when Alā-ud-dīn occupied the fort of Chitor and placed his son, Khizir Khān, as its Governor.

1 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, p. 115.

RANA SANGA OF MEWAR

Rana Sanga of Mewar played such an important part as the champion of Hinduism against Islam[1] that the local history of Mewar during his reign may be considered as a very significant episode in the general history of India. His career as an antagonist of Babur naturally occupies a prominent place in all works dealing with the history of India in the sixteenth century. Rai Saheb Har Bilas Sarda's biography and Rai Bahadur Gauri Sankar Ojha's monumental work contain an elaborate account of Sanga's eventful life. It appears, however, that there are problems upon which the final word yet remains to be said.

I

EARLY YEARS

So far as the history of the early years of Rana Sanga's life is concerned, our principal authorities are

1 In Rajputana he is still described as the *Hindupat* (chief of the Hindus). See Sarda's *Maharana Sanga*. In Babur's Memoirs (*cf.* pp. 550,558,561 etc. in Beveridge's translation), he is described as a 'pagan' fighting against 'Islam-guarded soldiers'.

Nainsi and Tod. Nainsi's account, being earlier in date and more logical in character, deserves preference.

According to Nainsi, the first four sons of Rana Rai Mal in order of seniority were—Prithviraj, Jay Mal, Jay Singh and Sanga.[1] That Prithviraj was the eldest son is clearly established by the designation '*Mahākumāra*' given to him in a contemporary inscription.[2] We may, therefore, reject Tod's statement that Sanga was the eldest son and heir-apparent.[3]

It is admitted on all hands that "fraternal affection" between Prithviraj and Sanga "was discarded for deadly hate, and their feuds and dissensions were a source of constant alarms". There are two difficulties about the generally accepted account of these 'feuds and dissensions'. In the first place, the prin-

1 Sarda disagrees with Nainsi's statement, for he says that Sanga was the third son, and he does not include Jassa in his list of Rai Mal's 14 sons. (See pp. 12-13). He gives us no authority in support of his rejection of Nainsi's statement . Ojha (*History of Rajputana*, Vol. I, p. 658) agrees with him. But he says elsewhere (p. 655) that Rai Mal recognised Jay Singh as his heir-apparent.

2 *A Collection of Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions*, published by the Bhavanagar Archaeological Department, p. 141.

3 For Tod's account of Sanga's career, see Crooke's edition, Vol. I, pp. 340-59.

ciple of hereditary succession was so well-established[1] that it seems difficult to understand why Sanga and Jay Mal ventured to dispute the claim of Prithviraj. Prithviraj was an able prince, "the Rolando of his age";[2] it was certainly idle for the younger brothers to expect that either Rai Mal or the *Sardars* would pass him over in favour of either of them.[3] Again, Sanga's chance of ascending the throne was still more remote than that of Jay Mal, for two candidates (Jay Mal and Jay Singh) stood between him and Prithviraj. Jay Mal was an active candidate, and he

1 Sarda (p. 14) says that every one of the brothers of Prithviraj "considered himself qualified by descent and personal bravery" for the throne. But on p 146 Sarda himself refers to two Rajput princes– Chunda of Mewar and Ajjaji of Halvad in Kathiawar– who had relinquished their *right as eldest sons* to their ancestral thrones. These instances, and others too numerous to be mentioned here, clearly prove that the principle of hereditary succession was definitely accepted in Rajputana. The principle was abandoned only under exceptional circumstances.

2 Tod's description.

3 Sarda (p. 14) recognises the fact that Jay Mal "was conscious that with Prithviraj as his elder brother there was little chance of his obtaining the throne". The inscription of 1503-4 A.D. shows that Prithviraj was already recognised as heir-apparent by Rai Mal, and there is nothing to show that the *Sardars* dissented from this decision.

was bold enough[1] to demand the recognition of the *Sardars* if Prithviraj died or was put aside. After Jay Mal there was Jay Singh. He might have been addicted to pleasure and sport, as Nainsi says; but no one could anticipate in Rai Mal's life time that he would be passed over by the *Sardars* in favour of Sanga.[2] Later on Sanga proved himself to be a cautious man,[3] and it is difficult for us to believe that he devoted himself to the pursuit of so distant an object as the possession of the throne was in his case. Secondly, are we justified in accepting as historically true[4] the *Nahra Mugro* incident related by Tod? He says, " ... Sanga observed that, though heir to 'the ten thousand towns' of Mewar, he would waive his claims, and trust them ..... to the omen which should be

1 The incident of Tara Bai shows that Jay Mal was a young man of doubtful moral character, but there is nothing on record to show that he lacked the quality of courage, the first requisite of a Rajput ruler.

2 So far as Sanga's case is concerned, our argument is not much weakened if we follow Sarda and Ojha in denying the existence of Jay Singh.

3 Tod says that Sanga's "courage was tempered by reflection".

4 See S. C. Dutt, "New Light on the Early History of Rana Sanga", *D. R. Bhandarkar Volume*, ed. B. C. Law.

given by the priestess or Charuni Devi at Nahra Mugro ..... they (i.e., Prithviraj, Jay Mal, Sanga and their uncle Suraj Mal)[1] repaired to her abode. Prithviraj and Jaimal entered first, and seated themselves on a pallet; Sanga followed and took possession of the panther-hide of the prophetess; his uncle, Surajmal, with one knee resting thereon. Scarcely had Prithviraj disclosed their errand, when the sybil pointed to the panther-hide as the decisive omen of sovereignty to Sanga, with a portion to his uncle.[2]

1 Sarda (p. 14) says that Suraj Mal "was of the same age" with the three brothers. Under normal circumstances an uncle is older than his nephew. That Suraj Mal's case was not an exceptional one, may be presumed from two facts recorded by Tod.

Suraj Mal addressed Prithviraj as 'child'. He could hardly have used such an expression had he not been considerably older than his nephew. Secondly, on one occasion he said to Prithviraj, "If I am killed, it matters not; my children are Rajpoots, they will run the country to find support". (This incident is noted by Sarda on p. 39). This statement seems to imply that Suraj Mal's sons were old enough at that time to "run the country".

2 A similar story is told about Asoka. Once King Bindusara decided to select his heir, and asked his sons to take their seats. Other princes occupied seats fit for royalty, but Asoka sat on the ground. The wise men of the court decided that the earth was the best seat which a King could choose. Asoka was

..... Prithviraj drew his sword and would have falsified the omen, had not Surajmal stepped in and received the blow destined for Sanga ..... Surajmal and Prithviraj were exhausted with wounds, and Sanga fled with five sword-cuts and an arrow in his eye, which destroyed the sight for ever".[1] There are certain incongruous elements in this story. It is based on the supposition that Sanga was the eldest brother and therefore the rightful heir to the throne—a supposition which we cannot accept. If anybody could 'waive his claims, and trust them ..... to the omen', it was Prithviraj. If he really agreed to decide his fate by the judgment of heaven, why did he try to falsify the omen as soon as the judgment went against him?

As a matter of fact, the real clue to the troubles of Rai Mal's reign will be found in the ambition of Suraj Mal. He was a son of Kshema Singh and thus a grandson of Rana Mokal. Tod says that it was he "who had fomented these quarrels"[2] between

thereupon nominated as the heir-apparent. May we assume that in Tod's story we come across a faint reflection of this ancient legend?

1 Ojha (pp. 643-4, 647) gives a slightly different version.

2 Ojha (p. 643) rejects the statement of Tod, supported

Prithviraj and Sanga, and that he was "resolved not to belie the prophetess if a crown lay in his path". Are we to assume, as Tod does, that the ambition to seize the crown of Mewar took possession of Suraj Mal's mind after the *Nabra Mugro* incident? In that case we cannot explain why he fomented quarrels among the princes. We are probably entitled to believe that Suraj Mal's ambition was of earlier origin, and that he purposely fomented quarrels among the princes in order to create dissensions within Mewar. That he was the author of a deeply laid conspiracy against Rai Mal may be clearly inferred from certain facts noted by the chroniclers. In the first place, we are told by Nainsi that during Kumbha's reign Kshema Singh (Suraj Mal's father) revolted, established his authority over the south-

by the *Virvinod*, that Suraj Mal was associated with the quarrels of the princes, and says that it was Sarangadeva who played the part of the mediator. The learned writer admits that Suraj Mal was the enemy of the royal family; he says that Sarangadeva joined Suraj Mal later on because he (Sarangadeva) was expelled from his *jagir* by Prithviraj. This view is inconsistent with the tradition recorded by Tod and accepted by Sarda (p. 14) and the *Virvinod*. Moreover, it fails to explain the cause of Sanga's exile.

eastern corner of Mewar, and tried to make himself an independent ruler. His plan did not succeed at that time, but it was inherited by Suraj Mal.[1] He must have been trying to make it a success even before the closing years of Rai Mal's reign. Secondly, that Suraj Mal had other accomplices within the royal family is proved by his alliance with Saranga Deva, another descendant of Rana Lakha. Thirdly, Suraj Mal did not hesitate even to invoke the assistance of the Muslims against his own clan. Tod says that he "repaired to Mozuffir, the Sultan of Malwa". We know that Malwa had no Sultān of this name, but we are told by Firishta[2] that in 1503 A.D. Sultān Nāsir-ud-dīn Khaljī of Malwa "proceeded towards Chittoor, where having received a large present in money from the Rana ..... he returned to Mando". From Tod's account, supported by an inscription of 1503-4 A.D.,[3] it would appear that the Muslims

1 Sarda's view (p. 14) that Suraj Mal's treachery to the crown was caused merely by "the limitations which naturally circumscribe the activities of scions of a younger branch of a royal family", is not an adequate explanation of his conduct.

2 Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 243. Firishta does not refer to Suraj Mal or any other Hindu ally of the Sultān in this expedition.

3 *Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar.*

occupied a part of Mewar[1] and that Suraj Mal (with his ally, Saranga Deva) was actively fighting against the Rana's troops. Fourthly, Suraj Mal's persistent hostility to the ruling branch of the family is proved by the fact that he "finally abandoned Mewar" and his grandson Bika founded the principality now known as Deolia Pratapgarh.[2]

We must review Sanga's early career against the background of Suraj Mal's treachery. It is very probable that Suraj Mal wanted to utilise him against his elder brothers, and there is little doubt that Sanga allowed himself to be associated with the conspiracy. Probably he was ambitious enough to aspire after the throne, and, knowing fully well that from the point of view of legitimacy he had no chance of being called upon to rule, he tried to realise his ambition by unfilial treachery. Such an explanation is not inconsistent with his character as we know it; did he not want to secure the imperial crown of Delhi? Ambition, then, is the key-note of Sanga's career.

1 An inscription of 1489 A.D. (*Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions of Kathiawar*, pp. 117-133) contains numerous references to Rai Mal's struggle with the Muslims.

2 This is Nainsi's version of the story. Tod says that Suraj Mal himself founded Deolia Pratapgarh.

The exact circumstances which compelled Sanga to live as an exile for some years[1] cannot be determined. If we do not accept the *Nahra Mugro* incident as historical, we cannot ascribe Sanga's flight to it. Tod says that Sanga was aware of Prithviraj's "implicable enmity", and seems to imply that this was the real cause of his flight. We also know that Jay Mal was not well-disposed towards Sanga (for Tod tells us that it was Jay Mal who tried to capture Sanga after the *Nahra Mugro* incident). If the "implicable enmity" of these two brothers was *alone* responsible for Sanga's flight, why did he not return to Mewar *after* Jay Mal's death and *before* Prithviraj's recall?[2] The fact that Sanga was not recalled before his father was about to die, seems to imply that he was guilty of some offence against Rai Mal. This explanation is quite consistent with Prithviraj's

1 Firishta places Nasir-ud-din's invasion in 1503 A.D. Tod's version makes it clear that Sanga fled sometime *before* this incident. Sanga did not return till 1509 A.D., when Rai Mal was in his death bed. So Sanga must have been an exile for *at least* six years.

2 The same argument applies against Sarda's suggestion (p. 16) that Sanga fled because he was "unwilling to attack the heir-apparent to the throne".

"implicable enmity" towards him, for the legitimate heir to the throne could not allow a younger brother to deprive him of his patrimony.[1] Sanga's close association with Suraj Mal shows that Sanga was guilty of treachery towards his father.

During the period of his exile Sanga naturally lived the life of an adventurer. We are told that after the *Nahra Mugro* incident "Sanga fled with five

1 This explanation makes it somewhat difficult to account for Prithviraj's banishment. Tod, labouring under the delusion that Sanga was the eldest son, says that Rai Mal was angry because Prithviraj was about to deprive him of his heir by killing Sanga at *Nahra Mugro*. But Jai Mal was also implicated in the affair, and the father's wrath did not fall upon him. Again, it is strange to note that when the intending murderer was banished by the King, the victim fled of *his own accord* and did not venture to return to his father till the latter was in his death bed. Prithviraj, like Sanga, might have lent his ears to Suraj Mal, and the old Rana might have reasons to suspect that his heir-apparent intended to supplant him. Such an analysis of Prithviraj's motive is not inconsistent with his character. Most of the achievements attributed by Tod to this "Rolando of his age" owed their success to treachery. He treacherously killed the Mina chief in whose service he had enlisted himself and his band. He treacherously murdered Saranga Deva. He treacherously killed Lalla Khan, the Afghan Chief of Toda. He attacked his brother-in-law, Jug Mal of Sirohi, when the latter was asleep at night. We may not be very far from the truth in assuming that Prithviraj, like another heir-apparent of Mewar (Uda *Hatiaro*), was anxious to occupy the throne by murdering his father.

sword-cuts and an arrow in his eye, which destroyed the sight for ever". He took shelter in the sanctuary of Chaturbhuja, where his life was saved from Jay Mal's attack by a Rathor named Bida. He "had recourse to many expedients to avoid discovery" and was compelled to pass his days among goatherds and peasants. Then he went to Ajmer and took service with Karam Chand, the Paramar chief of Srinagar. His identity was accidently revealed (here we are told the traditional story of a serpent rearing its crest over the head of the sleeping exile); the Paramar chief "gave Sanga a daughter to wife, and protection" which he needed so much.

Meanwhile events in Mewar had been moving rapidly. Prithviraj had been banished; Jay Mal had been killed by Rao Surtan in defence of his daughter's honour, Prithviraj had been recalled; the attack of the Muslims of Malwa had been repulsed; Suraj Mal had been compelled to leave Mewar. Time, however, had not softened Prithviraj's heart in favour of Sanga. He was preparing for an expedition against Karam Chand of Srinagar, Sanga's protector and father-in-law,[1] when his attention was

1 Sarda, p. 42.

diverted to Sirohi by a letter from his sister Ananda Bai. He went to Sirohi and humiliated his brother-in-law Jug Mal, who retaliated by poisoning him.[1]

After Prithviraj's tragic death Jay Singh, the third son of Rana Rai Mal, became the heir-apparent. Nainsi says that Jay Singh was given to pleasure and sport, and the *Sardars* passed him over and placed Sanga on the throne. There is nothing improbable in this story. Mewar, constantly threatened by the Muslim Sultans of Malwa and Gujarat, required a strong ruler. Sanga was probably about 26 years old in 1509 A.D.[2] and his career must have revealed his qualities. That he had fled from Mewar as a traitor was, from the political point of view, no disqualification; it was rather a point in his favour in the judgment of the *Sardars*. Sanga might have been afraid of Prithviraj, but he had no reason to be afraid of a worthless prince like Jay Singh. If the crown went to Jay Singh, Sanga might revive the policy of Suraj Mal and try to seize it with the assistance of his Muslim neighbours. We may conclude, therefore, that these weighty reasons of state led to the recall

1 Tod. Sarda, pp. 42-44 Ojha, *History of Sirohi*, p. 205.
2 Nainsi says that Sanga was born in 1483.

of Sanga during the last illness of Rai Mal as well as to his accession to the throne after the old Rana's death.

II

Gujarat and Malwa

The peculiar geographical position of Mewar involved her rulers in a long-continued struggle with the Muslim Sultans of Gujarat and Malwa. Mewar was bounded on three sides by the Muslim kingdoms of Delhi, Gujarat and Malwa. So long as the Sultanate of Delhi was strong and aggressive, the rulers of Mewar had to remain conscious of their weakness, and to thank their stars if they succeeded in preserving their independence against the all-conquering Turks. The recovery of Chitor by Rana Hamir was followed by the disruption of the Sultanate, but the rise of the independent Muslim kingdoms of Gujarat and Malwa in the beginning of the 15th century created new problems for his descendants. If Delhi was no longer strong enough to threaten Mewar, she was likely to be assailed by these two new kingdoms. Mewar offered to them a natural field for expansion, and their rulers were not slow to take advantage of

any weakness which the Guhilots might betray. On the other hand, the vigorous rulers of Mewar were no longer content to play a subsidiary part. Conscious of their own strength, men like Kumbha and Sanga were determined to extend the boundaries of thtir petty ancestral state at the cost of Gujarat and Malwa. When both sides are bent upon aggression, excuses are not difficult to find.

Rana Sanga's first venture in the sphere of foreign policy was significant. Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa owed his throne to the loyal and able support of a Rajput chief named Medini Rai,[1] who naturally enjoyed a unique ascendancy in his court. The exclusion of the Muslim nobles from power excited their jealousy, and they resorted to various expedients in order to destroy the all-powerful minister. At last the Sultan himself came to suspect Medini Rai without adequate reasons, and stealthily left his capital for Gujarat. He was cordially received by Sultan Muzaffar Shah of Gujarat, who started in 1517 to restore his ally on the throne of Mandu.

1 The incident is described by Firishta (Briggs, Vol. IV, pp. 84-86, 245-261) and in *Mirāt-i-Sikāndari* (Bayley, *Local Muhammadan Dynasties, Gujarat*, pp. 247-262).

Medini Rai knew that he was not strong enough to oppose the Gujarat army with success. So he reinforced the garrison of Mandu and then went to Chitor in order to obtain assistance from Rana Sanga. The Rana responded to his appeal,[1] and arrived with a large force within a few miles of Ujjain. Meanwhile Mandu had fallen[2] before the attack of the Gujarat troops and Muzaffar Shah had begun to march against Sanga. On hearing of his approach Sanga retreated to Chitor. The Gujarat army gave up the pursuit and returned home. Sanga prevented Medini Rai from committing suicide and regarded him as a "greatly trusted friend."[3] The grateful Rajput chief rendered valuable help to his patron in his wars with Bahadur Shah of Gujarat and Babur.

There is no doubt that Sanga's policy in this crisis was determined by his desire to revive Hindu

1 According to the *Mirāt-i-Sikāndarī*, the Rana agreed "to advance as far as Sarangpūr, but said that afterwards he would act as circumstances should require." (Bayley, p. 257).

2 In 1518 A.D. according to the *Mirāt-i-Sikāndarī* (Bayley, p. 258), but in 1519 A.D. according to Firishta (Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 261).

3 Beveridge, *Babur's Memoirs*, Section III, p. 593.

ascendancy in Central India. The allegations heaped upon Medini Rai by the Muslim historians do not survive scrutiny; but even a cursory glance at the story of his amazing life makes it clear that he was determined to rule Malwa in the interest of the Hindus.[1] He did not "usurp the crown" because, if he did so, "the Kings of Gujarat, of Khandesh, and of the Deccan, uniting, would very soon reduce Malwa to their subjection."[2] He was satisfied with power unadorned by the crown, because he was wise enough to understand that the Muslim neighbours of Malwa would not allow him to establish a Hindu dynasty in Mandu. That he considered himself as the champion of Hindu interests in Malwa is further proved by his appeal to Rana Sanga. We are told that he "represented" to Rana Sanga "that in Hindustan, among the Hindus, there was no man greater than he, and that if he did not assist his own race, who else was to do so?"[3] Sanga was already

1 Firishta says that "excepting the personal servants of the King, amounting to about two hundred, the whole of the offices of government were filled with Rajpoots." (Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 257).

2 Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 258.

3 Bayley, p. 257.

respected as the best man to "assist his own race," and he did not disappoint his suitor. His failure to achieve success in the enterprise may be ascribed to the difficulties with which he was confronted. Probably he found the combined forces of Gujarat and Malwa too strong for him. He may also have been swayed by the fear which had prevented Medini Rai from usurping the crown of Malwa. If he placed Medini Rai on the throne of Mandu, the Sultans of Gujarat, of Khandesh and of the Deccan might enter into a grand alliance against the infidel.[1] Such an alliance Mewar was not in a position to resist. So Sanga considered it wise to retreat,[2] reserving for a more favourable occasion his plan of striking a decisive blow in favour of the Hindus.

In 1519 A.D. Muzaffar Shah returned to Gujarat, leaving 3000 cavalry to be stationed at Mandu.

1 The ruler of Berar was "on friendly terms" with Mahmud Khalji (Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 249). Sultan Sikandar Lodi had sent a force of 12,000 cavalry to help the Muslim nobles of Malwa against Medini Rai. (Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 253).

2 It must be remembered that after the fall of Mandu and the death of 19,000 Rajputs in its defence, it was almost hopeless for Sanga to expect any assistance from the Hindus of Malwa. (See Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 261, and Bayley, p. 258).

Mahmud Khalji now decided to wrest from the Rajputs those forts which they still occupied.[1] Chanderi and Gagrun were in the possession of Medini Rai's troops, and Bhilsa, Raisin and Sarangpur were held by another Rajput chief named Silhadi. Mahmud Khalji marched to Gagrun. Rana Sanga came to meet him with "a powerful army" and "a great battle was fought." The Muslims were defeated, and Mahmud Khalji became a prisoner in the hands of the Rana. The chivalrous Rana "caused him to be brought into his own tent, dressed his wounds, attended him in person, and showed him every mark of attention; and after his recovery, he furnished him with an escort of one thousand Rajput horse, and sent him to Mandu, where he re-assumed the reins of Government."[2] According to the *Mirāt-i-Sikāndarī,* the Rana's "tenderness" was inspired by his "fear of the Muhammadan Sultans whose dominions bordered on Mandu, such as Ibrahim Lodi, Padshah of Delhi, Sultan Muzaffar of

1 Briggs, Vol. IV, pp. 262-63. Bayley, pp. 263-64.

2 It seems that the Sultan's son was kept as a hostage in Chitor. (Bayley, p. 275). Babur says that the Sultan was made to surrender "a famous crown-cap and golden belt." (Beveridge, Section III, p. 613).

Gujarat, and others." This explanation of the Rana's motive is not unreasonable, although it extols his cautiousness at the cost of his chivalry. Mewar was not yet strong enough to absorb Malwa and face the combined opposition of her Muhammadan neighbours.

Sanga came into direct conflict with Gujarat in connection with the affairs of Idar,[1] a small Rajput principality situated on the borders of Gujarat. On the death of Suraj Mal, the throne of Idar was inherited by his minor son Rai Mal, who was, however, within a short time deposed by his uncle Bhim (Suraj Mal's younger brother). Rai Mal took shelter in Chitor. Later on Bhim died and his son Bhar Mal[2] became the ruler of Idar. Rai Mal grew up to manhood and recovered his ancestral state with Rana Sanga's help[3] in or about 1514 A.D. Bhar Mal appealed for assistance to Sultan Muzaffar Shah of Gujarat. Bhim seems to have been a vassal of the

1 Bayley, pp. 252-53, 264-70. Briggs, Vol. IV, pp. 82-4, 87-90.

2 Bihar Mal, according to the *Mirāt-i-Sikāndarī*.

3 According to the *Tabaqat-i-Akbarī*, Rai Mal was Sanga's son-in-law.

Sultan;[1] the latter was, therefore, interested in maintaining his son on the throne of Idar. He ordered Nizam-ul-Mulk to drive Rai Mal out of Idar and re-establish Bhar Mal. The Gujarat army at first succeeded in driving Rai Mal to the hills, but in 1517 A.D. Rai Mal re-occupied his territory with the Rana's assistance. Meanwhile Nizam-ul-Mulk had been recalled and Nasrat-ul-Mulk placed at the head of the Gujarat army. He failed to achieve any lasting success against Rai Mal. So he was removed, and Mubariz-ul-Mulk was nominated to the office vacated by him. Local officers were not well-disposed to Mubariz-ul-Mulk; they "set themselves to watch for an opportunity of ruining" him. Mubariz-ul-Mulk seems to have been a rash and boastful man. Unable to tolerate the taunt of a wandering minstrel, he tied up a dog at the door of his *darbar* and said that if Rana Sanga did not come to fight, he would be treated like the dog. On hearing the news the Rana marched to Idar. Mubariz-ul-Mulk appealed

1 Muzaffar Shah "said that Bhim had taken possession of Idar with his sanction." (Bayley, p. 252). Firishta (Briggs, Vol. IV, pp. 81-2) says that Bhim was defeated by Muzaffar Shah's troops and saved himself by paying money.

to Muzaffar Shah for reinforcement, but his enemies at court concealed his letters till it was too late. Mubariz-ul-Mulk was persuaded by his associates to take shelter in Ahmednagar. The Rana captured Idar and approached Ahmednagar. The Muslims were severely defeated; Mubariz-ul-Mulk, severely wounded, took shelter in the town of Barni. "The Rana took the town of Ahmednagar, sacked it, and carried away captive all the inhabitants." His officers requested him to plunder Ahmedabad, but the Rana did not consider himself strong enough to undertake such an enterprise. He advanced to Vadnagar and intended to plunder it, but the Brahmin inhabitants of the town requested him to spare it and he agreed. Then he proceeded to Visalnagar and plundered it. Sometime later the Rana left Gujarat and made a triumphal entry in Chitor. He had succeeded in establishing his protegé in Idar and his plundering raid must have made his name a terror to the people of Gujarat.

.Next winter (1520 A.D.) Muzaffar Shah proceeded to take revenge on the Rana.[1] His arrange-

1 Bayley, pp. 271-75. Briggs, Vol. IV, pp. 90-95.

ments left nothing to be desired. Many prominent *amirs* came to Ahmedabad. "The allowances for the whole army were increased from ten to twenty per cent, and a year's pay was issued from the treasury, so that every man might provide himself with what was requisite for the campaign." The command was entrusted to Malik Aiaz, who promised to "bring back the Rana alive in chains, or scatter his life to the wind of death." The Muslims invested the fort of Mandisor (1521 A.D.). The Rana came with a large army; but, finding that it was impossible to save the fort, he requested Malik Aiaz to conclude peace, "promising henceforth to do nothing inconsistent with submission and obedience."[1] In the Muslim camp counsels were divided. Day by day the Rana's strength increased; all neighbouring chiefs went to his support.[2] But Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa joined the Gujarat

1 Firishta says that Sanga "consented to [redacted]ledge fealty to the crown of Gujarat," but certain "extrava[redacted] conditions" were connected with this overture. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Sanga did not really intend to become a vassal of his Muslim enemy.

2 Silhadi, the Rajput Chief of Raisin, was won over by Medini Rai.

army. At last Malik Aiaz concluded peace[1] with the Rana without informing Muzaffar Shah. Mahmud Khalji also came to terms with him, "on condition that the Rana gave up the Sultan's son, whom he held a prisoner, and made a suitable present." Malik Aiaz returned to Ahmedabad, and was coldly received by Muzaffar Shah "who gave out that, after the rains, he would himself renew the campaign." In 1521 A.D.[2] "he commenced his intended expedition against the Rana and marched to Ahmednagar. There the son of the Rana brought to him the elephants and tribute agreed upon, so the expedition was given up." The Rana's son was in all probability the leader of a mission of good will, and the elephants and tribute were hardly anything more than presents.

Bahadur Khan,[3] the second son of Sultan Muzaffar Shah, was ambitious enough to covet the th[illegible]. Not satisfied with the *Jagir* which his father

1 [illegible]an explanation of his motive, see Bayley's note on p. 273. Firishta says that Malik Aiaz foresaw that "no co-operation could take place between him and the other Gujarat officers."

2 This is Firishta's date. Bayley gives 1523 A.D.

3 Bayley, pp. 277-278, 304-306. Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 96.

had assigned to him, he left Gujarat and claimed the hospitality of his father's enemy, Rana Sanga (1525 A.D.). Sometime ago Bahadur Khan had expressed his desire "to wrest the fort of Chitor out of the hands of infidels,[1] and to make it over to the Musulmans, in retribution for what the accursed Rana had done at Ahmednagar, when he slew so many Musulmans and carried their women away captive." This sentiment, however, did not prevent him from accepting the "accursed" infidel's salt. We are told that the Rana "showed him all possible attention" and the Rana's mother regarded him as her "son." The prince's rashness[2] made Mewar too hot for him, and he went to Mewat.

Sultan Muzaffar Shah was succeeded in 1526 A.D. by his eldest son, Sikandar Shah. His younger brother, Latif Khan, "raised a considerable force..... and appeared only to wait for an opportunity of declaring his pretensions to the throne." Sikandar Shah sent Shirza Khan to oppose him; "but hearing that the Prince Latif had gone to Chitor, the troops were directed to march in that direction, where they

1 He succeeded in realising his ambition after Sanga's death.
2 See an incident described in Bayley, pp. 305-306.

sustained a complete defeat.[1] Whether this defeat was inflicted by Rana Sanga or by Latif Khan's troops, we do not know. Chand Khan and Ibrahim Khan, younger brothers of Latif Khan, seem to have taken shelter in Chitor.[2] When, after Sikandar Shah's assassination, Bahadur Khan came to occupy the throne of Gujarat, he passed through Chitor, where he was met by Chand Khan and Ibrahim Khan.

It seems that Sanga was determined to place Bahadur Khan on the throne of Gujarat. He refused to come to terms with the Gujarati nobles who were trying to oppose Bahadur Khan.[3] At his instance Udi Singh, the ruler of Dungarpur, helped Bahadur Khan,[4] and intercepted the letter for help which the

1 This is Firishta's version. (Briggs, Vol. IV, pp. 89-90). According to the *Mirāt-i-Sikāndarī,* Latif Khan received the support of the Raja of Munka. (Bayley, p. 308). The *Tabaqat-i-Akbarī* calls him the Raja of the jungles of Chitor. Latif Khan might have been assisted by a hill chief. Under the circumstances it is difficult to accept Sarda's statement (p. 93) that Rana Sanga sent a *Sardar* to drive Shirza Khan out of Mewar.

2 Bayley, p. 318.

3 Bayley, p. 318.

4 Bayley, p. 326.

Gujarati nobles had sent to Babur.[1] We may conclude, therefore, that Bahadur Shah had many reasons to be grateful to Sanga for the valuable assistance rendered by him during the most critical period of his career.

III

Ibrahim Lodi

After his accession to the throne of Delhi in 1517 A.D. Sultan Ibrahim Lodi had succeeded in alienating the sympathy of his nobles. Troubles were going on in Delhi, and Sanga decided to take advantage of the Sultan's difficulties. He attacked the fort of Chanderi,[2] which occupied a strategic position to the east of Mewar. This fort originally belonged to the Sultans of Malwa. After Mahmud Khalji's accession one of his rival brothers named Muhammad Shah "laid hands on Chanderi and put it under Sultan Sikandar Lodi's protection, who, in his turn, took Muhammad Shah's side and sent him large forces. Muhammad Shah survived Sultan Sikandar and died in Sultan Ibrahim's time, leaving

1 Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 102.
2 Briggs, Vol. IV, p. 102. Bayley, p. 326.

a very young son called Ahmed Shah whom Sultan Ibrahim drove out and replaced by a man of his own."[1] Sanga succeeded in capturing the fort. The fort was given to Medini Rai, "the greatly trusted pagan," who began to guard it with 4,000 or 5,000 soldiers. This incident must have happened between Sultan Muzaffar Shah's capture of Mandu in 1518 A.D. or 1519 A.D.[2] and Sultan Mahmud Khalji's attempt to recover Chanderi in 1519 A.D., unless we assume that Chanderi was seized by Sanga sometime before Medini Rai came under his protection. In any case, Chanderi could not have fallen to Sanga's troops before 1517 A.D., the year of Ibrahim Lodi's accession.[3]

It may be presumed that Sanga had something to do with Sultan Ibrahim Lodi's troubles with his nobles, for otherwise it is difficult to explain the Sultan's determination to crush him. Sometime after the Chanderi incident the Sultan sent against him a large army under the command of Mian

1 Beveridge, *Memoirs of Babur*, p. 593.
2 Bayley gives 1518 A.D., but Firishta gives 1519 A.D.
3 Sarda (p. 62) says that Sanga captured Chanderi after his victory over Mian Makhan.

Makhan,[1] with whom were associated three other generals—Mian Husain Khan Zar Bakhsh, Mian Khan Khanan Farmuli, and Mian Maruf—men who "could have instructed even Rustam in the art of war." The Rana advanced to meet the Muslims. Before the battle Mian Husain Khan left the imperial army and joined the Rana. Sanga succeeded in inflicting a complete defeat on Mian Makhan. After the victory Mian Husain and Mian Maruf fell suddenly upon the Rajput camp and captured a few elephants and horses.[2] But the Rana's victory was decisive. His troops pursued the Muslims "as far as Biyana and so alarmed the Sultan that he advanced from Agra to the river."

1 Elliot and Dowson, Vol. V, pp. 16-20.

2 This story, narrated in the *Tarikh-i-Salatin Afghana*, is rejected by Sarda (p. 62) on four grounds: (i) The *Tarikh-i Daudi* and *Wakiat Mushtaki* do not record it. (ii) Mian Husain and Mian Maruf had only a small following. (iii) Sanga obtained a large part of Malwa and tracts up to Biyana. (iv) Ibrahim Lodi had Mian Husain assassinated soon after this battle. It may be remarked that (1) *argumentum ex silencio* is hardly a safe guide for historians; (2) the generals attempted a surprise attack; (3) Sanga, not being defeated by the surprise attack, could easily follow up his victory over Mian Makhan; (4) Mian Husain's desertion of Mian Makhan deserved this punishment.

We are told by Tod that in two battles Sanga was "opposed by Ibrahim Lodi in person, at Bakrole and Ghatolli, in which last battle the imperial forces were defeated with great slaughter, leaving a prisoner of the blood royal to grace the triumph of Chitor." In the absence of any other detail, it is impossible to verify the truth of this statement.[1] Muslim writers do not refer to Ibrahim Lodi's coming in person or to the capture of any "prisoner of the blood royal" by Rana Sanga.

IV

Babur

On the eve of his fatal contest with Babur for the supremacy of Northern India, Rana Sanga occupied a really unique position. We read in Babur's Memoirs[2] that "not one of all the exalted sovereigns of this wide realm, such as the Sultan of Delhi, the

1 Sarda (p. 56) refers to a battle between Sanga and the imperial troops near Khatoli (Tod's Ghatolli?). "In this battle, the Maharana lost his left arm by a sword cut, and an arrow made him lame for life."

2 Beveridge, pp. 561-562.

Sultan of Gujarat and the Sultan of Mandu, could cope with this evil-dispositioned one, without the help of other pagans; one and all they cajoled him and temporized with him." This estimate of the Rana's power and influence is not exaggerated. We have seen that he had twice defeated the troops of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi of Delhi and snatched away from his hands important places like Chanderi and Biyana. He had defeated the Gujarati troops more than once and plundered a large portion of Gujarat with impunity. He had helped Bahadur Shah to occupy the throne of Gujarat. So far as Malwa is concerned, Sanga's victories were still more brilliant and fruitful. He had captured Sultan Mahmud Khalji and retained his son as a hostage. Babur says[1] that "in the downfall from power of the Mandu Sultans, he became possessed of many of their dependencies such as Rantanbur, Sarangpur, Bhilsa and Chandiri." Within Rajputana Sanga's ascendancy was complete. His vassals ruled over Idar and Dungarpur. Tod says, "The princes of Marwar and Ambar did him homage, and the Raos of Gwalior, Ajmer, Sikri,

1 Beveridge, p. 483.

Raisin, Kalpee, Chanderi, Boondi, Gagrun, Rampura and Abu served him as tributaries or held of him in chief."[1]

Such a ruler was eminently fit for restoring Hindu supremacy in Northern India. The moment was appropriate; the Sultanate of Delhi was tottering to its fall. Nor did Sanga lack in the patience and determination which are essential for success in such a dazzling but difficult enterprise. Since his accession he had been deliberately trying to strengthen his position by weakening his formidable neighbours, the Muslim rulers of Malwa and Gujarat. He had succeeded in a trial of strength with Ibrahim Lodi himself. He had invited Babur to occupy Delhi,[2] so that he himself might easily "move on Agra." After the battle of Panipat Sanga felt that the moment, for which he had been waiting so long, had come at last. The Sultan of Malwa had been humbled; Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat almost

1 It is difficult to verify this statement, but Babur's list of Hindu chiefs killed at Khanua includes Chandrabhan Chauhan, Bhupat Rao of Chanderi, Manik Chauhan, Dilpat Rao, Gangu Singh, Karm Singh and Daukusi, each of whom was "a splendid and magnificent chieftain." (Beveridge, p. 573).

2 Beveridge, p. 529.

owed his throne to his support; Ibrahim Lodi was dead; Babur, the new-comer, was threatened by numerous Afghan chiefs in eastern and northern India, and his position was still further weakened by the anxiety of his lieutenants to leave India.[1] Sanga boldly decided to strike now.

Sanga had promised to "move on Agra" if Babur came to Delhi from Kabul, but he gave no sign of moving even after the capture of Delhi and Agra by the Mughals.[2] We may assume that Sanga did not intend to help Babur in occupying the throne left vacant by Ibrahim Lodi. His real aim was to seize that throne for himself. That aim could not be realised without driving Babur out of India.[3] So Sanga began to advance towards Babur's head-quarters and at the same time strengthened himself by securing the alliance of the discontented Afghan Chiefs.[4] He captured Kandar, a fort in Rajputana,

1 For Babur's difficulties after Panipat, see Beveridge, pp. 523-525.

2 Beveridge, pp. 529-530, 550-557.

3 *Cf.* Rushbrook Williams, *An Empire-Builder of the Sixteenth Century*, p. 141.

4 They wanted to place Mahmud Lodi, a brother of Ibrahim Lodi, on the imperial throne with the Rana's assistance.

from the hands of a Muslim chief named Hasan, who appealed in vain for assistance to Babur. Reports about Sanga's "hostile and mischievous attitude" began to reach Babur. Hasan Khan Mewati joined the Rana, although Babur had tried to conciliate him by releasing his son who had fallen into his hands in the fight with Ibrahim Lodi. Babur left Agra "for the Holy War" on February 11, 1527, and encamped at Fatehpur Sikri. Sanga captured Biyana and came "near and nearer" the Mughal army. Babur's army "shewed signs of want of heart." On February 25, Babur renounced wine. Then he made his nobles and soldiers take an oath that no one would "think of turning his face from this foe, or withdraw from this deadly encounter so long as life is not rent from his body." Here we have the most effective testimony to the strength and reputation of the Rana.

Tod says that sometime before the battle of Khanua Babur tried to conclude peace with Sanga. "The negotiation had reached this point, that on condition of Babur being left Delhi and its dependencies, the Peela-Khal at Biyana should be the boundary of their respective dominions, and even an

annual tribute was offered to the Rana." Neither Babur himself nor any Muslim chronicler refers to this story, but in view of Babur's desperate position it cannot be rejected as altogether improbable.[1] Whether Babur really wanted to keep his promise, if he made it at all, is very doubtful. In all probability he wanted to gain time, so that he might attack the Rana when circumstances were more favourable to him. The Rana acted wisely in rejecting the proposal. He was fighting for the imperial throne, not for a fort or a province;[2] and he could not conclude an enduring peace with the man who wanted to keep Delhi for himself.

On the eve of the battle the number of soldiers at the Rana's disposal was, according to Babur, more

1 Rushbrook Williams (p. 156) says that Tod's story has "no stamp of truth upon" it, but gives no reason for this remark.

2 Sarda (p. 138) remarks that Silhadi, who is said to have conducted the negotiations, was displeased because Sanga rejected the proposal "though the Maharana had been offered more than what he had started from Chitor to fight for." What did the Rana start from Chitor to fight for—a slice of territory, or the crown of Delhi? Sarda himself observes in another place (*Foreword* to his book) that Sanga wanted "to contest the crown of India."

than two *lakhs*.[1] Tod says that Sanga was usually followed into the field by "eighty thousand horse, seven Rajas of the highest rank, nine Raos, and one hundred and four chieftains bearing the titles of Rawul and Rawut, with five hundred war elephants."[2] So far as the numerical strength of Babur's army is concerned, the translator of his *Memoirs* remarks,[3] "Babur's army, all told, was 12,000 when he crossed the Indus from Kabul; it will have had accretions from his own officers in the Punjab and some also from other quarters, and will have had losses at Panipat; his reliable kernel of fighting strength cannot but have been numerically insignificant, compared with the Rajput host."

After numerous skirmishes the final battle[4] took place at Khanua, a dependency of Biyana, on March 17 1527. The Rajputs were defeated.

1 Beveridge, Section III, p. 562.

2 This estimate seems to have been accepted by Smith. See *Oxford History of India*, p. 323.

3 Beveridge, p. 547. Rushbrook Williams (pp. 152-153) says that "in effectives the Rajput chieftain outnumbered his antagonist by seven or eight to one." See also Ojha's estimate, pp. 686-688.

4 For a description of the battle, see Beveridge, Section III, pp. 563-573, and Rushbrook Williams, pp. 149-156.

Many Hindu chiefs were killed. "Many fell dead on the field of battle; others, desisting from fighting, fled to the desert of exile and became the food of crows and kites. Mounds were made of the bodies of the slain, pillars of their heads."[1] After the victory Babur gave up the 'plan' of "moving into the pagan's country.....because of the little water and much heat on the road."

It is necessary to analyse the causes which led to Sanga's defeat in the battle of Khanua. Tod gives two reasons—the treachery of Silhadi and Sanga's inactivity before the final battle. The story of Silhadi's treachery is extremely doubtful.[2] Neither Babur nor any other Muslim writer refers to the story. Again, instead of rewarding Silhadi for his alleged treachery to Sanga, Babur wanted to attack him soon after the battle of Khanua.[3] Finally, after Sanga's death Silhadi allied himself with his son and successor, Ratan Singh, against Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa. These facts, together with a

1 Beveridge, Section III, pp. 572-573.

2 See Beveridge, *Asiatic Review*, November, 1915; Rushbrook Williams, p. 156. Sarda (p. 145) accepts the story.

3 Beveridge, p. 598. Babur's plan did not mature.

statement of Babur's secretary that Bhupat. a son of Silhadi, died for Sanga at Khanua,[1] make it difficult for us to accept Tod's view about the part played by Silhadi in the battle of Khanua. So far as Tod's charge about Sanga's inactivity before the battle[2] is concerned, there seems to be a confusion between the preliminary skirmishes (in which Sanga's army came out successful) and the final engagement. Babur's narrative makes it clear that Sanga did not give him any respite *during the final engagement.*

Sarda[3] says that the battle was lost by the Rajputs because "an arrow.....struck with such force on the forehead of the Maharana" that he lost his consciousness and had to be removed from the battle-field. Raj Rana Ajjaji, "who held the first rank among the nobles of Mewar," occupied the royal seat on Sanga's elephant, but he failed to prevent the rumour from spreading like wildfire. The bond of unity in the Rajput army was broken, and

1 Beveridge, p. 573.

2 This charge is supported by Ojha (p. 691) and Sarda (pp. 138-139).

3 See pp. 146-150.

defeat naturally followed. This story, though supported by one stray couplet quoted by Sarda, is not mentioned by Tod (who says that the Rana was wounded), nor is it supported by any Muslim writer.

Sanga's weakness really sprang from different reasons. Babur clearly says that he was the leader of a "rabble-rout."[1] His supremacy over Rajputana wounded the clan sentiment of the average Rajput. The Rathors, the Chauhans and the Kachchhawahas could not whole-heartedly accept the hegemony of a chief who belonged to a different clan. As Babur says, "……the rajas and rais of high degree, who obeyed him in this battle, and the governors and commanders who were amongst his followers in this conflict, had not obeyed him in any earlier fight or, out of regard to their own dignity, been friendly with him."[2] Sanga was trying to impose on the Rajputs a new type of unity which went against the traditional politico-social organisation of the race. Nor could the *'Hindupat'* have expected whole-hearted loyalty and assistance from his new-found Afghan allies. Everything separated them—reli-

1 Beveridge, p. 561.
2 Beveridge, pp. 561-562.

gion, tradition, ultimate object (for while Sanga wanted to establish Hindu ascendancy in Northern India, the Afghans aimed at placing a Lodi prince on the throne of Delhi); they were united only by a common emergency—the necessity of driving Babur out of India. Such an unnatural combination could hardly be effective against a group of men whose future in an unknown country depended upon cohesion and desperate courage.

Another factor—purely military—contributed to Babur's success. There is no doubt that, as a general leading his men to a definite goal through definite means, Babur was far more able and far-sighted than his rival. Apart from this, these two great men were fighting on different principles of warfare. While Babur relied on artillery and mobility, Sanga depended on cavalry. Tod says that Babur's artillery made dreadful havoc in the close ranks of the Rajput cavalry. Babur's experience of war outside India enabled him to strike a decisive blow against an antiquated system which prevailed in conservative India. As Tod says in another connection, "The use of artillery was now (i.e. in the reign of Vikramajit) becoming general, and the Moslems

soon perceived the necessity of foot for their protection: but prejudice operated longer upon the Rajput, who still curses 'those vile guns,' which render of comparatively little value the lance of many a gallant soldier."

V

Last Days

After the battle of Khanua "Sanga retreated towards the hills of Mewar, having announced his fixed determination never to re-enter Chitor but with victory." His enemy gave up, for the time being at least, the 'plan' of "moving into the pagan's country," but he tried to weaken the Rana by subjugating his Rajput vassals.[1] A few months after the battle of Khanua Babur started against Chanderi, which was still in the possession of Medini Rai.[2] The fort occupied an important strategic position. Babur stormed and captured it on January 29,

1 Babur says, "We had come to Chanderi meaning, after taking it, to move against Raisin, Bhilsa, and Sarangpur, pagan lands dependent on the pagan Salahuddin, and, these taken, to move on Rana Sanga in Chitur." (Beveridge, p. 598).

2 Beveridge, pp. 589-597.

1528. Sanga seems to have advanced as far as Irej in order to attack the Mughals; but some of his ministers, unwilling to continue the struggle against Babur, administered poison to him.[1] Sanga died in March or April, 1518.[2]

Sanga left Mewar weaker than he had found her. Externally, Babur's strength was increasing day by day, Bahadur Shah was consolidating his position, and Mahmud Khalji was thinking of a war of revenge. Internally, the undue favour shown by Sanga to his favourite wife Karameti and her son Vikramjit[3] created dissensions within the royal family. The dazzling military and political successes of the great Rana evaporated even before his death.

1 The story of poison, though not mentioned by Babur, is supported by Abul Fazl.

2 Ojha (p. 697) gives January 30, 1528.

3 The Rana gave the important fort of Ranthambhor to Vikramjit. On his accession to the throne Ratan Singh, the eldest of Sanga's sons, claimed it. Karmeti and her son sought and received Babur's assistance. (See Nainsi and Beveridge, pp. 612-613).

POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE RAJPUTS IN THE DAYS OF TOD

In the present state of our knowledge it is hardly possible to give a satisfactory account of the political organisation of the Rajputs during the Middle Ages. The available manuscripts do not furnish us with any clear idea about medieval Rajput polity. 'The quasi-historical poems and the commemorative songs of the *Chāranas* rather magnify, as they are expected to do, the achievements of the princes, and the people have left few spokesmen.'[1] Tod's chapters on "Sketch of a Feudal system in Rajasthan"[2] contain a brief description of Rajput political organisation in his days, with special reference to the circumstances prevailing in Mewar. His *Annals* of Marwar, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Amber, and Haravati also contain chapters dealing with some aspects of the political, social and economic organisation of those states. Tod was an enthusiastic[3] and

1 S. C. Dutt, "Rajput Polity," *The Guardian*, Aug. 22, 1931.
2 *Annals*, Vol. I.
3 He says, "I look upon Mewar as the land of adoption,

acute observer; he has left for us many valuable facts which bring to light some interesting aspects of Rajput polity, although in some cases their value is vitiated by his anxiety to discover the elements of Feudalism in Rajput life. It must be remembered, again, that Tod's account relates to the circumstances prevailing towards the close of the eighteenth, and the beginning of the nineteenth, century. We cannot be sure whether his observations should be regarded as applicable to the political organisation of the Rajputs in the pre-Mughal age or even in the seventeenth century.

It has been suggested that the autocracy of the Mughal Emperors exercised an indirect influence on the constitutions of the Rajput states: "The autocracy at the imperial capital supplied the incentive to the prince to play the autocrat in his more limited sphere of action."[1] It was the influence of the Mughal court, we are told, which transformed the

and, linked with all the associations of my early hopes and their actual realization, I feel inclined to exclaim with reference to her unmanageable children, 'Mewar, with all thy faults, I love thee still'." (*Personal Narrative*).

1 S. C. Dutt, "Rajput Polity," *The Guardian*, August 27, 1931.

leader of the clan into 'the irresponsible bureaucrat of the eighteenth century.' Tod[1] clearly shows that in his days the Rajput Prince was much more than the nominal leader of his clan. He observes, "Throughout Rajasthan the character and welfare of the states depend on that of the sovereign: he is the main-spring of the system—the active power to set and keep in motion all these discordant materials; if he relax, each part separates, and moves in a narrow sphere of its own." But the autocratic Monarchy of the eighteenth century, built upon the model provided by the Mughals, yet retained obvious traces of its patriarchal origin. Tod says, "*Baupjee,* 'sire,' is the appellation of royalty, and, strange enough, whether to male or female; while its offsets, which form a numerous branch of vassals, are called *babas,* 'the infants.'" These terms were applied in a special sense: "The Rajpoot, who possesses but an acre of land, has the proud feeling of common origin with his sovereign, and in styling him *bapjee* (sire), he thinks of him as the common father or representative of the race."

1 Almost all facts concerning Mewar are taken from Tod's chapters on "Sketch of a Feudal System in Rajasthan."

This was the logical corollary of the fact that every Rajput state is, generally speaking, one particular clan politically organised into one unit under the pressure of historical circumstances now forgotten. "In every state the ruling class belongs to one particular clan.....The humblest members of the clan considered themselves along with the ruler as the sons of the same father, enjoying their patrimony by the same right as the ruler himself. The latter was thus nothing but *primus inter pares*.....The state in fact did not belong to the ruler—it belonged to the clan as a whole."[1] But this identity of the clan with the state was not an active force in the Rajput polity of the eighteenth century. Ambitious Princes anxious to imitate the Mughal pattern of autocracy naturally tried to undermine the authority of the clan speaking through the Chiefs. One of the measures adopted by them to serve this purpose was to introduce within their respective states some Chiefs who were 'foreign in country and blood.' Tod says, "Chiefs of the Rahtore, Chohan, Paramara,

1 S. C. Dutt, "Rajput Polity," *The Guardian*, August 27, 1931.

Solanki, and Bhatti tribes were intermingled.'"[1] The epithet of *Kala putta*, or 'black grant,' attached to all grants of land to 'foreign' chiefs. Naturally the position of these Chiefs was less secure than that of the Chiefs of the indigenous clan, and the Prince could place more reliance on outsiders having no root in the soil and absolutely dependent on himself. However, the importance of this factor must not be over-emphasized. The Prince was never free to dispose of any substantial portion of the patrimony of the clan in favour of 'foreigners.' Tod says, "Though in all these estates there is a mixture of foreign Rajputs, yet the blood of the chief predominates." The clan system was too strong to be broken.

1 Ganora, one of the chief towns of Godwar, was held by a Rathor Chief. "From this important district," says Tod, "the Rana could command four thousand Rathores holding lands on the tenure of service, of whom the Ganora chief, then one of the sixteen nobles of Mewar, was the head." The Chief of Rupnagar, a conspicuous member of the second grade of the Rana's nobility, was a Solanki. Bijolli, one of the principal fiefs of Mewar, was held by a Chief of Paramara tribe. A Bhatti Chief held the important estate of Khejurla in Marwar. Among the principal Chiefs of Jaipur, ten were 'Foreigners.' These instances have been collected from Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

The Prince was naturally the head of all departments of the state. With the aid of his civil council, the four ministers and their deputies, the Rana of Mewar promulgated all the legislative enactments in which the general rights and wants of the community were involved. "In these the martial vassals or chiefs had no concern: a wise exclusion, comprehending also their immediate dependents, military, commercial, and agricultural." In Feudal Europe the vassals were not excluded from that privilege. This is an important point of distinction between European Feudalism and the system of government prevalent in Rajputana, but Tod has not appreciated its significance.

There was little scope for legislation in states dominated by age-long customs. Customs varied in each state, and not infrequently in the different parts of one state. In some cases tradition has handed down to later generations the circumstances explaining the origin of particular customs, but, generally speaking, such information is not available. Tod was particularly interested in the inscriptions which lie scattered all over Rajputana. "Sumptuary laws," he says, "……are to be traced in these inscriptions; the

annulling of monopolies and exorbitant taxes; the regulation of transit duties; prohibition of profaning sacred days by labour; immunities, privileges, and charters to trades, corporations, and towns."[1] Tod also found important records in the archives of the Princes, which showed that 'monopolies and restraints on commerce were well understood in Rajwarra, though the doctrines of political economy never gained footing there." Moreover, there were many books of grants to the Chiefs and vassals, and also the grand rent-roll of the country. "From all these a sufficiency of customary rules could easily be found to form the written law of fiefs in Rajasthan."

1 Tod illustrates his remarks by specific references to some typical inscriptions: "……one contains an abolition of the monopoly of tobacco; another, the remission of tax on printed cloths, with permission to the country manufacturers to sell their goods free of duty at the neighbouring towns. To a third, a mercantile city, the abolition of war contributions, and the establishment of its internal judicial authority. Nay, even where good manners alone are concerned, the law-giver appears, and with an amusing simplicity: 'None shall eat after sun-set,' shews that a Jain obtained the edict. To yoke the bullock or other animal for any work on the sacred *Amavus*, is also declared punishable. Others contain revocation of vexatious fees to officers of the crown; 'of beds and quilts;' 'the seizure of the carts, implements, or cattle of the husbandmen……"

It will be noticed that the legislation of the Rajput Princes dealt with civil affairs alone; criminal cases were presumably governed solely by customs. Whether Muslim law exercised any influence on the Rajputs in this matter, is uncertain. Nor are we in a position to give a consistent account of the judicial system. It may be presumed that the Prince was not only the formal fountain of justice but also the actual judge of the more important cases. In Mewar the resident ruler of every district was also a judicial functionary. There was a special officer in charge of each frontier *thana* (garrison post), who 'united the triple occupation of embodying the quotas, levying the transit duties, and administering justice, in which he was aided at the *Chabootra*[1] or court, by assembling the *Chotias* or assessors of justice.' "Each town and village has its *chotia,* the members of which are elected by their fellow citizens, and remain as long as they conduct themselves impartially in disentangling the intricacies of complaints preferred to them. They are the aids to the Nagar Seth, or chief magistrate, an hereditary officer in every large city in Rajasthan. Of

1 Literally 'terrace' or 'altar.'

this *chotia* the Patel and Patwari are generally members." Finally, there were the general *Panchayets*, formed from the respectable population at large, who decided petty cases.

The regular administration of justice was often impeded by the privileges and obstinacy of the Chiefs. Tod says, "The *Chabootras*, or terraces of justice, were always established in the *Khalisa*, or crown demesne. It was deemed a humiliating intrusion if they sat within the bounds of a chief. To 'erect the flag' within his limits, whether for the formation of defensive posts or the collection of duties, is deemed a gross breach of his privileged independence, as to establish them within the walls of his residence would be deemed equal to sequestration. It often becomes necessary to see justice enforced on a chief or his dependent, but it begets eternal disputes and disobedience, till at length they are worried to compliance by *rozina*.....an officer or herald is deputed with a party of four, ten, or twenty horse or foot, to the fief of the chief, at whose residence they take up their abode; and carrying, under the seal, a warrant to furnish them with specified delay (*rozina*) rations, they live at free quarters till he is quickened into com-

pliance with the commands of the prince. This is the only accelerator of the slow movements of a Rajpoot chieftain in these days, whether for his appearance at court or the performance of an act of justice. It is often carried to a harassing excess, and causes much complaint." This peculiar system indicates one of the plague spots in the political organisation of the Rajputs.

The above account applies specially to Mewar. In Marwar, as at Jaipur, confined criminals were maintained by individual charity, for the grants made by the state for their maintenance were usually misappropriated by the agents of the government. Tod says, "When once confined, the criminals are little thought of, and neglect answers all the ends of cruelty." Prisoners were released on special occasions, like a lunar eclipse, or the birth of a son to the Prince, or the beginning of a new reign. The criminal laws were not sanguinary. In cases of murder justice was usually satisfied with fine, corporal punishment, imprisonment, confiscation, or banishment. Inferior crimes, such as larcenies, were punished by fine and imprisonment, and, when practicable, restitution, or, in case of inability to pay, corporal

punishment and confinement. The nature of the punishment often depended on the temperament of the judge. Raja Bijay Singh (1753-1793) of Marwar never confirmed a sentence of death. Stories relating to his clemency were current in Rajputana in Tod's days. The trial by *sogun* (oath of purgation) was occasionally resorted to in all parts of Rajputana, but it was not a common practice. The *Panchayets* decided the civil cases. From these 'courts of equity' there was an appeal to the Prince; but as unanimity was required of the members of the *Panchayet,* and a fee had to be paid by the appellant before his case could be brought to the Prince, the number of appeals was not considerable.

We have seen that in the sphere of legislation a distinction was drawn between the civil and military counsellors of the Prince. That distinction was enforced in other departments as well. Tod says, "In all these states some great court favourite, from his talents, character, or intrigue, holds the office of premier.[1] His duties are proportioned to his wishes,

1 The Premier enjoyed different titles in different states. "At Oodipur he is called *bhanjgurh;* at Jodhpur, *pradhan;* at Jeypur (where they have engrafted the term used at the court of Delhi) *moosahib;* at Kotah, *Kelladar,* and *dewan* or regent."

or the extent of his talents and ambition; but he does not interfere with the civil administration, which has its proper minister. They, however, act together. The Rajpoot Premier is the military minister, with the political government of the fiefs; the civil minister is never of this caste.....He becomes a most important personage, as dispenser of the favours of the sovereign. Through him chiefly all requests are preferred, this being the surest channel to success. His influence, necessarily, gives him unbounded authority over the military classes, with ultimate power over the inferior officers of the state.'' In several Rajput states the office of the Premier was hereditary;[1] but the laws of succession were so regulated that the Premiers 'could not usurp the throne of their prince, though they might his functions.'

The submission of the Rajput Princes to the Mughal Emperors did not curtail their authority over their subjects. Tod says, "They made a nominal

1 "When the treaty was formed between Mewar and the British Government, the ambassadors wished to introduce an article of guarantee of the office of *pradhan* to the family of the chief noble of the country, the Rawut of Saloombra.' In the case of Zalim Singh of Kota the British Government guaranteed the administration of affairs to his sons and successors for ever.

surrender to him (i.e., the Mughal Emperor) of their kingdom, receiving them back with a *sunnud*, or grant, renewed on each lapse; thereby acknowledging him as lord paramount. They received, on these occasions, the *Khelat* of honour and investiture, consisting of elephants, horses, arms, and jewels; and to their hereditary title of 'prince' was added by the Emperor, one of dignity, *munsub*. Besides this acknowledgement of supremacy, they offered *nuzzerana* and homage, especially on the festival of *Noroza* (the new year), engaging to attend the royal presence when required, at the head of a stipulated number of their vassals. The emperor presented them with a royal standard, kettle-drums, and other insignia, which headed the array of each prince."

The financial resources of the Rajput states were limited.[1] The land in the *Khalisa*, or Crown demesne, was the chief source of supply. According to Tod's estimate, it was doubtful whether the *Khalisa* lands in Mewar amounted to one-fourth of those distributed in grant to the Chiefs. And land was not distributed to the Chiefs alone: the temples, the

1 The system of Zalim Singh of Kota (described by Tod in *Annals of Kotah*, chapters VII-VIII) was an exception.

priests, the Brahmins, the bards and the genealogists received a substantial share. Tod says, "There is scarcely a state in Rajpootana in which one-fifth of the soil is not assigned for the support of the temples, their ministers, the secular Brahmins, bards, and genealogists. But the evil was not always so extensive; the abuse is of modern growth."[1]

The following account of the present revenue system of Mewar is probably not very different from that prevalent in Tod's days: "In the *Khalsa* area there is no distinction between rent and revenue, and no trace of *Zamindar* middleman.....The system is *ryotwari*, that is to say, the actual cultivator pays revenue (*bhog* or *hasil*), usually in cash but sometimes in kind, direct to the *Darbar*. The rest of the terri-

1 *Religious Establishments, Festivals, and Customs of Mewar*, Chapter XIX. Tod adds, "In Mewar, the lands in *sahsum*, or religious grants, amount in value to one-fifth of the revenue of the state, and the greater portion of these has arisen out of the prodigal mismanagement of the last century. The dilapidated state of the country, on the general pacification in A.D. 1818, afforded a noble opportunity to redeem in part these alienations, without the penalty of denunciation attached to the resumer of sacred charities.....The Rana dreaded a 'sixty thousand years' residence in hell,' and some of the finest land of his country is doomed to remain unproductive."

tory is held on either the *jagir, bhum* or *muafi* tenure. The majority of the Rajput *jagirdars* pay to the *Darbar* a fixed annual quit rent, called *chhatund,* because it was once supposed to be one-sixth of the annual income of their estates, and usually take from their cultivators a share of the produce, varying from one-fourth to one half. The *bhumias* generally cultivate their own lands, and they pay a small sum yearly to the *Darbar;* it is called *bhum barar,* and was formerly one-sixth of their assets, but now bears no relation whatever to the rental value of their holdings. The *muafidars* ordinarily pay nothing to the state and collect rent in kind from those to whom they lease their fields, but in some cases, when they do not themselves cultivate, the *Darbar* exacts a share of the produce.'[1]

In Marwar 'the entire amount of personal revenue' of the Prince did not exceed in the early years of the reign of Man Singh (1803-1843) ten *lakhs* of rupees, though in the reign of Bijay Singh (1753-1793) the income of the state amounted to sixteen *lakhs,* one-half of which arose from the salt lakes

1 Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer,* Vol. IIA, p. 49.

alone. The aggregate revenue of the 'feudal' lands was approximately fifty *lakhs*, but in Tod's days these lands hardly produced half this sum. In the *Khalsa* lands the revenues were collected from the *ryots* in kind. The cultivator had to surrender 50 per cent. of the produce; besides, he had to pay the expense of guarding the crops and also those royal officers who divided the produce. The *ryots* of the Chiefs were much better off than those of the *Khalsa;* they had to surrender two-fifths of the produce, and, in lieu of all other taxes and charges, they had to pay a land tax of Rs. 12 on every hundred *bighas* of cultivated land. "The cultivators," says Tod, "repay this mild assessment by attachment to the chiefs."[1]

In Bikaner the lands of the Chiefs were proportionately more extensive than those in any other state. This abnormal distribution was the result, says Tod, 'of the original settlement, when the Beedawats and Kandulotes, whose joint acquisitions exceeded those of Beeka, would not admit him to hold lands in their territory, and made but a slight

1 *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XVI.

pecuniary acknowledgement of his supremacy.' In Tod's days the revenue of the *Khalsa* lands did not exceed one *lakh* of rupees.[1] In Jaisalmer the Prince derived more than one *lakh* from the land. Tod says, "From one-fifth to one-seventh of the gross produce of the land is set aside as the tax of the crown, never exceeding the first, nor falling short of the last. It is paid in kind, which is purchased on the spot by the Palliwal Brahmins, or Banias, and the value remitted to the treasury."[2]

The farming system was prevalent in Jaipur and Kota. In Jaipur the farmers were generally wealthy bankers and merchants. They obtained control over entire districts, and underlet them in *tuppas*, or sub-divisions, the holders of which again subdivided them into single villages, or even shares in a village. Tod gives a vivid account of the oppressive character of this system: "With the profit of all these persons, the expenses attending collections, quartering of *Burkendases*, or armed police, are the *Bhomias* and *Ryots* saddled. Could they only know the point where exaction must stop, they would still

1 *Annals of Bikaner*, Chap. II.
2 *Annals of Jessulmer*, Chap. VII.

have a stimulous to activity; but when the crops are nearly got in, and all just demands satisfied, they suddenly hear that a new renter has been installed in the district, having ousted the holder by some ten or twenty thousand rupees, and at the precise moment when the last toils of the husbandman were near completion.....it is far from uncommon for three different renters to come upon the same district in one season, or even the crop of one season, for five or ten thousand rupees, annulling the existing engagement, no matter how far advanced. Such was the condition of this state; and when to these evils were superadded the exactions called *dind*, or *burrar*, forced contributions to pay those armies of robbers who swept the lands, language cannot exaggerate the extent of misery." In the year 1802-3 the revenues—'fiscal, feudal, commercial and tributary'—of Jaipur were estimated to exceed eighty *lakhs* of rupees, half of which came from the *Khalsa* lands.[1]

In Kota, says Tod, the peasants were 'Helots in condition if not in name.'[2] Zalim Singh, the *de facto* ruler of the state, was the farmer-general. In

1 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. VIII.
2 *Annals of Haravati*, Chap. VII.

1784 he possessed only two or three hundred ploughs; in 1820-21 he had no less than four thousand ploughs. "The fields," says Tod, "which had descended from father to son through the lapse of ages, the unalienable right of the peasant, were seized in spite of law, custom, or tradition, on every defalcation; and it is even affirmed that he sought pretexts to obtain such lands as from their contiguity or fertility he coveted, and that hundreds were thus deprived of their inheritance." Although this system ruined many peasants, it increased the area under cultivation, and thereby contributed to the prosperity of Kota. Tod himself observes, "There is not a nook or a patch in Harouti, where grain can be produced, which his ploughs do not visit. Forests have disappeared; even the barren rocks have been covered with exotic soil, and the mountain's side, inaccessible to the plough, is turned up with a spud, and compelled to yield a crop."[1]

In addition to the land tax in the *Khalsa*, and the income drawn from the Chiefs, the Princes derived considerable revenues from other sources. In

1 *Annals of Haravati*, Chap. VIII.

Mewar there were many taxes: the transit duties on commerce and trade, duties realised from the larger towns and commercial marts, the mines,[1] the marble quarries, war tax,[2] house tax, plough tax, marriage tax, *nazarana* on confirmation of estates, fines,[3] the duties on the sale of spirits, opium and tobacco, *Khur-lakur*,[4] quit-rents of the *Bhumia* Chiefs, etc.

1 "The mines were very productive in former times, and yielded several lacs to the princes of Mewar. The rich tin mines of Jawara produced at one time a considerable proportion of silver. Those of copper are abundant, as is also iron on the now alienated domain on the Chumbul, but lead least of all."—Tod. What Tod calls the tin mines of Mewar are probably the lead and zinc mines at the village of Jawar, 16 miles south of Udaipur, which were discovered towards the end of the fourteenth century. They were worked till the great famine of 1812-13, and are said to have yielded up to 1766 a net annual revenue of about two *lakhs*. (Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. IIA, p. 53).

2 It was a kind of substitute for the regular mode of levying the rents on the produce of the soil and was generally realised from those mountain regions where the produce was disproportionate to the cultivated surface.

3 Fines on renewal of estates and also in composition of offences. "A heavy fine has more effect (especially on the hill tribes) than the execution of the offender, who fears death less than the loss of property."—Tod.

4 "When the princes of Mewar were oftener in the tented field than in the palace, combating for their preservation, it was the duty of every individual to store up wood and forage for the supply of the prince's army. What originated in necessity

The privilege of coining was a royal monopoly,[1] and the mint was a considerable source of income. It will be noticed that almost all the sources of revenue, except the commercial taxes, were inelastic. Commerce could not flourish during the troubled period through which Rajputana passed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Hence during that period the Rajput Princes were reduced to acute financial stringency. They were compelled to introduce many novel and vexatious taxes: *Bulmunsie* ('good behaviour'),[2] *Annie* (an agricultural tax), *Rek Burrar* (tax for registering), *Bhet-Begar* (forced labour),[3] dues exacted for 'repairs of forts, boats at ferries, night guards, guards of passes,' *Purmoh* (grain thrown on the inhabitants at an arbitrary rate),[4] *Poolee* ('the handful from each sheaf at harvest') etc. These taxes naturally reacted on trade and consider-

was converted into an abuse and annual demand." *Khur-lakur* means (the composition for) 'wood and forage.'

1 In Mewar the Salumbra Chief had a copper currency of his own.

2 Tod does not explain the term.

3 It was, of course, not a tax in the literal sense.

4 This was often resorted to at Kota, where the regent Zalim Singh, was farmer-general.

ably diminished the normal revenue derived from that source.

Similar, and in some cases more oppressive, taxes were common in other Rajput states. In Marwar there were the following taxes: poll-tax (*angah*) of one rupee, levied on all adults of either sex; a graduated tax on cattle (*gasmali*); a tax on doors (*Kewari*); imposts (*sayer*) on grain, whether of foreign importation, or the home-grown, in transit from one district to another. Moreover, there were some miscellaneous taxes (*basil*), fluctuating or uncertain. The salt lakes of Marwar yielded more than seven *lakhs* per year.[1] In Bikaner there were the following taxes: a tax on smoke or hearth (*dhooah*);[2] a graduated tax on men, women and beasts (*angah*);[3] imposts on trade; a tax on ploughs (*pusaeti*); special

1 *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XVI.

2 "All must eat; food must be dressed; and as they have neither Chimneys nor glass windows on which to lay the tax, Soorut Singh's (Raja of Bikaner, 1788-1828) Chancellor of the exchequer makes the smoke pay a transit duty ere it gets vent from the various orifices of the edifice."

3 It was graduated according to age and sex in the human species, and according to utility in the brute.

land-tax paid by the Jats (*malbah*); a triennial tax on ploughs (*dhatoie*). In addition, benevolences and compulsory contributions (*Khooshali* and *dind*) were almost a normal feature of taxation.[2] *Dhooah* and *dind* were realised in Jaisalmer as well. In Kota Zalim Singh's system of taxation was so rigid that nothing escaped it. There was a heavy tax on widows who remarried. "Even the *gourd* of the mendicant paid a tithe, and the ascetic in his cell had a domiciliary visit to ascertain the gains of mendicity, in order that a portion should go to the exigencies of the state."[4]

Next to the Prince in rank and power was the Chief holding his estate directly from the Crown. The origin of these estates (called 'fiefs' by Tod) was due to two important factors. Some of them arose out of circumstances similar to those which led to the growth of 'marches' or 'marks' in medieval Europe. With regard to Mewar Tod observes, "The

1 A land-tax of two rupees on each hundred *bighas* of cultivated land.

2 *Annals of Bikaner*, Chap. II.

3 *Annals of Jessulmer*, Chap. VII.

4 *Annals of Haravati*, Chap. VIII.

local disposition of the estates was admirably contrived. Bounded on three sides, the south, east, and west, by marauding barbarous tribes of Bhils, Mers, and Meenas, the circumference of this circle was sub-divided into estates for the chiefs, while the *Khalisa*, or fiscal land, the best and richest, was in the heart of the country and consequently well protected." Thus the Chiefs were originally wardens of the marches, defending the heart of the Kingdom (i.e., the Crown demesne) against the frontier tribes. They were in all cases Rajputs, and in most cases they belonged to the Prince's own clan. But there were non-Rajput Chiefs too. Tod says, "Titles are granted, and even fiefs of office, to ministers and civil servants not Rajpoots; they are, however, but official, and never confer hereditary right. These official fiefs may have originally arisen, here and in Europe, from the same cause: the want of a circulating medium to pay the offices. The *Mantris* of Mewar prefer estates to pecuniary stipend, which give more consequence in every point of view..... In Mewar the prince's architect, painter, physician, bard, genealogist, heralds, and all the generation of the foster-brothers, hold lands." The following

sketch of the powers and privileges of the Chiefs is confined to the Rajput Chiefs alone.

The Chiefs were naturally divided into different grades according to their income and status in the court. In Mewar there were four grades. To the first belonged 16 Chiefs whose estates yielded more than Rs. 50,000 per year. They appeared in the royal presence only on special invitation, upon festivals and solemn ceremonies, and were the hereditary counsellors of the Crown. The second grade consisted of Chiefs whose annual income exceeded Rs. 5,000. Their duty was to be always in attendance upon the Prince. *Foujdars* and military officers were usually selected from them. To the third grade belonged those Chiefs whose income was usually below Rs. 5,000. They always attended on the Prince and 'indeed formed his strength against any combination or opposition of the higher vassals.' The fourth grade was peculiar in many respects. Tod says, "The offsets of the younger branches of the Rana's own family, within a certain period, are called the *babas*, literally 'infants,' and have appanages bestowed on them. Of this class are Shapura and Bunera; too powerful for subjects. They hold on none of the

terms of the great clans, but consider themselves at the disposal of the Prince. These are more within the influence of the Crown."[1]

The Rajput landholders in Mewar were divided into two classes. Tod says, "The *Grasya* chieftain is he who holds (*gras*) by grant (*putta*) of the prince for which he performs service with specified quotas at home and abroad, renewable at lapse, when all the ceremonies of resumption,[2] the fine of relief,[3] and the investiture take place. The *Bhoomia*[4] does not renew

1 "They have their grants renewed, and receive the Khelat of investiture; but they pay no relief, and are exempt from all but personal attendance at their prince's court, and the local service of the district in which their estates are situated."

2 *Zubti*—sequestration.

Tod says that the Prince had the right to resume a *Grasya* Chief's estate, 'while the non-practice of it, the formalities of renewal being gone through, may be said to render the right a dead letter.' In Mewar the estates were at first moveable, then perpetual, and finally hereditary. "The sons were occasionally permitted to succeed their fathers: an indulgence which easily grew into a right, though the Crown had the indubitable reversion. It is not, however, impossible that these changes were not of ancient authority, but arose from the policy of the times to prevent infidelity."

3 *Nazarana*.

4 The *Bhumias* were the military landed proprietors of Mewar. "While they disdained not to derive a subsistence from

his grant, but holds on prescriptive possession. He succeeds without any fine, but pays a small annual quit-rent and can be called upon for local service in the district which he inhabits for a certain period of time."

Some of the powerful and wealthy Chiefs lived in a semi-royal style. Tod says, "The court and the household economy of a great chieftain is a miniature representation of the sovereign's: the same officers, from the pradhan, or minister, to the cup-bearer, as well as the same domestic arrangements. He must have his *sheesh-mahal*,[1] his *bari-mahal*,[2] and his *mandir*,[3] like his prince. He enters the *durri-sala*, or carpet hall, the minstrel preceding him rehearsing the praises of his family; and he takes his seat on his throne, while the assembled retainers, marshalled in lines on the right and left, simultaneously exclaim, 'health to our Chief'; which salutation he returns by

labouring as husbandmen, they never abandoned their arms. They generally inhabited regions well protected by rocks or jungles. Many of them took wives from the aboriginal races in their neighbouring retreats. A mixed race thus grew up."

1 Mirror apartments.

2 Gardens on the terrace within the palace.

3 Private temple of worship.

bowing to all as he passes them. When he is seated, at a given signal they all follow the example, and shield rattles against shield as they wedge into their places." It was customary for the Chiefs to provide for their sons and brothers. Tod says, "In an estate of sixty to eighty thousand rupees of annual rent, the second brother might have a village of three to five thousand of rent. This is his patrimony (*bapota*): he besides pushes his fortune at the court of his sovereign or abroad. Juniors share in proportion. They again subdivide, and have their little circle of dependents. Each new family is known by the name of the founder conjoined to that of his father and tribe."

One of the primary rights of the Chiefs was to advise their Princes 'on all grand occasions where the general peace or tranquillity of the government was threatened.'[1] To be excluded from the council of the

1 In August, 1821, some expatriated Chiefs of Marwar complained against their Prince to the British Political Agent, Western Rajput States. The following significant statement occurs in their letter: "His forefathers have reigned for generations; our forefathers were their ministers and advisers, and whatever was performed was by collective wisdom of the council of our chiefs."

Prince was to be in utter disgrace. In the same way, the vassals and high officers of each Chief were entitled to advise him on all important questions. Tod says, "The council of each chief is, in fact, a miniature representation of the sovereign's. The greater sub-vassals, his civil *pradhan*, the mayor of the household, the *purohit*,[1] the bard and two or three of the most intelligent citizens, form the minor councils....."

So far as the distribution of justice in, and the internal economy of, the estates were concerned, the Chiefs practically enjoyed uncontrolled authority; the Prince seldom interfered in these matters. Tod says, "Now each chief claims the right of administering justice in his own demain, that is, in civil matters; but in criminal cases they ought not, without the special sanction of the crown.....the self-constituted tribunals, the *punchaets*, sit in judgment in all cases where property is involved." We have already pointed out that the Chiefs did not allow the establishment of royal *chabootras* within their estates. The custom of *Rozina* may also be referred to in this connection.[2]

1 Family priest.
2 See pp. 106-107.

One of the most important duties of the Chiefs was to attend the Prince's court. "For state and show," says Tod, "a portion of the greater vassals reside at the capital for some months, when they have permission to retire to their estates, and are relieved by another portion. On the grand military festival the whole attend for a given time; and when the prince took the field, the whole assembled at their own charge; but if hostilities carried them beyond the frontier, they were allowed certain rations." In Mewar the great Chiefs joined the Prince only on the occasion of particular festivals and solemnities Tod says, "If full attendance is required, on the reception of ambassadors, or in discussing matters of general policy, when they have a right to hear and advise as the hereditary council (*punchaet*) of the State, they are summoned by an officer, with the prince's *johar*,[1] and his request. On grand festivals the great *nagarras*, or Kettle-drums, beat at three stated times; the third is the signal for the Chief to quit his abode and mount his steed."

Tod has made an elaborate attempt to compare the general obligations of Rajput 'vassals' with the

1 A salutation, only sent by a superior to an inferior.

'Feudal incidents' of medieval Europe. The practice of realising '*relief*'[1] was widely prevalent in the Rajput states,[2] although during the troubled period preceding the establishment of British suzerainty some of the Chiefs secured the suspension or abolition of their dues in this matter. Alienation required the sanction of the lord paramount only in cases of donations for pious uses. In this respect, therefore, 'Feudalism' in Rajputana was not similar to Feudalism in Europe. *Escheats* and forfeitures were well known in Rajputana. Tod says, "The fiefs which were only to descend in lineal succession, reverted to the Crown on failure of heirs, as they could not be bequeathed by will.....Forfeitures for crimes must of course occur,

1 A sum of money due to the lord by a vassal of full age taking a fief by descent.

2 "On the demise of a chief, the prince immediately sends a party, termed the *Zubti* (sequestrator), consisting of a civil officer and a few soldiers, who take possession of the estate in the prince's name. The heir sends his prayer to court to be installed in the property, offering the proper relief. This paid, the chief is invited to repair to the presence, when he performs homage, and makes protestations of service and fealty; he receives a fresh grant, and the inauguration terminates by the prince girding him with a sword, in the old forms of chivalry. It is an imposing ceremony, performed in a full assembly of the court, and one of the few which has never been relinquished."

and these are partial or entire, according to the delinquency." *Aids*, implying free gifts or benevolences, were realised by the Rajput Princes from their Chiefs, and by the latter from their 'vassals.' In some states special taxes were levied on many occasions for the necessities of the Prince or the head of a clan.[1] On the marriage of the daughters of the Prince, a benevolence or contribution was always levied.[2] In Jaipur the most extensive benevolence was realised on the marriage of the heir-apparent. *Wardship* existed in Rajputana as well as in medieval Europe, 'often terminating.....in.....defrauding a helpless infant, to the pecuniary benefit of some court favourite.' The guardianship of infant Chiefs was generally vested in their mothers, occasionally in the heads of the respective clans. Sometimes the Prince himself undertook this responsibility. The control exercised by the feudal Kings of Europe on the *marriage* of their vassals was never claimed by the Princes of Rajpu-

1 See pp. 117-120.

2 "In this aid the civil officers of government contribute equally with others. It is a point of honour with all to see their sovereign's daughters married, and for once the contribution merited the name of benevolence."

tana.[1]. "Thus," concludes Tod, "setting aside marriage (which even in Europe was only partial and local) and alienation, four of the six chief incidents marking the feudal system are in force in Rajasthan, viz., relief, escheats, aids, and wardships."

Sub-infeudation, in the proper sense of the term, was unknown in Rajputana, but, as we have pointed out above, in large estates the Chiefs generally allotted villages for the maintenance of their sons and brothers.[2] Tod says, "The extent to which the sub-division.....is carried in some of the Rajpoot states, is ruinous to the protection and general welfare of the country. It is pursued in some parts till there is actually nothing left sufficiently large to share, or tc furnish subsistence for one individual: consequently a great deprivation of services to the state ensues. But this does not prevail so much in the larger principalities as in the isolated tributary *thacoorats* or lordships scattered over the

1 "Every chief, before he marries, makes it known to his sovereign. It is a compliment which is expected, and is besides attended with some advantage, as the prince invariably confers presents of honour, according to the station of the individual."

2 See p. 125.

country; as amongst the Jharejas of Kutch, the tribes in Cattiwar, and the small independencies of Guzerat bordering on the greater western Rajpoot states." In Mewar the Chiefs were careful not to let this practice become too common; they sent the extra members of their families to seek their fortunes abroad.

The general weakness of the Rajput central government, resulting in 'the unsettled state of society and the deficiency of paramount protection,' led to the growth of a peculiar system called *Rekwalee*, which had some resemblance with the *salvamenta* of Europe. Tod says, "It originated in the necessity of protection; and the modes of obtaining it, as well as the compensation when obtained, were various. It often consisted of money or kind on the reaping of each harvest; sometimes in multiplicity of petty privileges and advantages, but the chief object was to obtain *bhoom*[1].....Personal service at stated periods, to aid in the agricultural economy of the protector, was sometimes stipulated, when the husbandmen were to find implements and cattle,

1 See pp. 123-124.

and to attend whenever ordered.[1] The protected calls the chief 'patron;' and the condition may not unaptly be compared to that of personal commendation.....founded on the disturbed state of society." This practice received very wide currency during 'the interminable predatory warfare' of the half century preceding 1818. In Mewar it was abolished in the settlement which took place between the Rana and his Chiefs in 1818.

In its extreme form the *Rekwalee* system created conditions analogous to slavery. Whole communities surrendered their liberty and became, if not slaves, yet nearly approaching the condition of slaves, to the protector. The class called *Bussee* approxi-

1 Tod personally examined 'some hundred engagements' concerning *Rekwalee* and notices a variety of details: "We see the chieftain stipulating for fees on marriages; for a dish of the good fare at the wedding feast, which he transfers to a relation of his district if unable to attend himself; portions of fuel and provender; and even wherewithal to fill the wassail cup in his days of merriment. The Rajpoot's religious notions are not of so strict a character as to prevent his even exacting his *rekwalee* dues from the Church lands, and the threat of slaughtering the sacred flock of our Indian Apollo has been resorted to, to compel payment when withheld. Nay, by the chiefs, it was imposed on things locomotive: on caravans, or tandas or merchandize, whenever they halted for the day, *rekwalee* was demanded."

mated closely to the *tributarii* and *coloni*, perhaps to the *servi*, of the Salic Franks, "who were cultivators of the earth, and subject to residence upon their master's estate, though not destitute of property or civil rights." To the same class belonged the cultivator in Haravati, called *hallee* (ploughman). While the degradation of the *Bussee* was due to the necessity of protection arising out of external violence, the servility of the the *hallee*[1] was the result of administrative despotism.

Bussee signified 'acquired slavery,' in contradistinction to *gola*, 'an hereditary slave.' Thousands were sold into slavery as a result of famines and predatory warfare. The offspring of a *golee*[2] must be a *gola*. "Hence the great number of *golas* in Rajput families.....They are well treated, and are generally esteemed in proportion to the quality of the mother, whether Rajpootnee, Moslem, or of the degraded

1 The *hallee* "is servile though without the title—a serf in condition but without the patrimony; compelled to labour for subsistence on the land he once owned; chained to it by the double tie of debt and strict police; and if flight were practicable, the impossibility of bettering his condition from the anarchy around would render it unavailing."

2 Female slave.

tribes; they hold confidential places about the Chiefs of whose blood they are."[1] The illegitimate sons of the Ranas of Mewar (called *das* or slave) were liberally provided for, but they had no social status. The meanest Rajput would refuse his daughter to a son of the Rana of this kind. Tod illustrated the difference between *Bussee* and *gola* by the following remark: "The *bussee* can redeem his liberty: the *gola* has no wish to do so, because he could not improve his condition nor overcome his natural defects. To the *bussee* nothing dishonourable attaches: the class retain their employment and caste, and are confined to no occupation, but it must be exercised with the Chief's sanction."

The nature and strength of the Rajput political organisation were determined by two important factors: the reciprocal duties of Prince and Chiefs, and the relations between Chiefs and their 'sub-vassals.' Tod's observations on these points are illustrated by two important documents quoted by him.[2]

1 Tod often received the most confidential messages from Chiefs of the highest rank through these channels.

2 Appendix to *Sketch of a Feudal System in Rajasthan*, No. I, II.

These documents embody the views of the Chiefs of Marwar and the 'sub-vassals' of Deogarh, 'one of the largest fiefs in Rajasthan.'

In their complaint to the British Government against Raja Man Singh of Marwar, the Chiefs of Marwar declared: "Sri Maharaja and ourselves are of one stock, all Rahtores. He is our head, we his servants. *When our services are acceptable, then is he our lord; when not, we are again his brothers and kindred, claimants and laying claim to the land.*" There could be no clearer definition of the reciprocal duties of Prince and Chiefs, no more authentic interpretation of the idea that the state was the joint property of the clan.[1] The same idea is forcefully expressed in the remonstrance of the 'sub-vassals' of Deogarh against their Chief: "*When Deogarh was established, at the same time were our allotments; as is his patrimony, so is our patrimony*.....Our rights and privileges in his (i.e., Chief's) family are the same as his in the family of the Presence (i.e., the Rana)."

If the 'sub-vassals had their rights, they had

1 See pp. 100-101.

their duties too. They were bound to follow the standard of the lord (i.e., the Chief) even against their sovereign.[1] Tod says, "If the question were put to a Rajpoot to whom his service is due, whether to his chief or his sovereign, the reply would be, *Rajca malik weh pat ca malik yeh*:; 'He is the sovereign of the state, but this is my head:' an ambiguous phrase, but well understood to imply that his own immediate chief is the only authority he regards." Those 'sub-vassals' who wished to stand well with their Chiefs would be very slow in receiving any honours or favours from the Prince.[2] No 'sub-vassal' could perform any service to the Prince except through his

1 Numerous instances could be given of whole clans devoting themselves to the Chief against their sovereign. See the account of the death of the Chief of Nimaj in *Annals of Marwar* and the description of the Sheogarh Feud in Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

2 "The Deogurh chief sent one of his sub-vassals to court on a mission: his address and deportment gained him favour, and his consequence was increased by a seat in the presence of his sovereign. When he returned, he found this had lost him the favour of his chief, who was offended, and conceived a jealousy both of his prince and his servant. The distinction paid to the latter was, he said, subversive of his proper authority, and the vassal incurred by his vanity the loss of estimation where alone it was of value."

own immediate superior. No Rajput Prince was wise or strong enough to impose an oath of Salisbury on subjects whose service was available to the state only under these dangerous restrictions.

The looseness of the link between the Prince and the 'sub-vassals' was an obvious source of weakness, not only to the political structure of the Rajput state, but also to its military organisation. Originally there was no standing army in any Rajput state; the Prince had to depend on such forces as the Chiefs could collect in any emergency. Naturally the loyalty of the Chiefs, and the readiness of the 'sub-vassals' to render service, were decisive factors. The system completely broke down in the eighteenth century under the pressure of the political and military chaos of that age of transition.[1] Mewar had to create the nucleus of a standing army by enlisting

1 In 1803 the regular contingent of feudal levies in Jaipur amounted to about 4,000 efficient horse, when the *Kher* (*levee en masse*) was called out, 20,000 men, horse and foot, were available. In Marwar every Chief had to supply one cavalier for every five hundred rupees of rent. The table of the Chiefs of Marwar compiled by Tod shows that the total sum payable by them was Rs. 817,000; therefore the number of horsemen to be supplied by them was 1,634.

some mercenaries from Sind. The principal motive was probably to deal with internal troubles caused by 'over-mighty subjects.'[1] Tod has left for us the English version of a grant from Rana Ari Singh to a Sindhi chief named Abdul Rahim Beg (dated 1770). It is significant to note that this chief of Muslim mercenaries was granted privileges and rank similar to those enjoyed by the Chief of Salumbra, 'the first of home-chieftains.' Jaipur adopted the custom of employing mercenaries to a greater extent. In 1803 the foreign army of Jaipur was 13,000 strong, consisting of ten battalions of infantry with guns, a legion of 4,000 Nagas, a corps of Rohillas for police duties, and another corps of Rohilla cavalry, 700 strong. In spite of its numerical strength this standing army was 'an ill paid band, neither respected at home nor feared abroad.' "In Marwar," says Tod, "the feudal compact was too strong to tolerate it, till Pathan predatory bands, prowling amidst the ruins of Mogul despotism, were called in to partake in each family broil; the consequence was the weakening of all, and opening the door to a power stronger than any, to be the arbiter

1 See the story of Bhindir in *Personal Narrative*.

of their fate." The mercenary force maintained by the Princes of Marwar consisted mainly of Rohilla and Afghan infantry, armed with muskets and matchlocks Having cannon and sufficient discipline to act in a body, they were formidable to the Rajput cavaliers. The principal task was to overawe the turbulent Chiefs who opposed the Prince.[1] In addition to the Muslim mercenaries there was at Jodhpur a brigade of 'monastic militants' or fighting *Sannyasis*. These mercenaries were not satisfied with monthly pay alone; lands to a considerable amount were granted to the commanders. The result was ruinous to the country. Tod says, "The existence of such a species of force,[2] opposed in moral and religious sentiment to the retainers of the state, has only tended to widen the breach between them and their head, and to destroy every feeling of confidence." In Bikaner the household troops consisted of a battalion of foreign infantry, of 500 men with five guns, and three

1 For an example of the part played by the mercenaries against the Chiefs, see *Personal Narrative*. The Rohilla battalions were called *Alligoles*.

2 At one period the Raja of Jodhpur maintained a force consisting of 11,000 men.

squadrons of horse, about 250 in number; all under foreign leaders.[1] Zalim Singh of Kota also maintained foreign troops under foreign leaders. Dalil Khan and Mehrab Khan were his military advisers. "The stupendous fortifications of the capital, with which there is nothing in India to compete, save the walls of Agra, were all executed by the former. By him, also was raised the pride of the Regent, the city called after him, Jhalra-patun: while all the other forts were put into a state which makes Kotah the most defensible territory in India.....Mehrab Khan was the commander of the infantry, which he maintained in a state of admirable discipline and efficiency; they received their *bees roza*, or twenty days' pay, each month, with their arrears at the end of every second year."[2]

It is clear that the political and military systems on which the Rajput states had been reared during the Middle Ages were in a melting pot at the time when they came into contact with expanding British Imperialism. Was Tod correct in describing these systems as feudal? Our answer to this important

1 *Annals of Bikaner*, Chap. II.
2 *Annals of Haravati*, Chap. IX.

question may be best expressed in the words of the first edition of the *Rajputana Gazetteer*:[1] "In fact, the system upon which the land is distributed among the branch families and other great hereditary land-holders, is the basis of the political constitution of a Rajput State and forms its characteristic distinction. And this system is not, speaking accurately, feudal, though it has grown in certain states into something very like feudalism. The tenure of the great clans-men involves military service and payment of financial aids, but its source is to be found in the original clan-occupation of the lands, and in the principles of kinship and a purity of descent from the original occupants or conquerors."

1 Vol. I, 1879, pp. 59-60.

BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH MEWAR

The early history of Mewar is still shrouded in obscurity. It is unfortunate that even in the present state of our knowledge we are not able to give full and authentic information regarding important incidents like the capture of Chitor by Ala-ud-din Khalji and its liberation by Hamir. For about half a century Mewar struggled hard against the Mughals to preserve her independence; but neither patriotism nor geography could prevail for all time against superior military strength. In 1615 Rana Amar Singh submitted to Jahangir, but the terms granted to him were far less humiliating than those imposed upon the other Rajput Princes. In spite of this unusual favour the Ranas of Mewar made repeated attempts to throw off the Mughal yoke. Jagat Singh (1628-1642) precipitated a conflict with the Imperial court by repairing the fort of Chitor in contravention of the terms of the treaty of 1615. This work was continued after his death by his son and successor, Raj Singh (1652-1680). In 1654 Shah Jahan sent a large army against Chitor. Raj Singh submitted,

and the fortifications of Chitor were demolished. In 1679 Raj Singh espoused the cause of the Rathors and began war against Aurangzib. This war was continued after his death by his son and successor, Jai Singh (1680-1698), who, however, soon deserted the Rathors and concluded a separate peace with the Emperor (1681).

Marwar and Amber rose to prominence under the Mughals, for their Princes rendered conspicuous services to the Empire for about two centuries. But the Princes of Mewar kept themselves aloof from the splendour of Delhi and Agra and thereby lost the advantage which fell to successful courtiers. As Sir J. N. Sarkar observes, "The Maharana of Udaipur, in spite of his pre-eminent descent, was a negligible factor of the Hindu population of the Mughal world, as he hid himself among his mountain fastnesses, and never appeared in the Mughal Court or camp."[1] There was no change in the attitude of Mewar even after the death of Aurangzib. The decadence of the Empire was utilised by the rulers of Marwar and Amber (Ajit Singh and Sawai Jai Singh) for the aggrandisement of their own power, but the weak and

1 *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p. 324.

short-sighted successors of Raj Singh failed to make proper use of this excellent opportunity for the restoration of their former pre-eminence. Gradually the Maratha menace made its appearance. As early as 1728 the Marathas defeated and killed Girdhar Bahadur, the Mughal Governor of Malwa, and in 1734 Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia invaded Bundi. The whole of Rajputana was alarmed, and in October, 1734, Sawai Jai Singh of Amber summoned a conference of all the Princes of Rajputana to devise measures for the protection of their territory. But the Rajputs had ever been strangers to unity; so the conference failed to produce any tangible result,[1] and Rajputana became a helpless prey to Maratha aggression.

In January, 1736, Peshwa Baji Rao personally appeared at the southern frontier of Mewar, and the terrified[2] Rana, Jagat Singh (1734-1751), welcomed him at Udaipur. The Rana had to sign a treaty, promising to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 1,60,000, to cover which the *pargana* of Banhada was ceded

1 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 252.

2 See the Rana's letters to Biharidas Pancholi in Tod, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XV.

to the Marathas. This amount was divided into three equal shares, assigned to Holkar, Sindhia and Pawar. The management was entrusted to Holkar; subsequently Sindhia acted as receiver-general. Tod says, "This was the only regular tributary engagement Mewar entered into." It remained in force for ten years, after which it became a nullity.[1]

The fall of the Mughal Empire not only opened the gates of Rajputana to the ambitious Marathas; it encouraged mutual jealousy and civil war among the Rajput Princes and thereby made the work of the Marathas far easier than it otherwise would have been. Sir Jadunath Sarkar observes, "The imperial Government of Delhi had held together and protected all the feudatory States of India. But when the Emperor became a lifeless shadow confined within the harem:.....this unifying bond and common controlling authority was dissolved. No superior power was left to enforce lawful rights and prevent ambitious conflicts between one vassal State and another, one prince and another of the same royal house. All the pent up personal ambitions and inter-

1 Tod, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XV.

State rivalries,—which the strong hand of the paramount Power at Delhi, from Akbar to Bahadur Shah, had repressed for a century and a half—now burst forth without fear or check. And Rajputana became a Zoological garden with the barriers of the cages thrown down and the keepers removed. The fiercest animal passions raged throughout the land, redeemed only now and then by individual instances of devotion and chivalry which had not yet totally disappeared from the human bosom."[1]

A civil war began in Jaipur after Sawai Jai Singh's death (September, 1743), and Rana Jagat Singh played a prominent part in this disastrous conflict. Jai Singh was succeeded by his eldest son, Ishwari Singh; but Madho Singh, Jai Singh's son by a Mewar princess, claimed the *gadi* in accordance with the terms of the marriage treaty. Rana Jagat Singh supported his nephew's claim and advanced towards Jaipur. Ishwari Singh secured the support of the Marathas, who compelled the Rana to retreat in 1745. The Rana then secured the assistance of

1 *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. I, pp. 235-236.

Malhar Rao Holkar. In March, 1747, the combined army consisting of the troops of Mewar and Bundi,[1] supported by Holkar's cavarly led by his son Khande Rao, suffered a severe defeat in the battle of Rajmahal.[2] The flourishing commercial mart of Bhilwara was plundered. The whole of Rajputana was then suffering from a terrible famine.[3] Unable to continue the war, Jagat Singh concluded a humiliating peace. Even after this rebuff he continued his efforts to placate the Marathas. In December, 1750, Ishwari Singh committed suicide in order to escape from the galling yoke of the Marathas, and Madho Singh sat upon the *gadi* of Jaipur, but this

1 Ummed Singh, one of the claimants to the *gadi* of Bundi, was an enemy of Ishwari Singh.

2 Tod says, " ... the Seesodias did not evince in the battle of Rajmahal that gallantry which must have its source in moral strength ... The Rana vented his indignation in a galling sarcasm; he gave the sword of state to a common curtezan to carry in procession, observing, 'it was a woman's weapon in these degenerate times': a remark, the degrading severity of which made a lasting impression in the decline of Mewar."

3 Men could not get water even for washing their faces. The Rana decided to leave Udaipur and go to the bank of the Dhebar lake. (*Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. xxi, letter no. 19).

war of succession made the Marathas the arbiters of Rajputana.[1]

The exploitation of Mewar by the Marathas began in Jagat Singh's reign. Although he was a patron of arts,[2] he was not fitted by character to safeguard the real interests of his State in those stirring times. Tod says, "Addicted to pleasures, his habits of levity and profusion totally unfitted him for the task of governing his country at such a juncture; he considered his elephant fights of more importance than keeping down the Mahrattas."[3]

During the reign of his successor, Pratap Singh II (1751-1754), Mewar had to pay heavy contributions to the Marathas. Pratap Singh was disliked by a group of *sardars*, who tried to depose him and set up his uncle Nathji. Thus began a stormy period of disputed successions which made the

1 Tod, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XV. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, Chap. VII.

2 "Like all his family, he patronized the arts, greatly enlarged the palace, and expended £250,000 in embellishing the islets of the Peshola. The villas scattered over the valley were all erected by him, and many of those festivals devoted to idleness and dissipation, and now firmly rooted at Oodipur, were instituted by Juggut Sing II."—Tod, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XV.

3 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XV.

Marathas the umpire in the family disputes of Mewar. It was in the reign of Pratap Singh that Rampura, an important fief of Mewar, was assigned to Malhar Rao Holkar by Madho Singh of Amber, who had received it as an appanage from Rana Jagat Singh. This was, says Tod, 'the first limb severed from Mewar.'[1]

During the reign of Raj Singh II (1754-1761) the repeated depredations of the Marathas 'so exhausted this country, that the Rana was compelled to ask pecuniary aid from the Brahmin collector of the tribute to enable him to marry the Rahtore chieftain's daughter.'[2] Raj Singh was a minor when he ascended the *gadi,* and he died before attaining majority. This naturally aggravated the internal chaos in Mewar and made her a defenceless prey to the Marathas.[3]

Malhar Rao Holkar left Rajputana in January, 1760. The third battle of Panipat was fought on

1 *Annals of Mewar,* Chap. XVI.

2 *Annals of Mewar,* Chap. XVI.

3 In March, 1757, Raghunath Rao took a ransom of one *lakh*. In 1758 Jankoji Sindhia imposed a heavy contribution. In 1759 the Peshwa directed Malhar Rao Holkar to put pressure on the Rana for prompt payment.

January 14, 1761. The terrible disaster suffered by the Marathas[1] encouraged the Rajputs, and Madho Singh of Jaipur made a half-hearted attempt to crush Maratha influence in Rajputana. Mewar, distracted by minority rule and civil war, impoverished by the heavy contributions paid to the Marathas, failed to utilise this opportunity. The Marathas did not take long to recover their lost prestige. Within a few months of the battle of Panipat Malhar Rao Holkar took upon himself the task of restoring Maratha authority in Rajputana and Malwa.[2]

As Raj Singh II died without issue, his uncle Ari Singh II (1761-1773) succeeded him. In April, 1761, the Peshwa asked Malhar Rao Holkar to realise ten or twenty *lakhs* of rupees as the succession fee of the new Rana; but that war-worn veteran was so busy with difficulties in Malwa and Jaipur that he could not visit Mewar. For four years after his accession Ari Singh was not troubled by the Marathas. In 1765 Mahadji Sindhia realised five *lakhs* from

1 For the immediate effect of this battle see the author's *Peshwa Madhav Rao I*, pp. 131-132.

2 For details, see the author's *Peshwa Madhav Rao I*, Chap. VI.

him, and in 1766 the Rana promised to pay Rs. 26,30,221 in four years.[1]

Ari Singh's ungovernable temper and insolent demeanour alienated the nobility and introduced a disastrous war of succession which offered the Marathas a fresh opportunity of squeezing money out of impoverished Mewar. Only five out of the sixteen great Chiefs of Mewar remained loyal to him. The disaffected nobles set up a 'youth' named Ratan Singh, declared to be the posthumous son of Raj Singh II, as a rival candidate for the throne. It was also alleged that Ari Singh had murdered his nephew to acquire the crown for himself. Although there were strong grounds to question the legitimacy of Ratan Singh, yet his cause was supported by Bijay Singh of Jodhpur and Prithvi Singh of Jaipur. In 1769 Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar appeared near Udaipur to put the pretender in posssesion of Mewar. Differences, however, soon arose between these two Chiefs, as a result of which Tukoji Holkar returned to Kota. Mahadji remained idle and took

1 See Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 515-518. Tod's statements (*Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVI) on these transactions are unreliable.

no steps to deliver an assault on Udaipur. He thought it better to give up the cause of Ratan Singh, who had no money, and to support Ari Singh, who was prepared to pay. Ari Singh agreed to pay 64 *lakhs* as contribution and 5 *lakhs* as present to Sindhia, and to alienate 1 ¼ *lakhs* worth of *jagir* in favour of Ratan Singh. Of the promised amount a large share (33 *lakhs*) was given immediately; for the balance some districts[1] were left to be jointly administered by Rajput and Maratha officers.[2] "The attempt to take 64 lakhs of Rupees in cash from the kingdom of Mewar in its then condition was as hopeful of success as a plan to draw blood out of stone. It only left a sore perpetually open between the Maharana and the house of Sindhia."[3]

After Sindhia's departure Ari Singh quarrelled with his nobles, lost Godwar (which was taken by Bijoy Singh of Marwar), and finally fell a victim to

1 Jawad, Jiran, Nimach, Morwan. This arrangement continued till 1774, when Sindhia dismissed the Rana's officers and took these districts under his sole management. Later on Morwan was made over to Holkar, who also compelled the Rana to cede Nimbahera.

2 See the author's *Peshwa Madhav Rao I*, pp. 155-156.

3 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 521.

a Hada Prince's lance. He was succeeded by his minor son Hamir (1771-1777), whose proud and ambitious mother managed affairs in his name. She was supported by the Saktawats and opposed by the Chandawats, whose Chief had been murdered by Ari Singh. The mercenary Sindhi troops joined the feud. Tod says, "...the demoralization of Mewar was complete: her fields were deluged with blood, and her soil was the prey of every paltry marauder." The rebellion of one of the Chandawat Chieftains in 1774 compelled the queen-mother to invoke the assistance of Sindhia, who recovered the crown lands usurped by the refractory noble and imposed on him a fine of twelve *lakhs* of rupees. But Mewar had to pay a high price for this service: some valuable districts fell under the occupation of Sindhia and Holkar. Besides territorial sequestration, large contributions were also realised from Mewar by the Marathas during Hamir's reign.[1]

In 1777 Hamir died 'before he had attained even Rajpoot majority;' his younger brother, Bhim Singh, succeeded to 'the little enviable title of Rana.' Tod

1 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVI.

says, "……the half century during which he has occupied the throne, had been as fruitful in disaster as any period of her history……He was but eight years of age on his accession, and remained under his mother's tutelage long after his minority had expired. This subjection fixed his character; naturally defective in energy, and impaired by long misfortune, he continued to be swayed by faction and intrigue."[1]

When Mahadji Sindhia received a signal check from the combined forces of Marwar and Jaipur (1787),[2] the Rana's nobles for a moment forgot their feuds and made a determined effort to resume their alienated territory. Nimbahera, Jawad, Rampura and some other districts were occupied. When the Mewar nobles were about to advance towards Malwa for further operations against the Marathas, they were confronted by a large Maratha army consisting of contingents from Sindhia and Holkar. The Rajputs were defeated with great slaughter; some Chiefs, including the minister, were slain. The newly made conquests were all rapidly lost.[3]

1 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.
2 Battle of Tunga, miscalled the battle of Lalsot.
3 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

After this military disaster the internal feuds broke out again with fresh ferocity. The Rana's minister, who was a Saktawat, was murdered by the Chief of the Chandawats almost in the Rana's presence. The two clans now resorted to open war; the Rana remained a helpless spectator. The result was, naturally, disastrous. Tod says, "The agriculturist, never certain of the fruits of his labour, abandoned his fields, and at length his country; mechanical industry found no recompense, and commerce was at the mercy of unlicensed spoliation. In a very few years Mewar lost half her population; her lands lay waste, her mines were unworked, and her looms, which formerly supplied all around, forsaken. The prince partook of the general penury; instead of protecting, he required protection; the bonds which united him with his subjects were snapped, and each individual or petty community provided for itself that defence which he could not give. Hence arose a train of evils: every cultivator, whether fiscal or feudal, sought out a patron, and entered into engagements as the price of protection. Hence every Rajpoot who had a horse and lance, had his clients; and not a camel-load of merchandize could pass the abode

of one of these cavaliers without paying fees. The effects of such disorder were felt long after the cause ceased to exist.....'"[1]

Meanwhile Mahadji Sindhia had redeemed his lost influence in Rajputana by the battles of Merta and Patan (1790), 'in which the brave Rahtores, after acts of the most devoted gallantry, were completely overthrown.' Acting on the advice of Zalim Singh of Kota, who had sometime before been a noble at the court of Udaipur, Rana Bhim Singh solicited Sindhia's assistance to expel the rebellious Chandawats from Chitor. Sindhia was at that time very anxious to consolidate his influence in Rajputana. He furnished Zalim Singh with a strong corps under Ambaji Ingle. The ostensible object was the restoration of the Rana's authority in his State, but Zalim Singh's secret desire was to secure permanent influence in Mewar. He calculated that the combined resources of Kota and Mewar would bestow upon him the lead of Rajasthan. So he utilised Ambaji's contingent in suppressing those nobles of Mewar who were likely to oppose his pre-

1 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

dominance at the Rana's court. Sometime later Mahadji Sindhia himself saw the Rana at the Tiger Mount, within a few miles of Udaipur. Ambaji was shrewd enough to scent Zalim Singh's ulterior motive. He outwitted the crafty Rajput by entering into a secret compact with the Chandawats. The Salumbra Chief promised to humble himself before the Rana, to surrender Chitor, and to pay a contribution of twenty *lakhs,* provided Zalim Singh was ordered to retire from Mewar. "This suggestion," says Tod, "apparently founded on the rebellious chief's antipathy to Zalim, but in reality prompted by Umbaji, ensured the approbation, as it suited the views, of all parties, but especially Sindhia, who was desirous of repairing to Poonah. Zalim.....lost the opportunity of realizing his long cherished scheme of wielding the united resources of Mewar and Haravati."[1]

In 1792 Mahadji Sindhia left the North for Poona, leaving Ambaji Ingle[2] as his lieutenant in

1 *Annals of Mewar,* Chap. XVII.

2 Broughton (*Letters from a Mahratta Camp,* p. 51) wrote on February 26, 1809, "Ambajee is a tall, hale-looking man for his age, which is said to be upwards of eighty: his complexion

Mewar. For some years he remained the 'sole arbiter' of Mewar, 'reaping its revenues and amassing those hoards of wealth, which subsequently gave him the lead in Hindustan, and enabled him nearly to assert his independence.' For Mewar, however, his rule was not an unmixed evil. Says Tod, "……the suppression of feuds and exterior aggression (by the Marathas) gave to Mewar a degree of tranquillity and happiness to which she had long been a stranger".[1] Malcolm says, "Ambajee Ingliah, who was one of Sindhia's principal officers employed in Rajpootana, though he oppressed the princes and chiefs of that country, was kind and considerate to the inhabitants. It was on his departure that the scene of devastation commenced."[2]

When Ambaji became Sindhia's viceroy in Hindustan (1798),[3] he left Ganesh Pant as his lieutenant in Mewar. Ganesh Pant entered into a cons-

is dark; and there is much good humour and intelligence in his countenance. His dress was remarkably plain, almost amounting to meanness; consisting of a common chintz jacket, quilted with cotton, a coarse red shawl, and a white turban."

1 *Annals of Mewar,* Chap. XVII.

2 *Memoir of Central India,* Vol. I, 1824, p. 129.

3 *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. VIII, No. 82, 86.

piracy with some of the Rana's principal officers and tried 'to make the most of his ephemeral power with a rapacious spirit.' When his proceedings were reported to Ambaji, Ganesh Pant was replaced by Rai Chand. The Rana's officers refused to yield to Rai Chand, 'and each party formed a nucleus for disorder and misrule.' The dispossessed Chandawat Chiefs took to horse, and in conjunction with lawless Sindhis scoured the country. When they were hard pressed they appealed to Ambaji. For the sum of ten *lakhs* 'the avaricious Mahratta' agreed to recall his deputy from Mewar, denounced the Saktawats, and lent his support to the Chandawats. Strengthened by Ambaji's support the Chandawats gained the ascendancy in the Rana's court, attacked their rivals, and raised from their estates the money payable to Ambaji.[1]

Meanwhile Mahadji Sindhia had died (February 12, 1794) and he had been succeeded by Daulat Rao Sindhia, who had scarcely attained his fifteenth year.[2] In 1798 Daulat Rao's right to the *gadi* was

1 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

2 See Edwardes' note in Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II, p. 230.

challenged by Mahadji's widows, who were supported by the Shenwi Brahmins. These Brahmins formed a powerful faction, for they had held the principal offices under Mahadji's government, and many of them were connected by relationship. A very prominent member of this faction was Lakshman Anant, better known as Lakhwa Dada, one of Mahadji's principal officers. He wrote to the Rana to throw off Ambaji's yoke and expel his lieutenant. Ambaji retaliated by asking his deputy to eject all Shenwi Brahmins from Mewar. The most important Chiefs of Mewar gave their support to Lakhwa's party, at first secretly, then openly. Tod says, "Mewar now became the arena on which the rival satraps Umbaji and Lukwa contested the exalted office of Sindhia's lieutenancy in Hindustan". But Lakhwa was restored to favour in Sindhia's court in October, 1799, and appointed to the government of Hindustan. Daulat Rao ordered Ambaji to retire from Mewar and to deliver over the country to Lakhwa. Ambaji reluctantly obeyed his chief.[1] In January, 1800, Lakhwa reduced the fort of Jahazpur and

1 *Annals of Mewar,* Chap. XVII. Compton, . *European Military Adventurers in Hindustan,* pp. 160-166.

squeezed five *lakhs* from the Rana. Sindhia's court was, however, a battle ground of conflicting interests. In May, 1800, Lakhwa again revolted, and Ambaji was once more appointed Sindhia's viceroy in Hindustan. Lakhwa died in February, 1802. Bala Rao, Ambaji's brother, who was then pursuing Jaswant Rao Holkar, utilised this opportunity to realise money from Mewar, with the support and assistance of the Saktawats and Zalim Singh of Kota. Tod tells us that the Rana raised three *lakhs* 'by the sale of household effects and the jewels of the females of his family.'[1] At this stage the fortunes of Mewar became entangled with the vicissitudes of the Second Anglo-Maratha War.

II

The beginning of the Second Anglo-Maratha War in August, 1803, vitally affected the fortunes of the Rajput Princes. We need not enquire into the circumstances leading to the origin of that war, nor is it necessary for our present purpose to describe the British operations against Sindhia, Bhonsle and

1 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

Holkar. But it is necessary to remember that, while General Wellesley and his lieutenants were destroying Sindhia's power beyond the Narmada, Lord Lake, who was then the Commander-in-Chief, was seizing his territories in Hindustan. Both Bhonsle and Sindhia concluded peace in December, 1803. By the treaty of Surji Anjangaon Sindhia ceded to the East India Company his territory between the Jumna and the Ganges and all districts situated to the northward of the Rajput principalities of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Gohad; but the territory lying between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and to the southward of the former place, was reserved.[1] Thus, although this treaty considerably curtailed Sindhia's power in Northern India, it did not liberate Mewar.

Holkar was so suspicious of Sindhia that during the progress of hostilities he remained a passive spectator, utilising Sindhia's pre-occupation to raise enormous contributions in Malwa. When it was already too late, he decided to take the field against the British. From Malwa he proceeded towards Jaipur territory, for the purpose of negotiating for aid from

1 Articles 2, 7, 11 of the treaty of Surji Anjangaon.

the Rajputs, the Jats, the Rohillas, and the Sikhs. He also requested Sindhia to break the treaty, and renew the war. Daulat Rao was so exasperated against Holkar that he immediately brought the matter to the notice of the British authorities, but some of his ministers, especially his father-in-law, Sharza Rao Ghatge,[1] advised him 'to leave open the door of reconciliation, in case the project of Holkar, in whose wisdom and fortune all the Mahrattas began to have great confidence, should prove worthy of regard'. Sindhia officially agreed to act in 'cordial co-operation' for the reduction of Holkar, but he took no steps when the latter levied contributions at Ajmer[2] and made an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the fort of Ajmer. One of Sindhia's generals, Bapuji Sindhia, co-operated with the British army, but afterwards

1 Broughton describes him as 'the most unprincipled, sanguinary and daring public man that has for many years figured in Hindostan.' "He was," says Broughton, "bold and hasty in conception but.....little scrupulous in the means by which he endeavoured to attain his end.....Wanton cruelty was another principal feature in his character, and he is supposed to have caused more innocent and respectable blood to be shed than any Minister who ever conducted the affairs of a Mahratta State." (*Letters Written in a Mahratta Camp*, letter XX).

2 Ajmer belonged to Sindhia.

deserted to Holkar.[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Monson was instructed by Lord Lake to keep Holkar in check; but, in the words of General Wellesley, Monson 'advanced without reason and retreated in the same manner', suffering an 'overwhelming disaster' in the Mukund Dara Pass, thirty miles to the south of Kota (August, 1804). Rajputana had become the battle-ground of the English and the Marathas.

Holkar was defeated in the battle of Dig (near Bharatpur) on November 13, 1804, but Lord Lake's attack on the fort of Bharatpur failed early in 1805. A hasty peace was concluded with the Jat Raja, for an immediate rupture with Sindhia was apprehended. Sindhia advanced from Burhanpur towards Malwa, and after the conclusion of the British treaty with Bharatpur, Holkar, Bapuji Sindhia and Amir Khan, the well-known Pathan soldier of fortune, who was a lieutenant of Holkar, met with a cordial reception in Sindhia's camp. Grant Duff says, "Sindia in regard to Holkar endeavoured to justify himself to the

1 Grant Duff says, "No Mahratta doubts, and the governor general must have known, that Bappoojee Sindhia and Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskar joined Holkar with Doulat Rao's consent. Whilst disavowed, it was not expedient to charge him with such an act of treacherous hostility....."

British government, by telling the Resident that Holkar, who had intended to plunder the British territories, had at his request abandoned that design and consented to his mediation for the attainment of peace". But the British authorities were not deceived. Lord Lake ordered the British Resident to leave Sindhia's camp, and he himself moved from Bharatpur with his whole army towards Malwa. Sindhia and Holkar at once retreated in a south-westerly direction towards Kota. Tod says, "The Mahratta leaders were anxious, if the war should be renewed, to shelter their families and valuables in the strongholds of Mewar."[1] Sindhia asked the Rana 'to deliver up the fort of Kamalmeer to him, for him and Holkar to put their famalies in.'[2] An attempt was also made to induce the rulers of Udaipur, Jaipur and Jodhpur 'to form a combination against the British Government,' and Captain Sturrock, Resident at Jaipur, suspected that the Rajput Princes were willing to form an anti-British coalition 'from an ill-grounded apprehension that they have more to dread from its (i.e.,

1 Tod, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

2 Secret Consultations, Imperial Record Department, July 11, 1805, No. 2.

British Government) encroachment than from the Maratha Chiefs whose views are principally directed to the collection of tribute."[1]

Captain Sturrock's apprehensions were not altogether groundless. In Mewar the Chandawats, guided by Ambaji Ingle,[2] were anxious to come closer to the Marathas. They were, however, opposed by the Saktawats, who, although favourably inclined towards Jaswant Rao Holkar, tried to keep aloof from entanglements with the Marathas. Holkar was very jealous at the growth of Sindhia's influence in Mewar; so he encouraged the Saktawat policy of isolation and obstructed Ambaji's plan to partition Mewar amongst the great Maratha leaders. For the time being Mewar was saved by Holkar's mercy. Tod attributes the sudden change in Holkar's attitude to a spirit of chivalry,[3] but our information about Holkar's charac-

1 S. C., July 11, 1805, No. 2.

2 Ambaji had 'revolted, or pretended to revolt,' against Sindhia and joined the English, from whom he obtained by treaty a share of the district of Gohad. Within a short time he regained Sindhia's confidence and co-operated with Sharza Ghatge in persuading him to join Holkar. After Holkar's arrival in Sindhia's camp Ambaji was placed at the head of Sindhia's administration in place of Sharza Rao Ghatge through Holkar's instrumentality.

3 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

ter and the history of his relations with Mewar hardly justifies this assumption.[1] Tod adds that "a fair suitor, the Baeza Bae,[2] Sindhia's wife, powerfully contributed to the Rana's preservation on this occasion. This lady .....had unbounded power over Sindhia. Her sympathies were awakened in behalf of the supreme head of the Rajpoot nation, of which blood she had to boast, though she was now connected with the Mahrattas."[3] Whether Daulat Rao Sindhia was really influenced by his wife, we do not know.

In any case the Rana did not put his trust in the Marathas. Convinced that their demands for money would be repeated at the next favourable opportunity, Rana Bhim Singh sent a *vakil* named Bhiroo Bux to Lord Lake, who was then at Mathura.[4] (June, 1805). The Rana referred in his letter to 'the distress which this Government has suffered from the invasion of that race from the South who for the last 35 years have made repeated incursions.' He added that he

1 Cf. S. C., May 22, 1806, No. 23.

2 Baiza Bai, Sharza Rao Ghatge's daughter, was married by Daulat Rao Sindhia in February, 1798.

3 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

4 Tod says that the Rana's *vakil* saw Lord Lake at Tonk. (*Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII). I follow official letters.

had refused to surrender Kamalmir to Sindhia 'from regard for the kindness of the English Company.' Sindhia, therefore, 'being angry in his heart,' had arrived near his boundary, with the intention of plundering Mewar. Under the circumstances the Rana was prepared to 'co-operate with the English Company."[1]

Lord Lake welcomed this offer of co-operation from the Rana. He thought that "considerable advantages may be expected from granting aid and encouragement to the Rana of Udaipur" in case circumstances led to an 'interruption of the peace' with Sindhia. He considered "this direct overture at a moment when the British troops are at such a distance and those of the Marathas so near his territories, as a complete proof of the Rana's sense of the strength of the British power."[2] But Lord Wellesley was less enthusiastic than the Commander-in-Chief. Under his orders the Rana was informed that the British Government had 'no intention of proceeding to hostilities against Daulat Rao Sindhia or of acting in any manner contrary to the treaty of peace unless

1 S. C., July 4, 1805, No. 21.
2 S. C., July 4, 1805, No. 20.

that Chieftain's measures preclude the possibilities of maintaining peace with him."[1] After the arrival of Lord Cornwallis as Lord Wellesley's successor the policy of Non-intervention in Rajputana was confirmed. The Rana was thus left to the tender mercy of Sindhia's troops. Tod says that "a contribution of 16 lacs was levied immediately on Mewar."[2]

III

We now come to the tragic episode of Krishnakumari. Tod's romantic story[3] is fairly well known, but it is not possible for the historian to accept it in toto.[4] Krishnakumari, one of the numerous daughters of Rana Bhim Singh, was betrothed to Raja Bijay Singh of Jodhpur. After the latter's death she was betrothed again to his successor, Raja Man Singh. Man Singh offended the Rana by depriving his relative Kishwar Singh of his appanage of Khalirao. The Rana thereupon offered his daughter's hand to Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur. Raichand, the ambitious

1 S. C., July 4, 1805, No. 22.
2 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.
3 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.
4 See N. B. Roy's article in *Modern Review*, April, 1942.

Dewan of Jaipur, wanted to utilise this marriage for the extension of his master's political influence over Mewar. It was also likely to enhance the social prestige of the Kachchhwahs. Malcolm says, "The Sisodiya Kings of Mewar enjoyed the highest rank among the Princes of Rajasthan and an alliance with it was esteemed the greatest honour to which a Prince of that tribe could aspire."[1] In his eagerness to confirm the proposal Raichand sent an army to Udaipur (July-September, 1805).[2] Raja Man Singh now thought it necessary to prevent an alliance between the Rana and his hereditary rivals, the Kachchhwahs. Naturally he appealed to Daulat Rao Sindhia.

Sindhia, anxious for the consolidation of his influence in Rajputana and Central India, could not ignore this opportunity. At first he tried to bring about an amicable settlement between the parties. He suggested that Jagat Singh and Man Singh should each have one of the Rana's daughters in marriage, or "they should consent to an arbitration of the neighbouring Rajas on the subject."[3] Rana Bhim Singh

1 *Memoir of Central India*, Vol I, p. 330.
2 S. C., December 31, 1805, No. 2, 14, 18.
3 Mercer to Barlow, April 22, 1806.

was then 'held in control' by Jaipur troops; so he refused to accept Sindhia's proposal.[1] Sindhia asked him to dismiss the Jaipur troops. This request was also set aside.[2] Sindhia naturally took offence and sent two detachments under Jagu Bapu and Jaswant Rao Bhau to invade Mewar from two directions. (April, 1806).[3] The Jaipur troops remained inactive within the city of Udaipur. The Rana's troops offered but 'a feeble opposition.' Mewar lay prostrate at Sindhia's feet.

Mercer, Resident at Sindhia's Court, wrote to the Governor-General,[4] "This success, which has been more complete and rapid than appears to have been expected by Daulat Rao Sindhia, will necessarily throw into his hands the entire control over the Rana of Udaipur and his affairs." Sindhia declared to the British Resident that "his ultimate object is the dismission of the Jaipur troops, and that, on this being effected, he will leave the Rana in the quiet possession of his country, and relinquish any further interference

1 Mercer to Barlow, April 22, 1806.
2 S. C., May 8, 1806, No. 30.
3 S. C., May 22, 1806, No. 23.
4 S. C., May 22, 1806, No. 23.

in the dispute between the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas." But Mercer suspected that " Sindhia's conduct (towards Mewar) would be regulated more by the measures he may deem it expedient to pursue in regard to Jaswant Rao Holkar than by any predetermined resolution on the subject." Holkar claimed half of the Udaipur tribute, and it was hardly likely that he would "without a contest leave the whole of the authority and resources of that state in the hands of Sindhia." But at that moment Sindhia was "anxious to avoid an immediate rupture with Holkar." Mercer concluded, "Should Sindhia be enabled to reconcile Holkar to his retaining Udaipur, or, should a rupture with him be on other subjects unavoidable, it does not seem likely that Sindhia will gratuitously relinquish the complete ascendancy which he has now nearly attained over the Udaipur State."

Mercer was right. The Rana offered 'entire submission' to Sindhia's wishes, met him in two friendly interviews (May, 1806) and dismissed 'the greater part of Jaipur troops.'[1] Sindhia took advantage of the situation and made an offensive demand which

1 S. C., May 29, 1806, No. 20; June 5, 1806, No. 55.

'united both the Chundawat and Saktawat clans.'[1] He wanted to marry Krishnakumari, forgetting in his triumph that the proud Rana of Mewar could not be expected to tolerate the idea of entering into matrimonial relations with a low born Maratha.

At this crisis Jaswant Rao Holkar saved the Rana, In May, 1806, he plundered Jaipur territory and demanded tribute from Mewar.[2] The approach of Sindhia's rival encouraged Rana Bhim Singh and compelled Sindhia to withdraw the marriage proposal. Sindhia now pursued a fluctuating policy. He agreed to withdraw from Udaipur at the request of the Jaipur *vakils*, who promised to pay him four *lakhs*. This arrangement was, however, soon set aside by an offer from the Jodhpur *vakils* of a larger sum on the part of their master. Fortunately for Rajputana the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur at this stage realised 'the folly and danger of allowing the Marathas to interfere in their domestic disputes.' In April, 1806, it was settled that Jagat Singh would marry a daughter of Man Singh and Man Singh would marry a sister of Jagat Singh. Sindhia now found it necessary to

1 S. C., June 19, 1806, No. 34.
2 S. C., June 19, 1806, No. 34.

retreat from Udaipur (May, 1806),[1] leaving Jagu Bapu and Madhuji Huzure to realise as much money as they could. These zealous lieutenants were unable to get money; so they seized some Mewar Chiefs and carried them to Sindhia's camp.[2] Unfortunately the compromise between Jaipur and Jodhpur did not last long. The details of the renewed struggle between Jagat Singh and Man Singh do not concern us here.[3] The struggle naturally involved the revival of the rival claims for Krishnakumari.

The internal condition of Mewar was growing worse year after year. The troops of Sindhia and the Pindari followers of Holkar and Amir Khan indiscriminately ravaged her territory. The Rana remained a helpless spectator. In November, 1806, Sharza Rao Ghatge plundered Bhilwara, an important commercial town.[4] Gradually he established great influence in the Rana's council, and in accordance with his advice the Rana applied for military assistance to the British Resident in Delhi. His letters on this subject were

1 S. C., June 26, 1806, No. 34.
2 Mercer to Barlow, June 1, June 18, 1806.
3 See below, "British Alliance with Jaipur".
4 Mercer to Barlow, October 6, 1806.

intercepted by Sindhia, who demanded an explanation from the British Resident at his court. Mercer assured him that the British Government would not interfere in the affairs of those States 'to which it was not bound by defensive alliance'.[1] In 1808 Holkar's irregular troops plundered two *parganas* near Udaipur. Influential Chiefs like Sangram Singh of Lawa and Padam Singh of Salumbar disturbed internal peace by their bitter rivalry for power. The Rana received some assistance from Zalim Singh of Kota and Ambaji Ingle, but his difficulties went on increasing. In 1809 he became so helpless that he had to take a daily allowance of Rs. 500 from Sindhia's Viceroy in Mewar for the maintenance of the royal family.

During the years 1807-1810 Amir Khan gradually made himself the most powerful man in Central India. In 1807 he brought Man Singh of Jodhpur under his control. In 1809 he established his influence in Bhupal. In 1810 he took advantage of Jaswant Rao Holkar's madness and became the *de facto* ruler of the Holkar State. His first task after these

1 Political Consultations, Imperial Record Department, January 29, 1807, No. 22, 23.

successes was the realisation of tribute from Jaipur and Mewar.

In May, 1810, Amir Khan appeared in Mewar for the collection of tribute.[1] His progress was checked for a few weeks by internal troubles within his camp,[2] but everybody knew that it was absolutely impossible for the Rana to resist him. The Resident in Delhi became nervous. He wrote on July 8, 1810, "It is greatly to be feared that Amir Khan will at length succeed in getting possession of Udaipur and thereby putting an end to the sovereignty of the most ancient and most venerated of the Rajput Chiefs. The country is so strong and so easily defended that, if once the Pathans were in possession of the strongholds and passes, it would be next to impossible to dislodge them, and in its productiveness they would find immense resources. It would, moreover, insure and facilitate to Amir Khan the conquest of Jaipur where it would appear that the greatest alarm prevails."[3]

After his arrival near Udaipur Amir Khan informed the Rana that he was prepared to recover the import-

1 Mercer to Lord Minto, June 20, 1810
2 P. C., July 21, 1810, No. 38.
3 P. C., August 6, 1810, No. 77.

ant fortress of Kumbhalgarh from Sindhia's general, Jaswant Rao Bhau, if the Rana promised to pay him 12 *lakhs* of rupees. He also suggested that a body of his own troops should be entertained by the Rana in his service.[1] Naturally Bhim Singh refused to accept these proposals. Amir Khan then wanted an interview with the Rana, but he 'persisted in declining to admit Amir Khan into Udaipur or to visit him in a camp.'[2] But Amir Khan was not the man to take a refusal. He forced his way to Udaipur and dictated his terms to the unfortunate Rana. Bhim Singh agreed to engage in his service a body of Amir Khan's troops, and to satisfy the pecuniary demands of the Pathan Chief. But Amir Khan did not want peace in Rajputana. Although both Jagat Singh and Man Singh had already decided to 'relinquish all thoughts' of marrying Krishnakumari, Amir Khan was very anxious to revive that source of contest. He asked the Rana to celebrate his daughter's marriage with Man Singh. The Rana refused.

With regard to the final act of the tragedy our sources of information cannot be reconciled. Accord-

1 Mercer to Lord Minto, June 20, July 7, 1810.
2 P. C., August 6, 1810, No. 78.

ing to Tod, Amir Khan gave the Rana a choice between two evils: "either the princess should wed Raja Maun, or by her death seal the peace of Rajwarra." The Rana preferred the death of his daughter to a marriage which he considered dishonourable.[1] Tod's story is in substantial agreement with Amir Khan's own version of the affair as given in *Amir Nama*. But Busawan Lal, the author of *Amir Nama*, clearly says that the Rana agreed to contrive to get rid of his daughter, provided Amir Khan pledged to wrest Khalirao[2] from Man Singh. A modern writer has unreservedly accepted this interpretation of the Rana's conduct and remarked, "The crime was not excused by any sensitive regard for family pride that marked the high-mettled Rajputs of old. It was the result of a sordid bargain."[3] It is difficult to believe that the Rana was in a position to 'bargain' with Amir Khan. Tod says, ".....the Rana was made to see no choice between consigning his beloved child to the Rahtore prince, or witnessing the effects of a more extended dishonour from the vengeance of the

1 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.
2 See p. 169.
3 *Modern Review*, April, 1942.

Pathan, and the storm of his palace by his licentious adherents,—the fiat passed that Krishnakumari should die." In an official letter dated August 4, 1810, the Resident in Delhi clearly says that Amir Khan was 'responsible for the murder' and adds: "It is stated that the nobles of Udaipur, rendered desperate at the idea of the Rana's being forced by Amir Khan to sanction an alliance which would dishonour the tribe to which he belonged, held a solemn consultation in which it was determined as the only means of avoiding infamy to take off the young lady by poison, which with the concurrence of the unhappy father.....was actually carried into effect."[1] According to this version of the story, the decision to murder the princess was adopted by the nobles and carried into effect with the concurrence of the Rana. There can be no question, therefore, of 'a sordid bargain.' The princess, then a girl of sixteen, took the fatal cup of poison on July 21, 1810.[2]

Although the Rana humiliated himself so much,

1 P. C., August 25, 1810, No. 50.

2 Ojha, *Udaipur Rājya Kā Itihāsa*, p. 698. There is a reference to her death in an official letter dated August 4. (P. C., August 25, 1810, No. 50).

he received no protection from Amir Khan. In August, 1811, Bapu Sindhia appeared in Udaipur and took up his residence in the city. The Rana found himself obliged to receive him with an appearance of friendship, 'in opposition, no doubt, to the real state of his feelings.' The inevitable demand for money followed. Another object of the Maratha general was the suppression of the Pindaris, for Daulat Rao Sindhia was afraid of their rising power.[1]

While Amir Khan and Sindhia were thus struggling for mastery in Mewar, Lord Minto remained a silent spectator. He was a believer in the policy of Non-intervention. Roberts says that he found himself obliged from time to time to abandon the strictest interpretation of a *laissez faire* attitude.[2] So far as the Rajput States are concerned, however, there was no departure from the policy laid down by the authorities in England. All applications for British protection invariably received the reply that the Company did not want entangling alliances. The successive Residents in Delhi, Seton and Metcalfe, were in favour of taking the Rajput States under protection,

1 P. C., September 20, 1811, No. 1.
2 *History of British India*, p. 261.

but they knew they could not change the determination of the higher authorities. Perhaps Lord Minto himself felt that a change of front was necessary, but he wanted to carry his superiors with him. Malcolm observes, "The Government of Lord Minto had no result more important than the impression it conveyed to the authorities at home, of the utter impracticability of perseverance in the neutral policy they had desired to pursue." Thus Lord Minto prepared the ground for the bold and comprehensive plan adopted later on by Lord Hastings.

Meanwhile the policy of Non-intervention worked havoc in Rajputana, a common prey to the Marathas and the Pindaris.[1] With regard to Mewar

[1] The following description of the character of the atrocities committed by the Pindaris is taken from H. T. Prinsep's *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings* (Vol. I, p. 39) published in 1825:

".....every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money was immediately put to most horrid torture, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice; it was their common practice to burn and destory what could not be carried away; and, in the wantonness of barbarity, to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands and parents....."

Tod says, "Mewar was rapidly approaching dissolution, and every sign of civilisation fast disappearing, fields laid waste, cities in ruins, inhabitants exiled, chieftains demoralized, the prince and his family destitute of common comforts."[1]

IV

When Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris he found it necessary to take all Rajput States under British protection.

"The Pindaris were to be rooted out of their haunts which lay in Malwa, somewhat to the east of Ujjain, north of the Narbada, and between Bhopal and the dominions of Sindhia and Holkar; to accomplish this it had been decided to surround them on all sides—on the north and east, from Bengal, on the south from the Deccan, and on the west from Gujarat —and to keep the native states in check." Naturally the attitude of the Rajput Princes would be a very important factor in determining the nature of the operations against the Pindaris; and it was not difficult to anticipate that they would gladly co-operate with the

1 *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVII.

British Government in the extermination of their oppressors. The Rana had already sent 'a direct application for the protection of the British Government with an offer of a fourth of the estimated revenue of the country.' In October, 1817, Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an engagement with Udaipur. The instructions contained two important points. In the first place, it was 'desirable to obtain as large a portion of the revenue of Udaipur as might be practicable on account of subsidy.' Secondly, the question of the tribute due by the Rana to Sindhia and Holkar was 'to be treated as one between the British Government and the two latter powers exclusively, so that all direct intercourse and connection between the Rajput States and Marathas should cease.'[1]

Metcalfe began negotiations with the Rana's *vakils*, of whom the principal was Thakur Ajit Singh, in November,[2] 1817. The treaty was signed in Delhi on January 13, 1818. and ratified by Lord Hastings on January 22, 1818.

Article 1 provided for 'perpetual friendship,

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.

2 S. C., November 14, 1817, No. 50; December 19, 1817, No. 112; February 20, 1818, No. 67.

alliance and unity of interests between the two States from generation to generation.' By Article 2 the British Government engaged 'to protect the principality and territory of Udaipur.' By Article 3 the Rana promised to 'act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government and acknowledge its supremacy,' and not to have 'any connection with other Chiefs or States.' Metcalfe had anticipated some objections to this article due to the 'high pretensions' of the Rana. He wrote to the Supreme Government, ".....the Ranas of Udaipur have always boasted of never having acknowledged the sovereignty of the Mahomedan Dynasty in India, and.....one of the titles they have assumed is 'King of the Hindus' and another 'The Enemy of the King of Delhi.' The rank of the House of Udaipur is also generally acknowledged and the war between Jaipur and Jodhpur in 1807 on account of the Rana's daughter is a recent proof of the honour attached to a close connection with this family." Metcalfe was prepared to modify this article, but the *vakils* of the Rana offered no objection. One of them proposed in the course of discussions that "an article should be inserted to provide that the mission of an envoy to Delhi and the

submission of the Rana to the Company should not be drawn into a precedent for his allegiance to the Mahomedan Dynasty, and that the British should not make him over at any time to any other Power." Metcalfe gave an assurance that "though not expressed in the treaty the spirit of the proposal would remain in force."[1]

By Article 4 the Rana promised not to 'enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government.' Article 5 provided that all disputes between Mewar and other States would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government.

Article 6 provided that the tribute from Mewar would amount to one-fourth of her revenue for the first five years, and to three-eighths 'after that term, in perpetuity.' The *vakils* presented to Metcalfe a memorandum[2] of the Rana's claim for the restoration of territories which had 'fallen by improper means into the possession of others'—Sindhia, Amir Khan, Holkar, and the rulers of Jodhpur and Kota. Article 7 of the treaty referred to this matter and contained

1 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 107.
2 S. C., February 20, 1818, No. 29.

the following arrangement: ".....the British Government, from a want of accurate information, is not able to enter into any positive engagement on this subject, but will always keep in view the renovation of the prosperity of the State of Udaipur, and after ascertaining the nature of each case, will use its best exertions for the accomplishment of that object, on every occasion on which it may be proper to do so. Whatever places may thus be restored to the State of Udaipur by the aid of the British Government, three-eighths of their revenues shall be paid in perpetuity to the British Government." In fixing the amount of tribute Metcalfe was guided by two considerations —the then distracted condition of Mewar, and her prosperity in normal times. Metcalfe wrote, "It is understood that the country of Udaipur is a most productive country, that the soil is fertile in the greatest degree, and that the inhabitants are uncommonly industrious and devoted to agriculture. It is known that the power and revenue of the State are at present reduced to a wretched extreme, but it is expected that the latter will revive with astonishing capacity after the establishment of security in the country."[1] In

1 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 107.

addition to the tribute the Rana agreed that "the troops of the State of Udaipur should be furnished according to its means at the requisition of British Government." (Article 8). Article 9 provided that the Rana should always be the "absolute ruler of his own country" and that British jurisdiction should not be introduced into his principality.

In February, 1818, Captain Tod was deputed to the Court of Udaipur.[1] He arrived there on March 8 and introduced various measures for the restoration of prosperity to Mewar.[2]

1 S. C., March 6, 1818, No. 7.
2 Tod, *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVIII.

BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH JAIPUR

Amber, or Dhoondar, or Jaipur, is the state of the Kachchhwaha clan, which claims descent from the Solar race described in the Ramayana. According to traditions recorded by Tod, the state was founded in 968 A.D. by a prince named Dhola Rai. It is difficult to assess the historical value of the legends concerning the early history of Amber, but the following statement of Tod deserves acceptance: "Like all the other Rajpoot states, the country of the Cuchwahas is an assemblage of communities, the territories of which have been wrested from the aboriginal tribes, or from independent Chieftains, at various periods..."[1]

Amber remained an obscure principality till the establishment of the Mughal Empire. Tod tells us that Bhar Mal 'attended the fortunes' of Babar and received from Humayun the *mansab* of five thousand as Raja of Amber.[2] In 1562 his daughter was given in marriage to Akbar. This marriage raised the Kachchhwaha family to the highest position and influence

1 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. I.
2 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. I.

in the imperial court. "No Raja, no grandee was honoured by Akbar more than Raja Bhar Mal."[1]

Raja Bhagwan Das, son and successor (1569-1589) of Bhar Mal, loyally served the Mughal cause in various campaigns in Gujarat, Mewar, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. He is said to have enjoyed the rank of a Commander of 5,000, 'then the highest open to any one except the princes of the blood.' His daughter, Man Bai, was given in marriage to Prince Salim in 1585. His adopted son, Man Singh (1589-1613), was one of the pillars of the Empire for more than a quarter of a century. Gujarat, Mewar, Afganistan and Bengal were the scenes of his exploits. He is said to have been raised to the rank of a Commander of 7,000.

Man Singh's successors, Bhao Singh and Maha Singh, ruled for a few years without distinction; their weakness allowed the Rajas of Marwar to take the lead in the imperial court. But the prestige of the Kachchhwaha family was revived by Mirza Raja Jai Singh, who played a conspicuous part in the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzib. It was he who secured

1 Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, p. 61.

the submission of Shivaji in 1665. A veteran in the field of war and a consummate diplomat, he was at the same time a cultured patron of letters. He was succeeded in 1667 by his son Ram Singh, whose failure in an expedition for the conquest of Assam (1667-1676) lowered the position of the Kachchhwahas and made Jaswant Singh Rathor the premier Hindu Chief in the imperial court. His successor, Bishen Singh, was too weak to take advantage of Jaswant Singh's death and the occupation of Marwar by the Mughals.

Sawai Jai Singh, who succeeded Bishen Singh in 1698 and died in 1743 at the comparatively early age of 57, was a remarkable man. "As a statesman, legislator, and man of science," says Tod, "the character of Sowae Jey Singh is worthy of an ample delineation,[1] which would correct our opinion of the genius

1 It is unfortunate that no serious student of Indian history has accepted Tod's suggestion of writing a monograph on this Prince. "For such a sketch," says Tod, "the materials of the Amber court are abundant; to instance only the *Calpadrooma*, a miscellaneous diary, in which everything of note was written, and a collection *Ek seh noh goon Jey Sing ca*, or 'the one hundred and nine actions of Jey Sing'.....His voluminous correspondance with all the princes and chiefs of his time would alone repay the trouble of translation, and would throw a more perfect light

and capacity of the princes of Rajpootana, of whom we are apt to form too low an estimate." He was the founder of the new capital, Jaipur, 'the only city in India built upon a regular plan, with streets bisecting each other at right angles.' It was designed and constructed by a Bengali engineer named Vidyadhar, 'one of the most eminent coadjutors of the prince in all his scientific pursuits, both astronomical and historical.' Jai Singh was a celebrated astronomer. He erected observatories with instruments of his own invention at Delhi, Jaipur, Ujjain, Benares, and Mathura.[1]

At the time of Aurangzib's death Jai Singh was about 21 years of age.[2] In the civil war he espoused the side of Azam Shah. Bahadur Shah punished him by recognising his rival brother, Bijay Singh, as the legitimate ruler of Amber (1708). Jai Singh thereupon formed an alliance with Rana Amar Singh

on the manners and feelings of his countrymen than the most laborious lucubrations of any European." (*Annals of Amber*, Chap. II). Persian and Marathi sources are expected to throw much light on Jai Singh's career.

1 Tod, *Annals of Amber*, Chap. II

2 Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, pp. 43-44. Sir Jadunath Sarkar (*Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 242) says that Jai Singh was a lad of 18 in 1699.

and Ajit Singh of Marwar, and succeeded in re-establishing himself on the *gadi* of Amber. During Farrukh-siyar's reign he governed Malwa and fought against the Jats, but he could never distinguish himself as a soldier or general in the field. His relations with the Sayyid brothers were not satisfactory. He supported the cause of Nekusiyar against Rafi-ud-daulah, the weak nominee of the Sayyids. After the accession of Muhammad Shah he was restored to imperial favour and entrusted with the government of *sarkar* Surat in the *subah* of Ahmedabad. After the fall of the Sayyids he became governor of Agra and led another expedition against the Jats. In 1729 the governorship of Malwa was conferred upon him. In this capacity he was probably guilty of collusion with the Marathas, who were at that time establishing themselves in Malwa and Gujarat. If the Emperor's cause against the Marathas had been served "with the courage, enterprise and fidelity of.....Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, instead of Sawai Jai Singh's love of sensual ease, misappropriation of the imperial chest of military defence, and treacherous subserviency to the enemies of the country, the Marathas would have been successfully kept out of Northern India, and Rajputana

would have been spared the horrors of Maratha domination."[1]

The disruption of imperial authority provided ample scope for the ambitious vassals of Delhi, and the minor Princes of Rajputana suddenly found themselves at the mercy of their powerful neighbours. Tod says, "Amber was yet circumscribed in territory,[2] and the consequences of its princes arose out of their position as satraps of the empire. He (*i.e.*, Jai Singh) therefore determined to seize upon all the districts on his frontiers within his grasp, and moreover to compel the services of the chieftains who served under his banner as lieutenants of the King (*i.e.*, Emperor of Delhi)".[3] The first victim of this policy of aggression was Budh Singh of Bundi, who was dethroned

1 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 242.

2 "At the accession of Jey Sing, the *raj* of Amber consisted only of the three *pergunnas* or districts of Amber, Deosah, and Bussao; the western tracts had been sequestrated, and added to the royal domains attached to Ajmer. The Shekhavati confederation was superior to, and independent of, the parent state, whose boundaries were as follows. The royal *thanna* (garrison) of Chatsoo, to the south; those of Sambhur to the west, and Hastinah to the north-west; while to the east, Deosah and Bussao formed its frontier". (*Annals of Amber*, Chap. II).

3 *Annals of Haravali*, Chap. III.

by Jai Singh in 1729. The *gadi* of Bundi was transferred to Dalil Singh, on condition of his acknowledging the Raja of Jaipur as his overlord. For about twenty years (1729-1748) Budh Singh and his son, Ummed Singh, continued the struggle against Jaipur, Ummed Singh finally succeeding in occupying his ancestral *gadi*. Jai Singh also interfered in a dispute between Jodhpur and Bikaner and suffered a serious reverse in the battle of Gangwana (May, 1741).

Jai Singh was succeeded by his eldest son, Ishwari Singh (1743-1750), whose claim was disputed by Madho Singh, Jai Singh's son by a Mewar princess, in accordance with the terms of the Mewar-Amber treaty of 1708. Rana Jagat Singh supported Madho Singh's claim, but although he played a prominent part in the hostilities, he was not strong enough to place his nephew on the *gadi* of Jaipur. The tragedy of this fratricidal conflict lay in the fact that both the parties invoked, and secured, the assistance of the Marathas. In 1745 Ishwari Singh's Maratha supporters compelled Jagat Singh and Madho Singh to retreat to Mewar. In 1746 Jagat Singh, Madho Singh and Ummed Singh, the dispossessed heir of Bundi, secured 1,000 horse from Malhar Rao

Holkar; but the coalition suffered a severe defeat in the battle of Rajmahal (March, 1747). Invited by Emperor Muhammad Shah to assist him in repelling Ahmed Shah Abdali's invasion, Ishwari Singh advanced to the Punjab and met the Abdali at Manupur (March, 1748); but "he turned tail at the very beginning of the fighting and fled precipitately back to his own country, throwing his guns and kettledrums into wells to lighten his baggage!"

This cowardly retreat ruined his military prestige and encouraged his enemies. Jagat Singh, acting through Malhar Rao Holkar, converted Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao to Madho Singh's cause. The Marathas entered Jaipur territory (May, 1748) and demanded a contribution of 50 *lakhs* of rupees. Ishwari Singh could not pay so much; on the other hand, Madho Singh agreed to pay the Marathas 10 *lakhs* of rupees in exchange of the four *mahals* of Tonk, Toda, Malpura and Barwada. A Maratha army under Malhar Rao Holkar invaded Jaipur and defeated Ishwari Singh in the battle of Bagru (August, 1748). That helpless Prince now concluded peace by giving five *parganas* to Madho Singh and also restoring Bundi to Ummed Singh.

Ishwari Singh might have enjoyed peace for some time if he had been able to pay his dues to the Marathas, but he merely put off payment from day to day.[1] All his experienced ministers were gone one by one, and the half-witted Prince submitted himself to the guidance of a barber and an elephant-driver. Towards the close of the year 1750 Malhar Rao Holkar again invaded Jaipur; Ishwari Singh, unable to resist him, committed suicide (December, 1750). The Marathas occupied the city of Jaipur and placed Madho Singh on the *gadi*. In addition to money, they demanded that one-fourth of the territory of Jaipur should be made over to them. Madho Singh courageously resolved to free himself from the control of his inconvenient supporters. He tried to poison the Maratha chiefs, but failed. Then the citizens of Jaipur took the matter into their own hands. A riot broke out in the city; some 1,500 Marathas were killed and about 1,000 wounded. Madho Singh disclaimed all previous knowledge or share in this massacre and conciliated the Marathas by promises of money. Early in 1751 the Marathas left Jaipur.[2]

1 *Selections from Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. II, letter No. 15.
2 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 282-306.

No Rajput Prince ever paid money to the Marathas except under military pressure. As the Marathas were otherwise engaged for about three years after their departure from Jaipur, Madho Singh became a defaulter. A large Maratha army under Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao Holkar appeared in Jaipur towards the close of 1753. Madho Singh averted the desolation of his territory by agreeing to pay 16½ *lakhs* of rupees. More than ten *lakhs* were paid in 1755; the remaining portion was left unpaid. After the murder of Jayapa Sindhia by a Rathor envoy, Madho Singh joined Bijay Singh of Marwar and made a serious attempt to expel the Marathas from Rajputana. A Jaipur army suffered a severe defeat in October, 1755, and the allied Princes made peace with the Marathas in February, 1756. In 1757 Raghunath Rao again came to Jaipur, laid siege to Barwada (which belonged to the Shekhawats), and demanded from Madho Singh 40 to 50 *lakhs* in cash and the cession of an important slice of his territory. Madho Singh refused to accept these exorbitant demands and made excellent preparations for war. Raghunath Rao then lowered his demands and agreed to accept 11 *lakhs*, six *lakhs* being paid immediately. In 1758 Jankoji

Sindhia compelled Madho Singh to promise 36 *lakhs*, payable in four years. In 1759 Malhar Rao Holkar came to realise money from Jaipur and secured some military successes against the Rajputs; but the news of Ahmed Shah Abdali's arrival in the Punjab compelled him to leave Rajputana for Delhi (January, 1760).[1]

Madho Singh was now in a very favourable position. "Jaipur was now the strongest power in Rajputana, and its master, safely sheltered within his strongly fortified capital, could laugh an invasion to scorn." Most of the villages of Jaipur had protective walls and a martial population.[2] After the third battle of Panipat Madho Singh made a systematic attempt to dislodge the Marathas from Rajputana. He tried to organise an anti-Maratha coalition; with this end in view he invited the co-operation of Ahmed Shah 'Abdali, Emperor Shah Alam II, Najib Khan and the Rajput Princes. Although there was no effective response from the Muslims, many Rajputs promised to join him. But a large Jaipur army was defeated by

1 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 171-172, 174, 183-198.

2 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 196.

Malhar Rao Holkar in the battle of Mangrol (November 29, 1761). This decisive victory destroyed Madho Singh's fond hope of uprooting Maratha power from the North. He took measures for the defence of Jaipur city against the apprehended Maratha attack. Holkar arrived within 40 miles of this city, but the sudden invasion of Bundelkhand by Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-daula of Oudh compelled him to leave Rajputana.[1] Madho Singh's failure to take advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas was due to his 'lack of character, quarrels with his feudal barons, and above all chronic antagonism to Bijay Singh of Marwar,[2] the only Rajput Prince that counted for anything.'[3]

Tod points out that Madho Singh's failure against the Marathas was due to the rise of the Jats.[4] The Jat rulers of Bharatpur were nominally vassals of Jaipur, but Suraj Mal, the founder of the Jat power, was a far abler and more powerful prince than Madho Singh. Yet "so great was his moderation, that in spite of his immense wealth and military force, he

1 See the author's *Peshwa Madhav Rao I*, pp. 133-134.

2 Ram Singh, Bijay Singh's rival, was a protege of Madho Singh.

3 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 503.

4 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. III.

used to go to Jaipur every year at Dasahara and offer his homage and customary tribute as an humble vassal to Madho Singh. It was only a few years before his death that he gave up this practice in fear of treachery from his overlord."[1] His successor, Jawahir Singh (1763-1768), invaded Jaipur territory in 1765. Madho Singh invoked the assistance of the Marathas; the arrival of a Sindhia contingent compelled the Jat Raja and his Sikh allies to retreat. In December, 1767, Jawahir Singh again invaded Jaipur territory and won a 'Pyrrhic victory' in the battle of Maonda. Madho Singh then invaded the Jat country and defeated the Jats in February, 1768. A large Sikh force now arrived for Jawahir Singh's rescue; the Rajputs retreated to their own country.[2] The Jat Raja was assassinated in July, 1768. Internal dissensions broke out in the Jat Kingdom, and the intervention of the Marathas completed the ruin of the state created by Suraj Mal's genius.[3] But the Jat menace compelled Jaipur to adopt a pro-Maratha policy. Madho Singh conciliated the Marathas through Holkar, whose

1 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. II, p. 453.

2 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. II, pp. 512-513, 476-480, 512.

3 For details, see the author's *Peshwa Madhav Rao,* Chap. VI.

Diwan was probably bribed for the accomplishment of this purpose.

Madho Singh died in March, 1768. "He built seven cities, of which that called after him Madhupur, near the celebrated fortress of Ranthumbor, the most secure of the commercial cities of Rajwarra, is the most remarkable. He inherited no small portion of his father's love of science, which continued to make Jeypur the resort of learned men, so as to eclipse even the sacred Benares."[1]

Madho Singh's death was followed by prolonged anarchy and turmoil in Jaipur. He was succeeded by his minor son, Prithvi Singh (1768-1778), a boy of five. The Regency was held by the minor Prince's step-mother, who was advised chiefly by four persons: her father, Jaswant Singh Chandawat, the ruler of Deogarh in Mewar; an able Brahmin minister named Khush-hali Ram Bohra;[2] a common soldier named Raj Singh; and a Muslim elephant-driver named Firuz.[3] The chief nobles of the kingdom resented

1 *Annals of Amber,* Chap. III.

2 Originally he was the porter of Ganges water to Madho Singh, but he was a very able man.

3 Sir J. N. Sarkar (*Fall of Mughal Empire,* Vol. III, p. 331)

their exclusion from power and intrigued for the overthrow of the Queen's authority. These internal dissensions were utilised by Pratap Singh Naruka, the ambitious ruler of Macheri, who ousted Jaswant Singh from the administration, arrested Firuz and confined Khush-hali Ram. But towards the second half of the year 1777 the hostile feelings of the citizens of Jaipur compelled him to leave that city. Once more Khush-hali Ram became Prime Minister of Jaipur.

Pratap Singh Naruka, a Jaipur vassal, had been banished by Madho Singh 'for some fault'. He had found shelter in the court of Jawahir Singh, the Jat Raja. Later on he deserted his protector and fought against him on behalf of Jaipur. Madho Singh restored him to his favour and his fief of Macheri. After Prithvi Singh's death he began to dream of territorial expansion and independence. The decline of the Jat power made it easy for him to occupy Alwar and Lachhmangarh. His ambitious activities excited the suspicion of the Imperial Government, and Mirza Najaf Khan, who was at that time a powerful officer under Emperor Shah Alam II, invaded his territory.

rejects Tod's statement (*Annals of Amber*, Chap. III) that Firuz 'played the Mazarin to the queen-mother'.

Pratap Singh had to save himself by paying a large indemnity (1778).

Prithvi Singh was succeeded by his brother, Sawai Pratap Singh (1778-1803), a boy of thirteen. Khush-hali Ram temporarily checkmated the aggressive activities of Pratap Singh Naruka by forming a coalition with Mirza Najaf Khan (1778). In 1779 the Emperor in person marched to Jaipur territory; Khush-hali Ram avoided hostility by agreeing to pay twenty *lakhs* as tribute. Unfortunately, some rivals of this able minister won the Raja's confidence and persuaded him to throw Khush-hali Ram into prison (1779) on the charge of embezzlement. As the Jaipur Government was hopelessly in default of payment, Mirza Najaf Khan, who had in the meantime become Regent for the Empire, sent two of his officers to invade Jaipur territory. Khush-hali Ram was released from prison and vested with supreme authority (October, 1780). The imperial troops failed to coerce the Jaipur Raja for two reasons. In the first place, they failed to capture Jaipur fort, which was then considered impregnable. Secondly, Mirza Najaf Khan was not able to pay his troops regularly. Sir J. N. Sarkar says, "Mirza Najaf's finely conceived strategy,

though punctually carried out by ... two able subordinates, in the end broke down on the rock of finance. The delaying tactics of the Jaipur ministers succeeded, as the craven Rajah shut himself up in his capital, leaving all his realm outside open to Mughal spoliation". Early in 1781 Mirza Najaf Khan's officers returned to Delhi. After the departure of the imperial generals Sawai Pratap Singh again threw Khush-hali Ram into prison. In 1786 he was restored to power, but he was dismissed within a year. As his life was constantly in danger, he sought refuge with Mahadji Sindhia.

The troubles of Jaipur were due primarily to the character of the reigning Prince. Sir J. N. Sarkar says, "Sawai Pratap Singh had no brains, but was not harmless and quiescent like most other imbeciles; his folly burst out in capricious violence. Anticipating the decadent Nawabs of Oudh, he used to dress himself like a female, tie bells to his ankles and dance within the harem. His time was mostly devoted to drinking and attending songs and dances. ..., Sometimes he would sally forth at night with the ruffianly companions of his wine-cup, raid the houses of the bankers and jewellers, beat them and snatch away

their money! In addition to his unkingly and unmanly vices, his reckless speech and violent temper alienated the proud Rajput nobility and they left his capital for their seats in shame and disgust'.[1] The administration became inefficient and corrupt. The Shekhawat nobles seized Jaipur territory near their estates. Attempts were made to dethrone Pratap Singh and to put on the throne a minor Prince named Man Sigh, the son of Prithvi Singh.[2] The ruler of Macheri continued to pursue his aggressive and disloyal policy.

When Jaipur was thus on the brink of dissolution, Mahadji Sindhia, then the *Mir Bakshi* of the Empire, invaded this unfortunate kingdom for realising the tribute due to the Emperor and to the Mara-

1 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. III, p. 337. Tod (*Annals of Amber,* Chap. III) gives a different view of his character: "He was a gallant prince, and not deficient in judgment; but neither gallantry nor prudence could successfully apply the resources of his petty state againt its numerous predatory foes and its internal dissensions". See also Captain Pillet's remarks in *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. VIII, No. 1. Collins described him as 'a compound of pride, meanness, cunning and avarice'. (*Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. VIII, No. 172).

2 Man Singh lived at Brindaban, where he enjoyed a *jagir* granted by Mahadji Sindhia.

thas (1786). Khush-hali Ram avoided war by agreeing to pay 63 *lakhs*. But Sawai Pratap Singh stopped payment after Sindhia's departure. Moreover, he sent a confidential agent to Lucknow (1786) to intrigue for the hiring of an English contingent against the Marathas. Khush-hali Ram was dismissed in January, 1787; he found shelter in Sindhia's camp. Sawai Pratap Singh concluded a defensive alliance with the Raja of Jodhpur and openly prepared for war. Mahadji Sindhia realised that nothing but the annexation of a portion of Jaipur territory would enable him to secure payment from the obstinate Prince. He again invaded Jaipur in March, 1787. An indecisive pitched battle was fought at Tunga[1] in July, 1787. The Rajputs claimed it as a great victory, and Tod tells us that the Jaipur Raja spent the sum of 24 *lakhs* in charity[2] to commemorate it. But they were not able to expel the Marathas from the field, and their casualty list was much heavier than that of their enemy. On the other hand, Sindhia was not able to crush the Rajputs or to accomplish the purpose for which he had undertaken the offensive campaign. Within a

1 Also called battle of Lalsot.
2 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. III.

few days of the battle he retreated from Jaipur territory.[1]

After the retreat from Jaipur Mahadji Sindhia found himself opposed by a host of enemies, of whom two Muslim Chiefs, Ismail Beg and Ghulam Qadir, were the most powerful. He gradually restored his power by cautious military operations, in which he was substantially aided by De Boigne's battalions. Ismail Beg was finally crushed in the battle of Agra (June, 1788). Ghulam Qadir, who had become Regent of the Empire in September, 1787, and blinded Emperor Shah Alam in October, 1788, was expelled from Delhi and tortured to death in March, 1789. Mahadji Sindhia became the guardian of the blind Emperor and the *de facto* ruler of Delhi.

Ismail Beg and Bijay Singh of Jodhpur had assisted Jaipur in the battle of Tunga. These three allies again joined their forces against Sindhia, but De Boigne's battalions crushed them in the battle of Patan (June 20, 1790).[2] The defeat of the Rajputs was fol-

1 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 340-345, 349-392.

2 For a critical account of this battle, see Sir J. N. Sarkar's article in *Modern Review*, May, 1943.

lowed by the disruption of the alliance between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and Rajputana was left at the mercy of De Boigne's triumphant brigades. The Shekhawat territory was ravaged and brought under Sindhia's control.

At this stage the intensification of the old rivalry between Mahadji Sindhia and Tukoji Holkar introduced further complications in the political situation of Northern India. The creation of De Boigne's army and his victories in the battles of Patan and Merta (September 12, 1790) disturbed the balance of power in Hindustan. Holkar realised his danger and began to strengthen himself by raising a disciplined corps under the command of a Frenchman named Dudrenec.[1] He instigated Ismail Beg, who had re-

1 Edwardes, Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas,* Vol. II, pp. 216-217. The following remarks of Malcolm (*Memoir of Central India,* Vol. I, 1824, p. 132) are interesting: "The government of Holkar had been expelled from all share in the territories north of Jeypoor. Its title to the tribute of that country, however, was still recognized; but this, as well as the preservation of its possessions in Malwa, was owing, in the latter years of Madhajee Sindhia, less to any power the Holkar family possessed of maintaining its rights, than to the ties which still subsisted between Mahratta Chiefs, and which were not forgotten, even in the hour of battle. This national feeling gave a peculiar feature

mained inactive after his defeat at Patan, to make a further attempt for the destruction of Sindhia's power. Ismail Beg failed and surrendered to Perron. Sindhia's departure for Poona in the spring of 1792 emboldened Holkar to draw his own sword, but his troops were severely defeated in the battle of Lakheri (June 1, 1793).[1] The quarrel between Sindhia and Holkar, and the absence of the former from Hindustan, prompted Pratap Singh to declare his independence of Maratha control. After the battle of Lakheri De Boigne marched to Jaipur. Pratap Singh shut himself up in his capital; but at the last moment, rather than sustain a siege, he tendered his submission and paid nearly a million sterling.

The condition of Jaipur territory in 1794 is thus described by J. Pillet, a French military adventurer in the service of Pratap Singh: "Their country having

to their occasional contests with each other, which frequently terminated in a way that was unintelligible to those who did not understand the character and constitution of the confederacy. The value of this disposition to reunion, when apparently in the most broken and divided state, had been fully appreciated by Madhajee Sindhia; and he maintained, sometimes by great sacrifices, all those bonds and relations upon which it depended".

1 For a critical account of this battle, see Sir J. N. Sarkar's article in *Modern Review*, February, 1944.

been devastated and depopulated by the (Maratha) armies which eat up their produce, although immense, it has destroyed all the branches of commerce which made it flourish, and has left for their subsistence only what escapes the activity of these armies. Nearly 25 years of such calamities leave their ruinous effects to be easily judged.....'"[1] This enterprising well-wisher of Jaipur wrote a letter to Colonel John Murray, Military Auditor-General in Bengal, proposing a protective alliance between his patron and the British Government (June, 1794). He observed, "I see nothing except a well-formed alliance between the Jaipur Rajah and the Government of His Britannic Majesty and the East India Company—if they see their interest in it—that can avert the deluge ready to descend on the Rajah's head, already preceded by a frightful tempest." The Jaipur Raja's requirements were thus defined by Pillet:

> "First, a defensive and offensive treaty between him and the Company.

1 For the financial resources of Jaipur in 1795, see Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 4. The revenues had decreased from Rs. 1,23,20,000 to Rs. 86,51,000.

Secondly, one of the Company's representatives at his Court.

Thirdly, the supplying by the British of 7,000 fusils, etc., 2,000 musketoons for a corps of cavalry, and as many pistols, sabres or swords, banderoles, etc.

Fourthly, the uniforms necessary for that corps.

Fifthly, permission to raise or recruit [troops] in your territory or in that of the Nawab Wazir (of Oudh).

Pillet assured Colonel Murray that the acceptance of these terms by the British authorities would enable the Raja of Jaipur to support them with 50,000 cavalry, besides the resources of his territory, 'without asking for any return save a firm protection on the part of the Company and full liberty to enjoy his dominions in peace.'[1]

Colonel Murray's view was that 'the Northern Rajahs ought to be held up in their independence of the Marathas as a counterpoise.....but this is chiefly to be effected by the Rajahs, through their own wisdom, by uniting to resist encroachments and by

1 *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. VIII, No. 1.

resolution to guarantee each other in their respective dominions."[1] In a letter to Sir John Shore, dated July 10, 1794, he suggested the desirability of sending a Resident to the court of Jaipur. He observed, "The countenance of our Agent from the Government, to the Northern Rajahs, without any ties whatever, would serve to encourage them to unite and coalesce among themselves, by showing that the English wish them well, and have not any particular exclusive partiality for the Marathas, and if these last should understand that this Government does not wish that the Rajahs should be crushed, there is some chance that the power of the Rajahs might, in the course of a little time, be so consolidated, as to enable them to resist the depredations of the Marathas."[2] But Sir John Shore was not prepared to assume new responsibilities.

The court of Jaipur came into direct contact with the British Government in 1799 in connection with the surrender of Wazir Ali, ex-Nawab of Oudh. In January, 1799, he murdered Cherry, British Resident at Benares. and some other Europeans. He then

1 *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 2.
2 *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 3.

collected an army of several thousand men and made a desperate attempt to establish himself in Oudh, but the strong opposition of a British detachment compelled him to take refuge in Jaipur territory (June, 1799). The Jaipur Government prevented him from pursuing his journey towards Kabul, and confined him in the fortress of Amber. At the instance of the Governor-General (Lord Wellesley) Colonel Collins, Resident with Sindhia, went to Jaipur and requested Pratap Singh to surrender the 'assassin.' Pratap Singh agreed, but he demanded, and received, from Colonel Collins a written guarantee that Wazir Ali's life would be spared and he would be condemned to perpetual imprisonment without chains. In one of his conversations with the Resident the Raja "described, with much feeling, the oppressions and injuries that his subjects daily sustained from the rapacity and injustice of the Maratha Chieftains, and concluded his speech with affirming that it was the earnest desire of himself, and several other Rajput Sardars, to form an alliance with the Honourable Company." Colonel Collins replied that he was not authorized by the Governor-General 'to enter upon any subject of importance, which involved matters foreign to the object

of his present mission.' Wazir Ali was surrendered (December, 1799) and taken to Calcutta.[1]

In 1798 Pratap Singh was again in arrears with the payment of his tribute to the Marathas, and Vaman Rao was ordered to invade his country and collect what sums he could. Vaman Rao secured the assistance of the famous military adventurer, George Thomas, who had made himself master of Hariana. Early in 1799 the combined forces of Vaman Rao and George Thomas, about 4,000 strong, began to march for Jaipur territory. Pratap Singh collected about 40,000 troops and met the invaders at Fatehpur, a prosperous and important town in the Shekhawati territory. In the general engagement that followed[2] the Rajputs were defeated. Instead of paying a large indemnity Pratab Singh decided to continue the struggle. The Raja of Bikaner arrived with reinforcements of 5,000 men for the Jaipur army. Daulat Rao Sindhia and General Perron, who had recently been invested with the government of Hindustan,

1 *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, No. 183, 184, 186-191A, 193-198.

2 For a critical account of this battle, see Sir J. N. Sarkar's article in *Modern Review*, July, 1943.

ordered Vaman Rao to discontinue the war. Although Vaman Rao was unwilling to make peace, George Thomas decided to retreat. The depredations committed in Jaipur territory by his retreating army compelled Pratap Singh to make peace with Vaman Rao.

Early in 1800 Lakshman Anant, better known as Lakhwa Dada, who was then Daulat Rao Sindhia's supreme agent in North India, advanced into Rajputana, to collect the tribute due from the Rajput Princes. Pratap Singh had once again decided to throw off the Maratha yoke. A powerful Jaipur army was joined (April, 1800) at Sanganer, a few miles south of Jaipur, by 10,000 Rathor cavalry from Jodhpur; but the Jaipur *Darbar's* attempt to win over George Thomas proved unsuccessful. A decisive battle was fought at Malpura[1] on April 16, 1800. Although the Rathors cut the Maratha cavalry to pieces, the slaughter in the ranks of the Jaipur army was terrible. Compton says, "Pratap Singh never recovered from the blow to his power and prestige which was dealt him on his eventful day. Of the eighty pieces of canon which he had brought into the

1 For a critical account of this battle, see Sir J. N. Sarkar's article in *Modern Review*, July, 1943.

field, he lost seventy-four, together with all his camp, baggage and warlike stores."[1] Within three weeks of this crowning victory Lakhwa Dada lost his position in Sindhia's court and became a rebel. General Perron came to Jaipur. Pratap Singh realised the futility of further resistance and made peace on payment of 25 *lakhs* of rupees (May, 1800). The Raja of Jodhpur accepted the verdict of Malpura and paid up the arrears of tribute due from him, amounting to 12 *lakhs* of rupees.[2]

Pratap Singh was succeeded in 1803 by Jagat Singh, whom Tod describes as 'the most dissolute prince of his race or of his age.' He was infatuated with an 'Islamite concubine' called 'Ras-caphoor,' whom he 'formally installed as queen of half his dominions and actually 'conveyed to her in gift a moiety of the personality of the crown, even to the invaluable library of the illustrious Jai Singh, which was despoiled, and its treasures distributed amongst her base relations.' Coins were struck in her name.

1 Compton, *European Military Adventurers in Hindustan*, p. 240.

2 Compton, *European Military Adventurers in Hindustan*, pp. 237-241.

The Raja not only rode with her on the same elephant, but demanded from his nobles those forms of reverence towards her, which were paid only to his legitimate queens. Heavy fines were imposed on those nobles who refused to respect her as a queen. The end of this powerful concubine was pathetic. The Raja lent his ear to 'a report injurious to the fair fame of his Aspasia,' and condemned her to 'the castle allotted for criminals."[1] The nobles 'held both his authority and his person in utter contempt' and entertained serious thoughts of deposing him. The condition of the country was miserable. Tod says, "The lofty walls which surrounded the beautiful city of Jey Singh were insulted by every marauder; commerce was interrupted and agriculture rapidly declined, partly from insecurity, but still more from the perpetual exactions of his minions." Such was the Prince who 'continued to dishonour the *gadi* of Jai Singh' until his death (December 21, 1818).[2]

Even a brief survey of the vicissitudes through which the principal Rajput States passed in the eighteenth century brings some painful factors into

1 The prison of Nahrgarh.
2 *Annals of Amber,* Chap. III.

clear relief. A large share of the miseries suffered by the Rajputs was undoubtedly due to the greed and unscrupulousness of the Marathas. They were constantly in want of money, and to them the desert of Rajputana appeared to be as good a pagoda tree as the fertile Doab and the smiling plains of Bengal. The Mughal Emperors in a sense deserved the tribute which they drew from Rajputana, for they enforced internal as well as external peace, and afforded the Rajput Princes sufficient scope for the display of their military ardour and administrative skill. But the Marathas rendered no service in exchange for the large sums they exacted by force. Instead of suppressing internal dissensions in the Rajput States, they utilised them for their own aggrandisement. When Imperial generals like Mirza Najaf Khan and adventurers like Amir Khan devastated Rajputana, the Maratha overlords of the Rajputs did not come to their rescue. No Rajput Prince was allowed to fight under the Maratha banner as a respected and valued vassal, and the Maratha Empire gained nothing from the loyal service of the Rajputs, although the part played by them in the extension and consolidation of the Mughal Empire was even then a living

memory. Had the Marathas utilised the Rajputs as the Mughals had done, the history of India in the eighteenth century would in all probability have flowed through different channels.

In criticising Maratha policy towards the Rajputs two important points should be remembered. In the first place, frequent invasions, and consequent devastations of territory, were rendered necessary by the persistent refusal of the Rajput Princes to honour their agreements with the Marathas. They were determined not to pay money unless they were forced to do so. The Marathas knew this, and applied force whenever their demands were refused. Both the parties thus moved in a vicious circle; Rajputana lay prostrate under the heel of her oppressors. Secondly, the depredations caused by the Maratha armies grew in extent and horror with the increase of the non-Maratha element in the forces led by Sindhia and Holkar. Malcolm remarks about Mahadji Sindhia, "The countries under his own observation were well managed, as were all those where the inhabitants were peaceable and obedient; but in his efforts to reduce the chiefs of Hindustan, the princes of Rajpootana, and the petty Rajas of Central India, to the

state of subjects, he let loose all the irregular violence of his army; and the proceedings of some of those he employed to complete the subjugation of the Rajpoots, were marked by a spirit of rapacity and cppression, that has, perhaps, never been surpassed even in the annals of the Marathas."[1] The horrors committed by the Pindaris are generally reflected upon the whole course of Maratha relations with Rajputana, but this is hardly fair to the Maratha race.

While we must blame the Marathas for bringing to dust the descendants of those Rajput heroes who had fought for centuries in defence of their liberty and their faith, we must note with regret that the Rajputs of the eighteenth century were largely responsible for their own sufferings. The old clan feeling prevented unity even in the face of overwhelming disaster. Long submission to the Mughals had weakened the feeling of patriotism; that love of liberty, which had been the key to Rajput history for centuries, was no longer an active force in Rajput life. The simple, straightforward Rajput warrior had learned all the arts of the Mughal courtier, and tried

1 *Memoir of Central India,* Vol. I, 1824, p. 129.

to rival the Maratha in political intrigue and barren diplomacy. The Mughal harem had cast its baneful influence on the private life of the Rajput Princes and nobles: we find a descendant of Mirza Raja Jai Singh dressing himself like a courtesan and dancing in his *zenana* with bells tied to his ankles. Such men could not stand against the new-born imperial zeal of the Marathas, led by capable and ambitious leaders like Peshwa Baji Rao I, Malhar Rao Holkar and Mahadji Sindhia. The Rajput was not yet a total stranger to that reckless personal courage which had made him a fitting hero of medieval romance; but personal courage counted little in long-drawn contests with large Maratha armies. The Europeanised infantry of the Marathas shattered the impregnable walls of medieval Rajput forts[1] and crushed the proud Rajput cavalry. But the Rajputs remained blind to the lessons of the age, and sent their cavalry to destruction in pitched battles with De Boigne's brigades. The nobles lost their accustomed place of honour in the councils of their Princes, who gave their confidence to barbars, tailors, elephant-drivers and water-

1 Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, 1824, pp. 126-127.

carriers. Assassination became a recognized political weapon. Society became so corrupt that even the Royal *zenana* was occasionally polluted by immorality. Rajputana was on the verge of collapse from within while the Marathas were knocking at the gates from without.

II

Colonel Tod speaks enthusiastically of "the enlarged and prophetic views of Marquess Wellesley, which suggested the policy of uniting all the regular governments in a league against the predatory powers".[1] The 'predatory powers' were, of course, the Marathas, specially Sindhia and Holkar, whose relations with the Pindaris were well-known. The 'league' of 'regular governments' was, naturally, to be organised and led by the East India Company. Virtually this meant the imposition of the system usually described as 'Subsidiary Alliance' on the 'regular governments'. This policy was responsible for the conclusion of a treaty with Jaipur in 1803. Continually ravaged by the troops of Sindhia and Holkar, Jaipur

1 *Annals of Amber,* Chap. IV.

willingly accepted the guarantee of protection which 'a firm and permanent friendship and alliance' with the East India Company seemed to imply. The treaty was 'settled' by General Lake, signed by him on December 12, 1803, and ratified by Lord Wellesley on January 15, 1804.

Sawai Jagat Singh agreed by this treaty that "the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both", thus clearly entangling his State in the Anglo-Maratha struggle. The Company promised not to interfere in the internal administration of Jaipur, and no tribute was to be demanded from the Raja. If 'any enemy` (i.e., the Marathas) 'evinced a disposition to invade' the Company's territory in Hindustan, Jagat Singh would "send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army, and ... exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy." Military co-operation was hardly to be distinguished from subordination, for Jagat Singh consented to "act, during the time of war, or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the Commander of the English army ... employed with his troops". He would not "entertain in his service, or in any manner

give admission to, any English or French subject, or any other person among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Companny s Government". All disputes between Jaipur and any other State were to be submitted to the British Government. If the British Government failed to settle the dispute owing to 'the obstinacy of the opposite party,' the Company would grant military assistance to Jaipur, provided the Jaipur Government paid 'the charge of the expense of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other Chieftains of Hindustan'. In exchange for these concessions, the ruler of Jaipur received the Company's guarantee of 'the security of his country against external enemies'.

Although there were complaints from the British side,[1] yet it seems that, on the whole, Jagat Singh loyally fulfilled the demands preferred by the Company's officers engaged in hostilities against Holkar. Tod, who had an intimate personal knowledge of British relations with the Rajput Princes, says,[2] "... we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating

1 Secret Consultations, Imperial Record Department, July 11, 1805, No. 2.

2 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. IV.

the treaty upon our ally." It must be recognised that Holkar's movements in Hindustan placed the Jaipur Government in a very difficult situation. In June, 1805, Holkar threatened that "as the Raja (of Jaipur) did not join him in endeavouring to reduce the British Power within its limits...he would destroy his country." This letter was shown to Captain Sturrock, Acting Resident at Jaipur, in order to convince him that the Jaipur Government did not 'hold any improper correspondence with the enemy.' But the Resident was not convinced. He reported to the Governor-General that the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur were willing to form an anti-British coalition.[1] This suspicion was strengthened a few months later (October, 1805), when Jagat Singh hesitated, on various pretexts, to send his troops to join a British detachment. Captain Sturrock plainly told him that "his professions, contradicted by his actions, would not obtain credit with the British Government, which had experienced his insincerity and the little reliance that could be placed on his assertions." The Raja was also accused of allowing Holkar to draw

1 S. C., July 11, 1805, No. 2.

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1 *Annals of Amber,* Chap. IV.

willingly accepted the guarantee of protection which 'a firm and permanent friendship and alliance' with the East India Company seemed to imply. The treaty was 'settled' by General Lake, signed by him on December 12, 1803, and ratified by Lord Wellesley on January 15, 1804.

Sawai Jagat Singh agreed by this treaty that "the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both", thus clearly entangling his State in the Anglo-Maratha struggle. The Company promised not to interfere in the internal administration of Jaipur, and no tribute was to be demanded from the Raja. If 'any enemy' (i.e., the Marathas) 'evinced a disposition to invade' the Company's territory in Hindustan, Jagat Singh would "send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army, and ... exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy." Military co-operation was hardly to be distinguished from subordination, for Jagat Singh consented to "act, during the time of war, or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the Commander of the English army ... employed with his troops". He would not "entertain in his service, or in any manner

give admission to, any English or French subject, or any other person among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Companny s Government". All disputes between Jaipur and any other State were to be submitted to the British Government. If the British Government failed to settle the dispute owing to 'the obstinacy of the opposite party,' the Company would grant military assistance to Jaipur, provided the Jaipur Government paid 'the charge of the expense of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with the other Chieftains of Hindustan'. In exchange for these concessions, the ruler of Jaipur received the Company's guarantee of 'the security of his country against external enemies'.

Although there were complaints from the British side,[1] yet it seems that, on the whole, Jagat Singh loyally fulfilled the demands preferred by the Company's officers engaged in hostilities against Holkar. Tod, who had an intimate personal knowledge of British relations with the Rajput Princes, says,[2] "... we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating

1 Secret Consultations, Imperial Record Department, July 11, 1805, No. 2.

2 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. IV.

the treaty upon our ally." It must be recognised that Holkar's movements in Hindustan placed the Jaipur Government in a very difficult situation. In June, 1805, Holkar threatened that "as the Raja (of Jaipur) did not join him in endeavouring to reduce the British Power within its limits...he would destroy his country." This letter was shown to Captain Sturrock, Acting Resident at Jaipur, in order to convince him that the Jaipur Government did not 'hold any improper correspondence with the enemy.' But the Resident was not convinced. He reported to the Governor-General that the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur were willing to form an anti-British coalition.[1] This suspicion was strengthened a few months later (October, 1805), when Jagat Singh hesitated, on various pretexts, to send his troops to join a British detachment. Captain Sturrock plainly told him that "his professions, contradicted by his actions, would not obtain credit with the British Government, which had experienced his insincerity and the little reliance that could be placed on his assertions." The Raja was also accused of allowing Holkar to draw

1 S. C., July 11, 1805, No. 2.

supplies from his territory. This charge he 'denied with much earnestness,' but in vain. The Resident concluded a not very pleasant interview with the Raja by declaring that "if he pursued a different line of conduct in future, to that which good faith and a regard to his own interests required," the British Government would "abandon an alliance which from its nature must prove either very useful or very burdensome."[1] A few days later the Raja was assured that, "although the treaty would be dissolved by any delay or evasion on his part in performing the conditions of it, Government entertained no intention of attacking him, or deviating in any manner from the general friendship which has so long subsisted between the two States."[2]

One of the excuses on which Jagat Singh evaded the duty of sending military assistance to the East India Company was the despatch of Jaipur troops to Udaipur in connection with the marriage of Princess Krishnakumari.[3] As these troops 'held the Rana in control,' Daulat Rao Sindhia found it difficult to

1 S. C., December 31, 1805, No. 2.
2 S. C., December 31, 1805, No. 14.
3 See pp. 170-171.

realise his tribute from Mewar.[1] Sindhia then called upon the British Government to compel its ally, the Raja of Jaipur, to withdraw his troops from Mewar, or, in the alternative, to allow him to 'act against the Raja of Jaipur as an enemy.' Lord Lake thought that there were 'just grounds for the appeal made by Daulat Rao Sindhia,' and instructed Captain Sturrock to bring the matter to Jagat Singh's notice. The Resident explained to the Raja the implications of the treaty concluded by the British Government with Sindhia: neither the British Government nor any of its allies could offer any assistance to the Rana of Udaipur or any of Sindhia's tributaries. Jagat Singh agreed to recall his troops from Udaipur.[2] This promise was speedily fulfilled and 'a considerable force' from Jaipur was sent to join the Bombay Army under the command of Major-General Jones.[3] These troops rendered satisfactory service and returned to Jaipur[4] in December, 1805.

In November, 1805, Jagat Singh proposed that

1 Mercer to Barlow, April 22, 1806.
2 S. C., December 31, 1805, No. 18.
3 S. C., December 31, 1805, No. 48.
4 S. C., January 16, 1806, No. 42, 44.

Lord Lake should request Daulat Rao Sindhia to agree to his (Jagat Singh's) marriage with Krishna-kumari. He was "particularly anxious that the intended marriage should take place at some intervening period between the beginning of next year and the commencement of the next rainy season." Captain Sturrock expressed the opinion that no diversion of energy should take place during the war, and advised the Raja to delay his preparations for the marriage 'until a more favourable time appeared for its accomplishment.'[1] But Jagat Singh's repeated requests[2] could not be evaded. Lord Lake wrote a letter to Sindhia but at the same time warned Jagat Singh against 'the adoption of any measures...which include the smallest risk of creating any dispute, either with Sindhia, or with the Chiefs of the Rana of Udaipur.'[3]

In January, 1806, Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur, who was one of the suitors for the hand of Krishna-kumari,[4] sent some *vakils* to Jaipur 'to renew his

1 S. C., December 31, 1805, No. 57.
2 S. C., January 16, 1806, No. 42.
3 S. C., January 16, 1806, No. 43.
4 See p. 169.

remonstrances' and ordered the mobilisation of his troops. Captain Sturrock found Jagat Singh determined to push his claim. He advised the Raja to come to an amicable settlement with his rival or to submit the dispute to the British Government in accordance with article 5 of the treaty of 1803. This advice was followed by the usual threat that "if he did not adhere to the conditions of the treaty...he could not expect to benefit from its protection."[1] But the negotiations opened by the Jodhpur *vakils* proved abortive, and Captain Sturrock reported on February 3, 1806, "Both parties are preparing for hostilities in the event of their not being able to settle the point in dispute to their mutual satisfaction and an appeal to arms becoming necessary."[2]

While matters were heading towards a crisis Lord Lake decided that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh (who had applied for permission to send a *vakil*) should be given "a hope that the British Government will consent to arbitrate their present difference."[3] This policy was strictly adhered to by

1 S. C., February 27, 1806, No. 41.
2 S. C., February 27, 1806, No. 42.
3 S. C., March 13, 1806, No. 15, 17.

Captain Sturrock, who plainly told the Jodhpur *vakils* that, the dispute between the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur being of a 'private and family nature,' the British Government would "avoid interfering in it as much as possible."[1] Even after this Jagat Singh sent a *vakil* to Delhi, who pressed John Malcolm for intervention, throwing out a dark hint that the non-interference of the British Government "would lead to an appeal to others, who would instantly come forward from interested motives." Malcolm merely repeated Lord Lake's formula.[2] In an interview with Captain Sturrock on February 17, 1806, Jagat Singh referred to Article 5 of the treaty of 1803 (which provided for British mediation and assistance in case of dispute with any other State). The Resident replied that the article "could not be fairly constructed to mean that the British Government was to go to war to aid him in the accomplishment of an object of a private and family nature."[3] The steady refusal of the British Government to interfere in the dispute probably induced both the parties to conclude an

1 S. C., March 13, 1806, No. 16.
2 S. C., March 13, 1806, No. 25.
3 S. C., March 13, 1806, No. 26.

agreement in April, 1806. It was decided that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh would marry Krishnakumari, nor would they allow the Rana of Udaipur to select her husband without their approval. Further, the union between the two States would be cemented by the marriage of Man Singh with Jagat Singh's sister and the marriage of Jagat Singh with Man Singh's daughter.[1] Unfortunately this agreement could not prevent Sindhia from invading Mewar in April-May, 1806. Although the crisis seemed to be averted by the rapproachment between Jaipur and Jodhpur and the retreat of Sindhia from Mewar in May, 1806, there were troublesome persons who did not want peace, and within a few months they succeeded in renewing the struggle between Jaipur and Jodhpur.

Meanwhile the British Government had repudiated the treaty with Jaipur. It is well-known that during his brief tenure of office Lord Cornwallis reversed Lord Wellesley's policy and decided to withdraw British protection from the trans-Chambal States. This policy of withdrawal was approved and

1 S. C., May 8, 1806, No. 96, 97.

enforced by Sir George Barlow, who succeeded Lord Cornwallis as temporary Governor-General in October, 1805. The alliance with Jaipur was already strained by Captain Sturrock's unfavourable reports. Yet Sir George Barlow protected Jaipur against Holkar's claim for tribute (January, 1806).[1] But the alliance was broken up in July, 1806, and 'the principal States of India' were 'apprized of the grounds' on which this decision of the Governor-General was based.[2] That these 'grounds' did not satisfy some of the most well-informed and efficient officers of the Company is clear from the following statement of Tod: "The Jeypur Court retained a lively, but no grateful remembrance, of the solemn obligations we contracted with her in 1803, and the facility with which we extricated ourselves from them when expediency demanded, whilst we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating the treaty upon our ally."[3]

The charges officially levelled against the Raja were answered by him in a letter received by

1 S. C., February 27, 1806, No. 25.
2 S. C., February 13, 1807, No. 68.
3 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. IV.

the Government on January 12, 1807. He was accused of 'intentional delay and neglect' for his failure to co-operate with his troops at the siege of Bharatpur. He replied that during the siege he had not received any communication from the Commander-in-Chief requiring the assistance of his troops. The Commander-in-Chief merely asked him to station his troops on the frontier, and 'in the event of any attempt on the part of the enemy to pass through Jaipur territory, to appear and arrest his progress.' As Holkar did not proceed towards Jaipur, the Jaipur troops stationed on the frontier could do nothing. When Holkar descended to Rajputana, after some delay, Jagat Singh remained inactive in accordance with the advice of Major-General Jones. This 'political connivance' was later on considered 'in a wrong light' by the Commander-in-Chief. With regard to the charge of supplying provisions to Holkar's army, Jagat Singh pointed out that he had stationed his officers in different posts 'to furnish supplies, whenever they were procurable, for the British troops.'' In conclusion he observed, "With the utmost sincerity of heart, I have fulfilled every obligation of my alliance with the British Government and I have

positively rejected the propositions of the Southern Chiefs who sought an alliance with me.'"[1] This explanation did not satisfy the authorities in Calcutta.

III

About the middle of the year 1806 the position of Jaipur became very critical. In May-June Holkar plundered Jaipur territory, demanded tribute, and requested Sindhia to support Man Singh's claim for marriage with Krishnakumari.[2] His hands were tied by a mutiny in his army,[3] but he continued to press on Jaipur.[4]

About the same time the contest with Jodhpur was renewed. At the bottom of this trouble lay the intrigues of Sawai Singh of Pokaran, one of the principal *Sardars* of Jodhpur. With a view to bring the administration of Jodhpur under his own control he wanted to dethrone Man Singh. A claimant to the

1 Political Consultations, Imperial Record Department, January 15, 1807, No. 82.

2 S. C., June 19, 1806, No. 34.

3 This mutiny was caused by his inability to pay his troops. He was compelled to deliver his nephew as a hostage to a mutinous regiment.

4 S. C., October 2, 1806, No. 25; November 27, 1806, No. 31.

throne was found in Dhukol Singh, the posthumous son of late Raja Bijay Singh. Sawai Singh was a very shrewd man. Instead of putting his cards on the table he posed as a friend of Man Singh but secretly tried to endanger Man Singh's position by bringing about a renewal of the struggle with Jaipur. He requested Jagat Singh to marry Krishnakumari as soon as possible; at the same time he "intimated to Raja Maun that he would be eternally disgraced if he allowed the Prince of Amber to carry off the betrothed." As Tod says, "The bait was greedily swallowed by Man Singh," and preparations were at once undertaken for war.[1] It was also swallowed by Raichand, the ambitious *Dewan* of Jaipur, who hoped that "if Man Singh could be deposed, then his influence would rule both the principalities, besides having ascendancy at Udaipur through the marriage of the Raja with the Princess."[2] Raichand was an able man. He succeeded in enlisting the support of Sindhia, Sharza Rao Ghatge (who was at this time the *de facto* ruler of Mewar), Amir Khan and Surat

1 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIV.
2 Prinsep, *Memoirs of the Pathan Soldier of Fortune*, p. 312.

Singh, the Raja of Bikaner.[1] A powerful group of Jodhpur *Sardars,* led by Sawai Singh, joined him.

The attitude adopted by Holkar was uncertain, as usual. At first he wanted to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Jaipur and Jodhpur. It was confidently believed by the British authorities that "if his endeavours (for peace) were ineffectual, he would take part with Man Singh, of whose services, in giving an asylum to his family during the late war with the British Government, he seems to entertain the most grateful sense." He sent a *vakil* to Jaipur "to dissuade the Raja from going to war." In reply, Jagat Singh entreated him to take no part in the contest and offered him four *lakhs* of rupees as the price of his neutrality. Then Holkar made what British officials described as 'a proposal of desperate nature.' In January, 1807, he sent a *vakil* to the British Resident in Delhi with the proposal that, "if the British Government would give its consent to the measure, assist him with two battalions of sepoys, and settle what his share of the conquest was to be, he would

1 Mercer to Barlow, December 7, 1806; February 6, 1807. Prinsep, *Memoirs of the Pathan Soldier of Fortune,* p. 312. S. C., March 19, 1807, No. 3. P. C., January 29, 1807, No. 32.

take possession of the country of Jaipur, which produced a revenue of nearly a crore of rupees.'"[1] The Resident was directed by the Government to express 'an unqualified rejection of this proposal in mild and amicable terms."[2] This rebuff led to an unexpected change in Holkar's policy; he made terms with Jaipur. Tod says, "Raja Maun had only the gratitude of Holcar to reckon upon for aid, to whose wife and family he had given sanctuary when pursued by Lord Lake to the Attoc. But here Sowee again foiled him; and the Mahratta, then only eighteen miles from Maun, and who had promised to join him next day, made a sudden movement to the south. A bribe of £100,000...effected this desertion'.[3]

After some hesitation[4] Jagat Singh assumed the

1 S. C., January 29, 1807, No. 13.

2 S. C., January 29, 1807, No. 16.

3 *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIV. A British officer reported on March 1, 1807, that Holkar 'has certainly taken money from both and made fair promises to both.' (S. C., March 19, 1807, No. 3). On February 24, 1807, the Resident in Delhi received reliable information to the effect that Holkar had joined Jaipur. (S. C., March 26, 1807, No. 2).

4 Mercer reported on November 29, 1806, "……the known imbecility of the Jaipur Court renders it improbable that the Raja will persevere in this object at the risk of a war with Raja Man Singh assisted by Holkar." (P. C., January 1, 1807, No. 32).

leadership of the anti-Jodhpur coalition. In January, 1807, Dhokul Singh was brought to Jaipur and publicly acknowledged as the legitimate ruler of Jodhpur.[1] Seton, Resident in Delhi, was anxious to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, for, he thought, "an amicable accommodation between the two Rajas would in a political point of weight be beneficial to our interest, since their going to war might eventually tend to increase the power of the Marathas."[2] When the preparations for war were complete he informed the Supreme Government that 'the circumstance of so large a force being collected in the vicinity of our dominions could not be received with perfect indifference.'[3] But the policy so long pursued by the British authorities had to be given up if active efforts were to be made for bringing about 'an amicable accommodation' between Jagat Singh and Man Singh. For such a change the authorities were not yet ready.

On January 15, 1807, the Resident in Delhi wrote to the Supreme Government, 'The Raja of Jaipur appears to want steadiness, which renders it difficult to form a judgment of what he may ultimately determine upon." (P. C., February 5, 1807, No. 126).

1 P. C., February 5, 1807, No. 127.

2 P. C., January 29, 1807, No. 32.

3 S. C., March 19, 1807, No. 3.

Man Singh prepared himself for the impending contest and marched at the head of his army to Parbatsir (January, 1807).[1] While he was waiting there for the arrival of the Jaipur army, Sharza Rao Ghatge, re-inforced by a body of Jaipur troops led by Jiwan Chela, attacked Jodhpur territory from the south and advanced as far as Pali. He was, however, defeated and repulsed from Jodhpur territory. For a moment Man Singh became cheerful, but the discovery of 'a treacherous communication between his *Thakurs* and those attached to Dhukol Singh' completely un-nerved him.[2] Four chieftains alone remained loyal to him. He was induced by his friends to 'trust to the fleetness of his steed.' "The Raja remarked, he was the first of his race who ever disgraced the name of Rahtore by showing his back to a Cuchwaha." He reached Mairta in safety, but deeming it incapable of long resistance, he continued his flight and reached Jodhpur with a slender retinue. After his departure from Parbatsir the place was plundered by Amir Khan and Bala Rao Ingle, one of Sindhia's commanders.

1 P. C., February 5, 1807, No. 92.
2 P. C., April 23, 1807, No. 25.

While these incidents were happening in Rajputana, the Resident in Delhi was informed by the Rao Raja of Kota that Sindhia, Holkar and the Raja of Jaipur had entered into a secret league to attack the Company's dominions.[1] Seton forwarded the Rao Raja's letter to the Governor-General with the following observations: "It does not appear to me that the Raja of Jaipur can be so blind to his interest, nay to his safety, as wantonly to engage in a war of aggression which, whatever its result, must involve him in distress, since the aggrandisement of the Marathas would confirm his dependence, and the success of the British Government might cause the loss of his capital, and eventually that of his dominions." He added that a cordial co-operation between Sindhia and Holkar was 'hardly to be expected.'[2] The Supreme Government agreed with this conclusion and observed that 'in every point of view' the Rao Raja's report 'exceeded the limits of reasonable contemplation.'[3] Mercer officially expressed his 'entire disbelief of the information given, unsupported as it appears to be

1 S. C., March 26, 1807, No. 2A.
2 S. C., March 26, 1807, No. 2.
3 S. C., March 26, 1807, No. 5.

by either collateral evidence or probability."[1] The matter ended there.

Jagat Singh left his capital in January and slowly proceeded towards Jodhpur territory.[2] Holkar's attitude was still uncertain.[3] Jagat Singh's plan was to occupy Jodhpur, to place Dhokul Singh on the Rathor throne and then to proceed towards Udaipur for the celebration of his marriage with Krishnakumari.[4] The support of Holkar was probably purchased early in February.[5] The Resident in Delhi informed the Supreme Government in March: "It is stated that Holkar's *Sardars* are both amazed and discontented at his abandonment of Man Singh, and that the circumstance is likely to cause desertion in his army."[6] Towards the end of February Raichand

1 S. C., June 11, 1807, No. 12.

2 P. C., February 5, 1807, No. 127, 128; February 12, 1807, Nos. 94, 95, 96.

3 P. C., February 12, 1807, No. 96.

4 P. C., February 12, 1807, No. 97.

5 P. C., February 26, 1807, No. 26, 29.

6 P. C., March 19, 1807, No. 21. On March 28 Mercer wrote, "Holkar's conduct towards Raja Man Singh is reprobated even in this *Durbar*, and his influence and authority with both parties has certainly suffered by it." (P. C., April 23, 1807, No. 25).

purchased Amir Khan's support by the prompt payment of a *lakh* of rupees.[1] The Pindaris attached to his camp at once 'received orders to proceed into the country of Jodhpur, for the purpose of laying it waste.' The Resident in Delhi heard a rumour to the effect that Holkar had it 'in contemplation to assist Raja Man Singh indirectly by permitting certain of his *Sardars* to join that chieftain provided the Raja agreed to pay him seven *lakhs* of rupees, it being understood that Holkar was not to appear to countenance the conduct of his *Sardars*.'[2] Naturally the Jaipur *Durbar* delayed payment. Holkar tried 'to force a speedy conclusion of it by plundering some villages in Jaipur territory.[3]

It is extremely difficult to give a consistent account of the movements of Holkar and Sindhia at this juncture. Neither of them pursued any thing like a consistent policy. In February Mercer wrote to the Supreme Government, "I am fully convinced

1 P. C., March 19, 1807, No. 21.

2 P. C., March 19, 1807, No. 37. Some troops were allowed by Holkar to join Man Singh, but they took no part in the operations. (P. C., April 23, 1807, No. 25).

3 P. C., March 26, 1807, No. 38.

that the views of both Sindhia and Holkar are confined at present to the object of obtaining money from both parties and that neither of them are inclined to engage in actual hostilities with the other; yet it appears difficult to surmise how this object can be prosecuted by both without the risk of an open rupture. The consequence of Holkar's retiring from an interference in the present dispute, on the receipt of a sum of money from the Jaipur Raja, would be a decided superiority of influence and authority with all the Rajput States in favour of Sindhia, who would remain the sole arbiter...'"[1]

We have already referred to Man Singh's flight to Jodhpur. His enemies expected that, instead of holding out in the capital, which had no means of defence, he would take shelter in Jhalor. But at the suggestion of a loyal officer Man Singh decided to defend the capital. He collected troops and 'formed a garrison of five thousand men, on whom he could depend.'[2] The *Sardars* who still stood by him took

1 P. C., March 26, 1807, No. 38.

2 P. C., April 9, 1807, No. 25. Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIV.

a special oath of loyalty, and this 'greatly revived the drooping spirit of the Raja."

Meanwhile the Jaipur army was advancing unopposed through Jodhpur territory. Everywhere the *Sardars* were won over and 'the name and authority' of Dhokul Singh was established. Naturally the influence of Sawai Singh was found most useful. On April 1 the main body of the army, under the command of Amir Khan and Chand Singh, reached Jodhpur. On the following day the erection of batteries began.[2] Two weeks later Man Singh evacuated the town of Jodhpur and retired into the fort.[3]

Then the troubles of the besieging army began. In the Jaipur camp there was 'the utmost distress for want of money and provisions of every description.' Some of those Rathor *Sardars* who had espoused the cause of Dhokul Singh were so much exhausted by their sufferings and disgusted with the depredations committed in their country by the invaders that they deserted Jagat Singh with their followers. Jagat Singh's troubles were increased by the arrival of a

1 P. C., March 26, 1807, No. 38.
2 P. C., April 30, 1807, No. 28.
3 P. C., May 7, 1807, No. 22

detachment of Sindhia's troops at Ajmer. It was rumoured that Sindhia wanted to set up a rival claimant to the throne of Jaipur if Jagat Singh refused to pay him a large sum of money without delay.[1] Twelve *lakhs* of rupees were paid to Ambaji Ingle, and for the time being Sindhia was pacified.[2]

But misfortune now obstructed Jagat Singh at every step When his troops clamoured for pay, he requested Sawai Singh and other Rathor Chieftains to contribute to military expenses. "This appeal proved a test of their zeal." They proceeded direct to the camp of Amir Khan. "It required no powerful rhetoric to detach him from the cause (of Jaipur) and prevail upon him to advocate that of Raja Maun; nor could they have given him better counsel towards this end, than the proposal to carry the war into the enemy's country: to attack and plunder Jeypur, now left unguarded." As soon as Amir Khan's hostile intentions became clear, Jagat Singh directed his Commander-in-Chief, Sheolal, to attack him. Amir Khan fled towards Jaipur, hotly pursued by Sheolal.

1 P. C., June 11, 1807, No. 16.
2 P. C., September 1, 1807, No. 6A.

"Astonished at his own success, and little aware that the chase was in the direction projected by the enemy, Sheolal deemed he had accomplished his orders in driving him out of Marwar." He left his camp and repaired to the city of Jaipur 'to partake of its festivities.' Amir Khan 'availed himself of the imprudent absence of his foe,' inflicted a crushing defeat on Sheolal's troops, and captured their camp, guns, and equipments (August 18, 1807). He followed up this victory by a hurried march to Jaipur, and the capital of Jagat Singh was 'dismayed by the presence of the victor at her gates."[1]

This unexpected development at once broke up the confederacy against Man Singh. The Raja of Bikaner marched home; Jagat Singh raised the siege of the Jodhpur fort and started for Jaipur. He knew that his retreat was likely to be intercepted. So he bribed Sindhia's commandars, Bapu Sindhia, Bala Rao Ingle, and Jean Baptiste, to escort him in safety to his capital. Even Amir Khan was bribed, so that he

1 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIV. P. C., September 1, 1807, No. 6A, 14A; September 8, 1807, No. 13A. The Rani of Jaipur appealed to the Rao Raja of Kota for help and took measures for the defence of the capital. (P. C., September 8, 1807, No. 24; September 15, 1807, No. 3, 5).

might not attack him on his way. In order to speed up the retreat Jagat Singh burnt his tents and equipage at every stage. At length he had to kill with his own hand his favourite elephant, which, says Tod, "wanted speed for the rapidity of his flight." In spite of these humiliating precautions Jagat Singh was defeated near the frontier of Marwar by some Rathor Chieftains.[1] He reached Jaipur in October.[2]

Amir Khan now held the destiny of Rajputana within his grip. Those Rathor Chiefs who had intercepted Jagat Singh's retreat thought that it was necessary for them to secure the continuance of Amir Khan's aid and, with the financial assistance of the Raja of Kishangarh, who belonged to the Rathor clan, two *lakhs* of rupees were paid.[3] Towards the close of August Amir Khan reached Mairta at the head of these Rathor Chiefs, and invited Man Singh, who was still at Jodhpur, to join him in order that with their united force they might capture Nagaur, where Sawai Singh had taken shelter with Dhokul Singh.

1 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIV.
2 P. C., October 26, 1807, No. 21; November 16, 1807. No. 1.
3 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIV.

Amir Khan's treachery towards Jagat Singh and his insatiable greed for money had filled Man Singh's mind with anxiety and distrust. He replied that owing to want of money and provisions it was not possible for him to leave Jodhpur at that time. The Resident in Delhi reported, "It is probable that the Raja thinks it safer to trust to the effects of time and to the efforts of his countrymen than to place himself in the power of one so capricious and so devoid of good faith as Amir Khan....."[1]

But Man Singh found himself compelled to surrender to Amir Khan. The fortress of Nagaur, protected by a double chain of walls and garrisoned by Sindhia's battalions, was too strong to be occupied by Jodhpur troops alone. It was absolutely necessary to occupy it, for Dhokul Singh was there. So Man Singh concluded an agreement with Amir Khan,[2] received him at Jodhpur with 'distinguished honours', and interchanged turbans with him. From Jodhpur Amir Khan marched towards Nagaur, which he had decided to occupy by a treachery unparallelled even in the history of that faithless age. His intrigues

1 P. C., October 26, 1807, No. 20.
2 Prinsep, *Memoirs of the Pathan Soldier of Fortune*, p. 348.

compelled Jean Baptiste and Bapu Sindhia to withdraw their protection from the fort.[1] Then he met Sawai Singh, threw out hints of Man Singh's ungrateful return for his services, and induced the Rathor Chief to conclude an agreement with him in favour of Dhokul Singh. On an appointed morning Sawai Singh visited Amir Khan's camp, attended by the chief adherents of Dhokul Singh and about 500 followers. The tragedy may be best described in Tod's words: "A spacious tent was pitched in the centre of his camp for the reception of his guests, and cannon were loaded with grape ready to be turned against them. The visitors were received with the most distinguished courtesy; turbans were again exchanged, the dancing girls were introduced, and nothing but festivity was apparent. The Khan arose, and making an excuse to his guests for a momentary absence, retired. The dancing continued, when at the word *dugga*, pronounced by the musicians, down sank the tent upon the unsuspicious Rajpoots, who fell an easy prey to the ferocious Pathans."[2] (March, 1808).[3]

1 Mercer to Lord Minto, January 30, 1808.
2 *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. IV.
3 P. C., August 29, 1808, No. 58.

Dhokul Singh was now altogether helpless. He saved himself by a hasty flight from Nagaur. That city was plundered by Amir Khan and the spoils, including 300 pieces of cannon, were sent to his strongholds. After this terrible feat he returned to Jodhpur, and received ten *lakhs* in cash and two large towns yielding thirty thousand rupees per year 'as the reward of his signal infamy.' Man Singh took vengeance on all followers of Dhokul Singh, including the Raja of Bikaner,[1] who surrendered after bitter fighting (May-December, 1808).[2]

While Amir Khan was establishing his ascendancy in Marwar and driving Man Singh to insanity,[3] Jagat Singh was trying to bring about his long-deferred marriage with Krishnakumari. In January, 1808, a palace revolution at Jaipur brought a pro-Holkar party in power. This party was led by Ratanlal, at whose advice Jagat Singh offered to pay Holkar ten *lakhs* of rupees for his support.[4] But

1 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XV.

2 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XV. Close to Lord Minto, December 24, 1808.

3 See below, "British Alliance with Marwar."

4 Mercer to Lord Minto, October 26, 1807; January 30, 1808; February 29, 1808.

Holkar had already sunk to the position of a weak adventurer. In February, 1808, Mercer reported to the Governor-General that Holkar's army consisted merely of seven battalions of infantry.[1] Sindhia naturally resented Jagat Singh's overtures to Holkar. During the years 1808-9 his troops mercilessly ravaged Jaipur territory. In June, 1808, Rai Chand Singh, the Jaipur general, was severely defeated by Sindhia's troops.

Unable to receive any assistance from Holkar, Jagat Singh turned once again to the British Government. In August, 1808, the Resident in Delhi received a visit from Bakshi Bal Mukund, who was then on his way to Calcutta 'in the double capacity of *vakil* on the part of Holkar and the Raja of Jaipur.' The *vakil* suggested that a new defensive treaty might be concluded between Jaipur and the British Government. Seton told him that "the former treaty had been annulled in consequence of its not having been found to produce the expected advantages, and that it was not easy to assign a good reason for renewing an arrangement which upon trial had proved al-

1 Mercer to Lord Minto, February 29, 1808.

together useless." One of Bal Mukund's statements sounds almost as if it fell from the mouth of Lord Wellesley: "As the actual power as well as the dignity of the ancient sovereigns of India were now possessed by the British Government, the weaker States, when oppressed, had a sort of flight to look up to it for protection." Seton replied that "the British Government did not pretend or wish to be considered as the arbiter of the differences between independent States." At last the *vakil* said that "upon the present occasion all that was now solicited on the part of the Raja (of Jaipur) was the mediation of the British Government to procure a fair and amicable adjustment of the difference between him and Sindhia." Seton replied that "even the exercise of mediatorial interference would be a deviation from the system of the British Government.[1] Seton's replies were approved by the Supreme Government.[2]

Towards the close of the year 1808 Jaipur became a helpless prey to the battalions of Sindhia and the Pindaris of Amir Khan. Jagat Singh was 'totally devoid of energy and destitute of good advisers.'

1 P. C., September 12, 1808, No. 28.
2 P. C., September 12, 1808, No. 30.

Nothing could be expected from Holkar, whose 'occasional intellectual malady' was gradually developing into 'a confirmed derangement.' Amir Khan paid frequent visits to Holkar, with the aim of 'obtaining the military and political management of Holkar's affairs.'[1] In May, 1809, Jagat Singh concluded an agreement with Sindhia. The sum of 15 *lakhs* of rupees was to be paid by the Jaipur *Durbar*, and, in return, Sindhia agreed to withdraw his troops from the Jaipur territory.[2]

Even after this Jagat Singh continued to pray for British assistance. In July, 1809, the Resident in Delhi reported that the *vakils* of Jaipur and Jodhpur were continually pressing him to secure a treaty of alliance from the Governor-General. Seton was favourably inclined towards this proposal, for he wrote on July 15, 1809, "I am very sensible of the political advantage of conciliating the Chiefs of the Rajput States to the westward of the British possessions, more especially those situated towards the Indus. If the powerful Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur—supposing the government of the latter country to be once

1 P. C., January 16, 1809, No. 93.
2 P. C., June 3, 1809, No. 30.

more organised,—and the petty Chiefs of Bikaner and Jaisalmer and the ruler of Bahawalpur were cordially attached to us, a barrier might be formed against invasion...[1] But Lord Minto was not prepared to extend the system of alliances.

In April, 1810, Amir Khan made himself the *de facto* ruler of Holkar's territories. Jaswant Rao Holkar was now completely mad, and his ministers were unable to resist the Pathan Chief.[2] That adventurer had already established his authority in Jodhpur as well as in Bhupal. He now became the most powerful man in Central India; even Daulat Rao Sindhia was overshadowed. As Holkar's deputy he demanded tribute from Mewar and Jaipur. His *vakil* at Jaipur used 'some very strong expressions with respect to the tribute due from that State.' Once again the helpless Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur tried to avert disaster by mutual reconciliation. Towards the middle of the year 1810 they decided 'to relinquish all thoughts' of marrying Krishnakumari and to cement their alliance with matrimonial relation-

1 P. C., August 5, 1809, No. 1.
2 P. C., July 7, 1810, No. 37.

ships.[1] Even then they were anxious to secure the protection of the Company. In June, 1810, their *vakils* told the Resident in Delhi that "the countries of Jaipur and Jodhpur would never be secure from invasion until they were taken under the protection of the British Government."[2] Seton merely repeated the old reply.[3] Both Jagat Singh and Amir Khan tried to secure the direct or indirect countenance of the British Government for their respective causes, but Seton turned a deaf ear to their requests.[4]

After the submission of the Rana of Mewar and the murder of Krishnakumari (July, 1810) Amir Khan came to Jaipur, exacted from Jagat Singh a promise to pay 10 or 16 *lakhs* of rupees, and left his territory. (June, 1811). During his stay in the vicinity of Jaipur he was exposed to 'the severest insult and oppression' by his soldiers. Metcalfe, Resident in Delhi, reported to the Supreme Government, "He was sometimes deprived of his food, sometimes of his tent, and he was almost daily exposed for hours to the violent heat of the sun. It affords a very striking proof

1 P. C., June 21, 1810, No. 42.
2 P. C., June 21, 1810, No. 42.
3 P. C., July 7, 1810, No. 37.
4 P. C., July 7, 1810, No. 37.

of the weakness of the Jaipur Government when an army in such a state could make it tremble for its existence." The condition of the Jaipur army was similar. Jagat Singh continued his applications 'for a connection' with the British Government.[1]

Metcalfe observed, "It is impossible to live in this part of India and to see the scenes which pass before our eyes without regretting that the Rajput States are not under our protection. A confederation of the Rajput States under the protection of the Central Government must be a favourite object with every man who has any charge of political duties in this quarter.....It would connect the Bengal and Bombay territories by a country that might then be considered for all political and military purposes our own...It would deprive the vagabond armies of India of their principal resource for ravage and plunder...The intervention of the Rajputs under our influence would prevent any co-operation between those Northern and Southern powers that we have reason to suppose ill affected towards us." But Metcalfe was not 'insensible of the difficulties' involved in the project.

1 S. C., July 12, 1811, No. 1.

He added, "Existing treatise must be set aside and the policy of Government must be deviated from before it can be contemplated, and even if circumstances should arise to warrant the undertaking, perhaps it could not be accomplished without military operations of a very extensive nature, involving probably the complete establishment of British control over every part of India..."[1] But Lord Minto was not prepared to deviate from the policy of non-intervention: 'no consideration of advantage, however alluring,' could tempt the British Government to depart from 'a scrupulous adherence to the obligations of its engagements.'[2]

In July, 1811, Khush-hali Ram Bohra[3] once again became the chief minister of Jaipur in place of Megh Singh. The latter was completely overawed by Amir Khan; consequently he advocated compliance with all his demands. Metcalfe reported on July 23, 1811, "...Amir Khan regards the departure of Megh Singh from the councils at Jaipur as equivalent to the loss

1 S. C., July 12, 1811, No. 1.

2 S. C., July 12, 1811, No. 2.

3 See Broughton, *Letters written in a Mahratta Camp*, Constable's edition, p. 92.

of a partisan, and in consequence deems it necessary to prepare to gain some of his objects on Jaipur by more formidable measures than those which he has hitherto pursued."[1] Jagat Sing was still continuing through several *vakils*, who acted independently of each other, his efforts to secure British protection. One of the *vakils* suggested that the British Government should mediate a treaty between Jaipur and the Marathas, by which the Raja of Jaipur would agree to pay an annual tribute to the Marathas, and the Marathas should bind themselves not to enter Jaipur territory under any pretext. Another *vakil* suggested that Jaipur should cut up all connections with the Marathas and pay tribute to the East India Company. Another *vakil* said that "a declaration of the British Government taking Jaipur under its protection would not only be sufficient to drive away the Marathas and the Pathans, but would actually impart to Jaipur itself, without any further assistance, such a degree of strength as would enable it to do wonders against all its enemies." Metcalfe reported these suggestions to the Supreme Government because he was convinced

1 S. C., August 16, 1811, No. 1.

that the destruction of Jaipur by the Marathas or the Pathans or by both was sure to affect the interests of the British Government.[1] He was informed that, although the Governor-General was 'far from insensible of the actual and prospective evils resulting from ...the state of affairs in the north-western quarter of Hindustan," he was not prepared to 'enter upon the extensive and complicated field of military and political operations necessarily involved in the adoption' of the policy of intervention.[2]

The able management of Khush-hali Ram Bohra rapidly restored order in the affairs of Jaipur. He wanted to make a definite settlement about the contribution demanded by Amir Khan and threatened the outbreak of hostilities in case the Pathan Chief refused to agree to a final arrangement. The vassals of Jaipur placed so much confidence in him that they were prepared to co-operate with his plans.[3] Amir Khan at first agreed to accept 15 *lakhs*, to be paid in three instalments, but later on raised his demand to 20 *lakhs*, to be paid in two instalments. Megh

1 S. C., August 16, 1811, No. 1.
2 S. C., August 16, 1811, No. 2.
3 P. C., September 20, 1811, No. 10.

Singh, the former minister of Jaipur, was in the Pathan camp. Khush-hali Ram refused to be bullied and began hostilities (August, 1811). But Jagat Singh was not prepared to tolerate a powerful minister. Towards the close of the year 1811 Khush-hali Ram was appointed 'at his own desire as manager of affairs in the Shekhawati country.'[1]

After the dismissal of the minister Jagat Singh found it difficult to resist Amir Khan. Naturally the negotiations with Metcalfe were renewed. Jagat Singh's *vakils* offered to pay to the British Government the sums which Sindhia and Holkar extorted from him. The money might be paid in 'annual tribute or territorial cession'. Metcalfe could not openly encourage these proposals, but he wrote to the Supreme Government in January, 1812, " ... from the ruinous state of affairs at Jaipur and from the apparently utter impossibility of retrieving them except by our aid, there is a good reason to conclude that an advantageous treaty might now be made with the court of Jaipur ... ."[2]

As the Supreme Government made no response,

1 P. C., December 26, 1811, No. 26.
2 P. C., January 25, 1812, No. 31.

Jaipur suffered. The country was a prey to the Pindaris. The city was continually infested with robbery. Megh Singh was trying to recover his office with the help of the Pindaris. There was 'an appearance of the apathy of despair' in the Raja's proceedings. The prevalence of disorder in the Jaipur State could not be overlooked by the British Government. In December, 1812, Metcalfe reported that the military tribes of the Shekhawati country had repeatedly plundered the frontier of Hariana. On the other hand, some allies of the Company, like the Raja of Bharatpur, were anxious to aggrandize themselves at the cost of Jaipur, and nothing but the strong remonstrance of the Resident in Delhi restrained them. Metcalfe wrote, "The Jaipur Government bore many years of distress and devastation without being so reduced as to become an object of contempt to comparatively petty States[1] and to its own subjects. It preserved a certain deference and respect, longer perhaps than might have

1 The Rao Raja of Machiri occupied some Jaipur forts and villages. Both Metcalfe and the Supreme Government took a serious view of this aggression, and compelled the Rao Raja to restore them. (S. C., June, 25, No. 26, 27, 30, 31, 32; October 1, 1813, No. 99; October 8, 1813, No. 18).

been expected under such circumstances, and it has been only lately that, worn out, at length, by a protracted series of miseries, it has fallen into a condition of extreme degradation ... "[1]

Early in 1814 Jagat Singh concluded a 'regular engagement' with Amir Khan. The Jaipur *Durbar* agreed to pay him 'a small fixed sum', and the Pathan Chief undertook to withdraw his military posts from that portion of Jaipur territory which he had occupied. Very soon, however, trouble came from another side. Bapu Sindhia marched from Mewar, invaded Jaipur and began 'to plunder the districts and levy collections from the forts'. Jagat Singh reported the matter to the Governor-General and solicited his 'advice'.[2] In reply he was informed that there were some 'obstacles to a more intimate union of interest between the British Government and the State of Jaipur'.[3] Sometime later Bapu Sindhia returned to Mewar, but Amir Khan began his depredations again. Metcalfe wrote on October 15, 1815, "Of the forces which obey Amir Khan, three armies are now plund-

1 P. C., January 15, 1813, No. 6.
2 P. C., July 12, 1814, No. 14A.
3 P. C., July 12, 1814, No. 16.

ering and taking possession of different districts in the Jaipur country; ... The Chiefs assembled at Jaipur, for the defence of the country against the common enemy, have increased the distress of the State by violent dissensions.'"[1] Unable to deal effectively with this crisis Jagat Singh proposed that 'the treaty of alliance which was concluded during the administration of Lord Wellesley should be revived.'[2] (December, 1815). The request was repeated a few months later (March, 1816).[3] The *vakil* of Jaipur told Metcalfe that 'there were no terms to which his master was not willing to accede'. He offered either tribute, or territorial cessions, or even 'the entire management of the country, the appointment of the ministers, and the complete obedience and subserviency of the court in every way.'[4] But the time was not yet ripe, and Jaipur had to wait.

IV

It was Lord Moira who initiated a new policy. He was not prepared to hand over Jaipur to Sindhia

1 P. C., November 10, 1815, No. 13.
2 S. C., March 16, 1816, No. 60.
3 S. C., March 16, 1816, No. 61.
4 S. C., April 15, 1816, No. 45.

or to Amir Khan. In a Minute dated April 13, 1816, he observed, "Amir Khan would, as sovereign (of Jaipur), add to the native strength of Jaipur an army better composed, higher disciplined, and more fashioned to service than is possessed by any other chieftain in India. The very structure of this army, and all its circumstances, make our opulent provinces the object." It was injudicious to expect that the mutual jealousy so long existing between Amir Khan and Sindhia would prevent their co-operation against the Company. "The conferences,' Lord Moira remarked, "which took place between Amir Khan and Bapu Sindhia early in the Gurkha War were sufficient indications of their good understanding". Sindhia, the Governor-General thought, would not openly object to the conclusion of an alliance between the Company and Jaipur, at a time when the British "force is at liberty, when it is in the most efficient condition, and when its quality is displayed in a light so impressive to the native sovereigns, by its having trodden under foot the hitherto invincible Gurkhas." Metcalfe, the Resident in Delhi, was, therefore, to be authorised to conclude a treaty with Jaipur at once.[1]

1 S. C., April 20, 1816, No. 1.

Among the members of the Council Edmonstone opposed the Governor-General's proposal. His views are explained in detail in a Minute, dated April 16, 1816. In the first place, he drew a distinction between the 'organized troops of the Pathan leaders' and the Pindaris. "The former," he observed, "consist chiefly of infantry and artillery regularly formed and disciplined, to which is added cavalry such as is usually found in the ranks of native armies. These troops, it is true, have been employed in overthrowing...the States of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur and, especially in the dominions of the latter, have spread into the interior of the country, exacting contributions and practising those outrages which are systematic among native troops.... In the sense above described they may perhaps be justly termed predatory troops, but they are not, as the Pindaris are, mounted robbers without organization or discipline; nor do they go forth, as the Pindaris do, in bands to distant quarters for the purpose of committing robbery and plunder indiscriminately in all the territories accessible to their incursions." It was clear, therefore, that the weakening of Amir Khan's 'organized troops' was not a necessary step in the immediate expedition against the

Pindaris. Secondly, the plan of overthrowing Amir Khan's hold on Jaipur was a part of Lord Moira's comprehensive programme for 'the general settlement of Central India.' Edmonstone was convinced that the conclusion of an alliance with Jaipur 'must of necessity lead, by an uninterrupted and unavoidable gradation of procedures and events, to that extended system of paramount sway' which the Governor-General wanted and the authorities in London prohibited. The Secret Committee in London had observed in a despatch relating to the question of revising the system of alliances: "We are chiefly desirous that by prudent management our affairs should be maintained in the same relative state under which our possessions have now for ten years continued in a state of tranquility".[1] Edmonstone pointed out that "the continued exclusion of the State of Jaipur from the range of our political alliances is essential to the maintenance of that system to which the Hon'ble Committee refers."[2]

Seton, the former Resident in Delhi, was now a member of the Supreme Council. He carefully read the Minutes of Lord Moira and Edmonstone, and

1 Letter dated September 29, 1815.
2 S. C., April 20, 1816, No. 2

observed in a Minute dated April 17, 1816, "Our alliance with Jaipur should be renewed, and in consideration of the present critical state of that country, it is extremely desirable that the preliminary measures necessarily connected with the arrangement should be adopted with the least practicable delay". The principal grounds in favour of this view are thus stated by him. In the first place, an alliance with Jaipur would prevent the occupation of that country by Amir Khan. "In my judgment", Seton observed, "this is by no means a mere negative advantage, since Jaipur can in no case remain neutral. If its resources are not with us, they must be employed against us. If not thrown into our scale of influences, they must be thrown into that of our enemies. There is no medium". Secondly, as a protected State Jaipur would virtually become an advanced British military cantonment in Western India, "forming a species of connecting link between the western frontier of the Presidency of Bengal and the province of Gujarat". Thirdly, 'by the exercise of well-directed influence' British officers might 'restore the once flourishing country of Jaipur to its former state of prosperity and happiness'. Finally, the renewal of the alliance would remove 'the somewhat un-

favourable impression which attached to our dissolution of the former treaty'. Against these advantages three objections might be raised. In the first place, it might be argued that it was unwise to offend so powerful a military Chief as Amir Khan. Seton replied that sooner or later the Company must check Amir Khan's progress, and it was better that he should be checked before he succeeded in securing absolute control over Jaipur. Secondly, Amir Khan might plead the right of Malhar Rao Holkar (Jaswant Rao Holkar's successor) to the privilege of levying tribute from Jaipur. Seton suggested that the British Government might recognize the validity of this claim and provide for the regular payment of the sum decided upon.[1] Thirdly, Edmonstone had referred to the prohibitory order of the Secret Committee's letter and argued that the

1 Seton observed, "As far as I comprehended the meaning of the *vakiis* of the Rajas of Jaipur, when discussing this subject with them at Delhi, they did not absolutely deny the right of Sindhia and of Holkar to a pecuniary payment, as a species of tribute. But what they bitterly complained of, and with too much cause, was that under the pretext of levying this tribute, armies were stationed in their master's dominions ... It has frequently been hinted to me ... that the Rajas would be happy if the stipulated sum could be paid through the medium of the British Government." (S. C., April 20, 1816, No. 3).

revival of the alliance with Jaipur was not directly prohibited by it.[1]

After these deliberations it was decided that an alliance should be immediately formed with Jaipur, and Metcalfe was entrusted with the delicate task of carrying the negotiations to a successful end. It was apprehended that Sindhia would not "regard without dissatisfaction the conclusion of an alliance between the British Government and the State of Jaipur and that he would willingly throw every impediment in his power in the way of it." But the Governor-General believed that "it must be an object affecting him very near that would rouse him with active hostilities against the Britsh Government". Close, who was at that time Resident with Sindhia, was instructed to 'meet any enquiry' on the matter. He was asked to say that the British Government could not refuse to respond to the Raja's repeated applications for protection, that the Maratha Powers had no claim on Jaipur, and that the British Government had been loyally and sincerely observing the terms of the treaty of 1805 with Sindhia.[2]

1 S. C., April 20, 1816, No. 3.
2 Supreme Government to Close, April 20, 1816.

Metcalfe was fully aware of, and in full sympathy with, the new policy initiated by Lord Hastings. The instructions issued to him on April 20, 1816, were bold as well as precise. The negotiations with Jaipur were to be "conducted in such a manner as to render evident to the Raja that it is his interest and not that of the British Government that is principally concerned in their success, that we are yielding to his solicitations and not seeking our own advantage". He was to be solemnly warned that 'to deserve the benefits of our alliance' he must 'enter into it with a firm resolution to adhere in all events to the British Government'. The price demanded by Lord Hastings from the Raja of Jaipur was: "the establishment of a British force in the country, the whole or a large proportion of the expenses of which is to be borne by the Raja; a control over the conduct of the exterior relation of that Government; exclusion from Jaipur territory of all foreign influence and power; and the disposal of the military power and resources of Jaipur for all purposes connected with the alliance and the general welfare of the two States". The British Government must have the right "to introduce into Jaipur territory at all times any number of troops it may deem re-

quisite for the furtherance of the common interests of the two States, but it should be declared that the Raja will not be subjected to any additional charge on this account, except when the troops are augmented at his express solicitation or for objects exclusively his own." The amount of subsidy was to be fixed with reference to the financial condition of Jaipur; it was not to be placed 'on such a note as would render the punctual discharge of it a matter of difficulty'. In addition to the subsidiary force, the Raja should be asked to maintain a body of troops 'to be at the disposal of the British Government for purposes of common interest'. With regard to the control of external relations, the British Government must regulate the payment of tribute, if any, by Jaipur to Sindhia or Holkar. Lord Hastings thought, however, that neither Sindhia nor Holkar could justly demand tribute from Jaipur, for they had relinquished all claims on the allies of the British Government. The British Government, on its part, would defend the Raja of Jaipur against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and guarantee the integrity and 'independence of his territory."[1]

1 S. C., April 20, 1816, No. 6.

Lord Hastings expected that Metcalfe would be able to conclude the alliance without involving the British Government in actual hostilities with Amir Khan and his confederate Chiefs. But precautionary measures were necessary. Two detachments of troops, 18,000 effective fighting men, were posted at Rewari and Mathura under the command of Major-General Ochterlony. A corps of reserve waited at Cawnpore. Measures were also taken for the protection of the British frontier against the sudden movement of the 'predatory hordes'. If the conclusion of the alliance was followed by any trouble created or encouraged by Amir Khan, war would be declared against him; "in such an event his retreat from Jaipur will no longer be sufficient", and operations against him would be continued until he should be deprived of all his possessions.[1]

Sindhia was naturally anxious to keep both Amir Khan and the British Government away from Rajputana. As soon as he heard that negotiations would be opened with Jaipur by Metcalfe he ordered Bapu Sindhia 'to conciliate the Rajputs by every means in

1 S. C., April 20, 1816, No. 6.

his power, and not to discourage them by any conduct which may interrupt the harmony that Sindhia wishes to preserve with them'. At the same time re-inforcements were sent to Bapu Sindhia.[1] Close thought that Amir Khan was not strong enough to secure 'the double object of subduing the Jaipur Government... and of resisting the army under Bapu Sindhia'. He was, therefore, expected to leave the field open to Sindhia, who would then 'be at liberty to regulate his proceedings according to the disposition which he finds prevalent in the Jaipur *Durbar*'.[2] On the whole, however, Close was confident of Metcalfe's success. He observed, "We cannot from past experience imagine that Sindhia will remain silent under the prospect of his dominions being so nearly approached in their most vulnerable points by the power of the British Government, or perhaps even that His Highness will altogether abstain from movements of

1 Close wrote to Metcalfe in a letter dated May 19, 1816, "As the march of Sindhia's troops may inspire the Raja (of Jaipur) with some confidence of success against Amir Khan without submitting to the sacrifices he must make to obtain our effectual assistance, I should consider it a most desirable point to prevent or retard their advance into Jaipur ..." (S. C., June 11, 1816, No. 27).

2 S. C., May 25, 1816, No. 32.

a menacing appearance with a view to make a last effort to deter us from advancing; but as to any act of hostility, I am of opinion that the measures which your Lordship has resolved to pursue are precisely those which must discourage Sindhia from making any such attempt".[1]

As soon as the intention of the British Government became public, Amir Khan began to press Jaipur more closely than ever and brought re-inforcements to invest the capital. Bapu Sindhia failed to conciliate the Rajputs. The Jaipur *vakils* in Sindhia's camp complained of 'the inadequacy and futility of the exertions' made by him in their favour. Close suspected that Sindhia really 'wished to effect his purpose by intimidation rather than by force'. Amir Khan opened secret negotiations with Sindhia[2] and apparently succeeded in convincing him that they should act jointly for securing their common purpose—the exclusion of British influence from Jaipur.[3] Sindhia calculated that his acquiescence in the policy pursued by Amir Khan towards Jaipur would 'frighten the

1 S. C., June 11, 1816, No. 28.
2 S. C., June 15, 1816, No. 10.
3 S. C., July 13, 1816, No. 12.

Raja and deter him from putting his seal irrevocably to any treaty' with the Company. Naturally Amir Khan increased the vigour of his operations against Jaipur.[1] The position of Jaipur became very critical, for no assistance was available from Bapu Sindhia.[2]

In the meantime Metcalfe had opened negotiations with Jaipur. These negotiations were disturbed (June, 1816) by alarming rumours originating from unknown sources regarding the impending march of British troops upon Jaipur from Mathura and Rewari.[3] At first Jagat Singh was rather lukewarm about Metcalfe's proposal, for he expected relief from Sindhia. Metcalfe wrote to Close on May 26, 1816, "The conduct of the court of Jaipur since it received intimation of the disposition of our Government to negotiate a treaty of protection and alliance has not corresponded with its former eagerness in pressing its own overtures".[4] Towards the close of June the change in Sindhia's attitude and the intensification of

1 S. C., June 15, 1816, No. 11.
2 S. C., June 21, 1816, No. 25.
3 S. C., June 15, 1816, No. 10; June 29, 1816, No. 12; September 7, 1816, No. 5.
4 S. C., June 15, 1816, No. 8.

'Amir Khan's pressure restored the 'former eagerness' of the Jaipur *vakils*. The terms were settled and the draft of the treaty was ready for signature. All on a sudden, however, the Jaipur *vakils* adopted an uncompromising attitude and the work done so far was undone. This sudden change was due to Amir Khan's retreat from Jaipur. Metcalfe wrote on July 3,1816, "What he is to receive does not appear, and there is some reason to suppose that his necessities made him retreat". In spite of this unexpected disappointment Metcalfe did not despair, "for the distress of the Jaipur Government is of a permanent nature and the only permanent relief is in our protection'. A few days later the negotiations were resumed, but they were suddenly interrupted again by 'a most preposterous proposition'—the claim of the Jaipur *vakils* that Tonk and Rampura should be restored to their Government. Metcalfe wanted to keep these places for the Company:; "The fort of Rampura is a post of which we know the value by experience, and the district yields four or five *lakhs* of annual revenue".[1]

1 S. C., August 3, 1816, No. 3, 4.

When Metcalfe's reports were brought to the notice of the Governor-General-in-Council it was decided that the 'delusive character' of the Raja of Jaiput 'entitled him to no consideration'. Metcalfe was instructed to inform him that if he did not 'immediately recover the false step he had taken and conclude the alliance on the terms already proposed, he must consider the negotiations at an end and abide the consequences of this decision in the ruin and devastation of his country without an effort on the part of the British to save him'. (July, 1816).[1]

In a long despatch dated August 7, 1816, Metcalfe submitted to the Supreme Government a detailed report of his unsuccessful negotiations with the Jaipur *vakils* in Delhi. At first their response to his proposal was very unsatisfactory. Probably the ministers of Jaipur had not yet made up their minds as to the terms on which they should enter the proposed alliance. For a few days the *vakils* even omitted their ordinary visits on stated days, which they had never before 'omitted for years, as if ashamed of the apparent inconsistency of their own Court'. Later

1 S. C., August 3, 1816, No. 5.

on they re-opened the negotiations with a proposal that 'an English Gentleman' should be sent to Jaipur. Amir Khan was then advancing in full force against Jaipur. "The mission of an English Gentleman would have pointed out to him the determination of the British Government to protect Jaipur, and would have had nearly the same effect as a treaty in deterring him from violent measures. The mission of an English gentleman would also have shown our anxiety to accomplish the alliance and would to all appearance have reversed the relative positions of the two States in the negotiations". The proposal was, therefore, rejected by Metcalfe, although he was quite aware of the possibility that "the mission of an English gentleman to Jaipur might have tended to expedite the conclusion of a treaty from the advantage of direct intercourse with the Raja and his principal ministers".[1]

Amir Khan was in the meantime collecting his troops and advancing to attack the city of Jaipur. Metcalfe believed that he "wished to anticipate the connection (between Jaipur and the Com-

1 S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 5.

pany) that he apprehended, and sought by a decisive blow completely to prevent it, either by bringing the Raja entirely within his own power or by effecting at least a change in the Ministry and putting in men connected with himself. It was only after Amir Khan had begun the siege of Jaipur that the *Durbar* sent a *vakil* with full powers to conclude a treaty. This *vakil* was a respectable banker named Sankar Das. The *vakils* residing in Delhi were associated with him, but he was 'made the principal and most responsible person."[1]

After preliminary conversations it was decided that the expenses of the subsidiary force to be stationed at Jaipur would amount to 25 *lakhs* of rupees per annum and that the whole of this sum should be paid by the Raja of Jaipur if the resources of his territory could afford it. It was well-known, however, that the revenues of Jaipur were not sufficient for the payment of so large a sum, 'either under present circumstances or in past years of prosperity.' Metcalfe proposed that the treaty should contain an article "establishing the principle that 25 *lakhs* ought

1 S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 5.

to be paid, and should be paid whenever the resources of the country should admit of it, and that in the meantime the British Government should take a less sum, being as much as could be given according to a fair and just consideration of the resources of Jaipur, on which point the British Government should be the sole judge." The Jaipur *vakils* apprehended that the inclusion of such an article in the treaty would 'prove a warrant for insisting on the full payment of that sum hereafter.' They showed 'so decided a repugnance' to Metcalfe's proposal that he abandoned it and suggested that 15 *lakhs* should be agreed upon. Even then the *vakils* pleaded the inability of the Raja to pay so large a sum. Metcalfe thought that their argument was not absolutely without justification: "The devastation which has affected the territory of Jaipur for many years, and the actual occupation of a considerable portion of the country by enemies, afforded the *vakils* a reasonable ground for alleging that the payment of any considerable sum at first would be impracticable." The following arrangement was finally agreed upon: "for the first year nothing to be paid in consequence of the ruined state of the country, for the second and third years five

lakhs each, for the fourth and fifth years ten *lakhs* each, ever afterwards fifteen *lakhs* annually."[1]

Everything was now ready for the preparation of a draft treaty, which was to be signed on the following day. When the next day came and the draft[2] prepared by Metcalfe was read to the *vakils*, they

1 S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 5.

2 The draft treaty consisted of 16 articles. Article 1 provided for 'perpetual alliance and unity of interests between the contracting Powers.' Article 2 contained the promise of the British Government to protect Jaipur territory 'against all enemies. Article 3 related to subsidiary force. Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 regulated money payments. Article 9 provided that "the subsidiary force should be stationed at points to be hereafter determined in concert and that a fort should be assigned for the magazines and depots of the force." Article 10 provided for the maintenance of a force by the Raja "to be in constant co-operation with our troops and to be subject to our inspection." Article 11 stipulated that "on any invasion of the Jaipur country the British army should have admittance into any fort, the occupation of which might be expedient for the defence of the country." Article 12 provided that in time of war the Jaipur army should be subject to the orders of the British Government. Article 13 provided that the Raja would not enter into any negotiation with foreign chiefs and states without the concurrence of the British Government. Article 14 provided for the exclusion of Americans and Europeans from Jaipur territory. Article 15 stipulated that the British Government would not interfere in the internal management of the Jaipur state or with the Raja's dependants. Article 16 provided that duties should not be levied on articles for consumption in the British cantonments. (S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 5).

'commenced their observations upon it in an altered tone.' They objected to the arrangement about payment previously decided upon. After some delay Metcalfe agreed to take eight *lakhs* (instead of ten) per year, for the fourth and fifth years. Then the *vakils* demanded the restoration of Tonk and Rampura, which were at that time in the nominal possession of Holkar and actual control of Amir Khan. Metcalfe pointed out that Tonk and Rampura had been separated from Jaipur for a long period, and "that these districts had been for two years (1804-1806) in our possession during the former alliance, without such a demand being made on the part of Jaipur." But the Jaipur *vakils* plainly declared that they were 'not at liberty to sign any treaty without obtaining a satisfactory promise with regard to Tonk and Rampura.'[1] The negotiations were thus abruptly terminated. But Metcalfe was still sanguine. He wrote on August 7, 1816, "It is perhaps most probable that the Court of Jaipur has not really determined what course to pursue, and that there are at present two parties at work, one recommending an alliance with us on the terms insisted on, and the

1 S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 5.

other objecting either to the terms or to the alliance, and urging an arrangement with the plunderers of the country."[1]

In August, 1816, it became clear that the Jaipur *Durbar* wanted to protract the negotiations with the British in order to secure better terms from Amir Khan and Sindhia.[2] Metcalfe was informed that a minister would soon be deputed to him for the final adjustment of the terms of a treaty. Metcalfe was convinced that this proposal was nothing but an excuse for further delay. So he publicly 'declared the negotiations to be at an end on account of the persevering evasion of the court of Jaipur.'[3]

Although 'the deceitful and evasive conduct of the court of Jaipur necessarily excited the disgust' of the Governor-General, he was fully conscious of the fact that the advantages of an alliance with Jaipur were not 'immaterial' to the British Government. He

1 S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 5.

2 Close wrote from Sindhia's court on August 13, 1816, "The Jaipur question is now very little thought of. Bapuji Sindhia of his own accord lately.....advanced into Jaipur; he has again retired, but neither his advance nor retreat has excited any attention in the Durbar." (S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 9).

3 S. C., September 7, 1816, No. 6, 7.

was prepared, therefore, 'to receive and discuss any new proposition that may be made without animadverting on what has passed.' Metcalfe was authorised to conclude a treaty if the *vakils* of Jaipur accepted all the terms formerly agreed upon, as well as an additional condition to the effect that the British Government would be the arbitrator of any demand preferred by any State on Jaipur.[1] This arrangement was intended to 'form the basis of our resistance to the objections which may eventually be opposed by Sindhia or other Powers to the treaty on the pretence that it invades their rights with relation to Jaipur.' Metcalfe received unqualified praise for "conducting the negotiations with the same ability, zeal, firmness and address which have uniformly distinguished your official conduct in the many arduous and important transactions in which you have been engaged."

1 Metcalfe was fully aware of the importance of including this stipulation in the treaty, and the first draft prepared by him contained the following article: "All disputes between the Raja of Jaipur and other powers and all claims on the Raja by other Powers shall be submitted to the arbitration of the British Government." The Jaipur *vakils* displayed extreme apprehension and reluctance against this stipulation, and Metcalfe considered it unnecessary to insist on its acceptance. He thought that "the exercise of the power of arbitration in all disputes between Jaipur

The position of Jaipur was becoming worse day by day. Amir Khan was collecting revenue from the villages of Jaipur and one of his lieutenants was strengthening a fort within Jaipur territory which he had occupied. Bapu Sindhia did not obstruct Amir Khan's movements. There was no unity even in the capital of Jagat Singh. Rai Chand Singh, the principal commander of his troops, was pro-British. When the negotiations with Metcalfe were broken up he resigned his command and left Jaipur in disgust. His successor, Ganesh Narain, 'was undoubtedly most anxiously bent on the formation of an alliance with the British'. Metcalfe wrote on September 25, 1816, "Affairs are proceeding at Jaipur in that course which is likely, in my opinion, though at what period I cannot pretend to say, to lead to a further application for our protection, with entire submission to our terms."[1]

In November, 1816, some Jaipur *vakils* led by Shankar Das came to Delhi and renewed negotia-

and other Powers, and on all claims brought forward on that State, was inseparable from the character of protector which the alliance would give us, and did not absolutely require any specific stipulation." (S. C., November 2, 1816, No. 1).

1 S. C., October 12, 1816, No. 16.

tions with Metcalfe. The question of Tonk and Rampura was revived. The *vakils* no longer insisted on the insertion of any stipulation on that subject in the treaty; they were ready to be satisfied if Metcalfe promised in writing that he would try 'to prevail on the Governor-General to comply with their wishes, if, by any event, Tonk and Rampura came into the possession of the British Government.' Metcalfe expressed his inability to make any such promise. The *vakils* gave up their demand as if it had been 'made with a previous conviction that it would not succeed.' Then they wanted *jagirs* or pensions for themselves. Metcalfe 'got rid of this most preposterous proposal by exposing its absurdity and laughing it off in a manner that was likely to be least offensive.' The third request of the *vakils* was that the Resident at the court of Jaipur should be a man of 'mild and kind disposition and deportment.' Metcalfe gave them full assurance on this point. Then Metcalfe proposed the additional stipulation about arbitration. The *vakils* obstinately opposed it on the ground that "they did not know to what extensive and indefinite demands they might be subjecting themselves, should they bind themselves to abide by British decision on

every claim that might be brought forward against them.'' Metcalfe tried to remove their suspicions and agreed to put the article in the most harmless language. He suggested that the right of the British Government to arbitrate on all claims preferred by other Powers against Jaipur should be limited to claims, if any, advanced by Holkar and Sindhia relating to matters arising since the dissolution of the British alliance with Jaipur in 1806, for he suspected that the alarm of the *vakils* was particularly directed towards some bonds given by Jagat Singh to Holkar and some Pindari leaders before 1806. The *vakils* accepted this compromise, and everything was ready for the formal conclusion of the treaty. A strange difficulty was, however raised at the last moment. The *vakils* were not sure whether the treaty would be ratified by the Raja. They asked Metcalfe 'to be satisfied for the present with a treaty signed by themselves.' Metcalfe naturally rejected this 'extraordinary proposal', and unwilling to tolerate further delay, broke up the negotiations. He observed in his report to the Supreme Government, "A protracted and open negotiation is attended with many advantages to the Raja of Jaipur. It overawes his enemies and enables

him to make better terms with them. It does not bind him to anything, and it puts it in his power to close with the terms offered in a case of necessity. It it attended with some of the advantages, without any of the sacrifices and restraints, of an actual alliance. And it keeps open the chapter of accidents in which the politicians of this country delight to put their trust."[1]

Soon after the termination of the negotiations the chief minister of Jaipur publicly declared that he had never authorized Shankar Das and other *vakils* to agree to any stipulation for the payment of money to the British Government. When Metcalfe confronted the *vakils* with this declaration, they said that the minister was afraid to acknowledge 'the extent of the payment to which he had agreed' lest he should be driven from office by those chiefs who were opposed to the British alliance. Metcalfe accepted this explanation as worthy of belief and wrote a letter of protest to the Raja and the minister. He remarked, "Either the negotiators had agreed to those stipulations in disobedience of their instructions, in which

1 S. C., December 17, 1816, No. 2.

case they deserved punishment and were not fit to be employed, or the court, after giving assent to those stipulations, had uttered a falsehood in denying it... in either case it would be difficult to place any confidence in the future negotiations of the Court."[1] The Raja sent an evasive reply, which appeared to imply that the agents had 'agreed to more than they had authority for,' but it was recognized that the sum of money to be paid was the principal subject of discussion.[2]

In March, 1817, Metcalfe reported to the Supreme Government that Amir Khan was again advancing towards Jaipur. His progress created alarm in Jaipur, and Metcalfe found 'some light indication of a desire' to revive negotiations for British protection.[3] Before the negotiations were formally resumed Lord Hastings arrived at his final decision to crush the Pindaris. Sindhia, Holkar and Amir Khan were the three principal persons whose co-operation or submission was an essential preliminary to the success of this plan. Holkar was asked 'to abstain from all in-

1 S. C., February 4, 1817, No. 1.
2 S. C., April 19, 1817, No. 2.
3 S. C., April 19, 1817, No. 2.

terference or connection with the states of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Kota and Bundi.' Amir Khan, who had already opened negotiations for a settlement with the British Government, was required to withdraw his troops from all Rajput States and to restore Rajput forts occupied by him. With regard to the Rajput States the Governor-General's plan was 'to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it by the measures then (October, 1817) in progress'. Agreements were to be concluded with them "on conditions which should give to the British Government the entire control over their political relations and proceedings with each other and with foreign States, secure to them the enjoyment of their territorial possessions and the independent exercise of their internal administration under our protection and guarantee, and render their resources available for defraying the charge that will be incurred in the establishment and support of this system."[1]

There were two alternative methods of giving

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 13.

the new 'system' a concrete shape. The three principal Rajput States—Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur—might be combined in a common league under the paramount authority of the British Government, or separate agreements might be concluded with each State 'on the conditions best adapted to its peculiar circumstances and situation.' The Secretary to the Supreme Government observed in a letter to Metcalfe, dated October 8, 1817, "There are some points of view in which the advantages of the former might be found to preponderate, but it may be apprehended that, notwithstanding the similarity of features which in some respects they all exhibit, there are yet such distinctions as to render it difficult to frame any system of general confederation which would adapt itself to the circumstances of all. It is possible also that feelings of pride or jealousy might lead them to prefer a separate alliance with the British Government, by which each would preserve the appearance and form of a substantive power, to an union which would bring their common dependence on the British Government too prominently forward."[1]

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.

With regard to Jaipur Metcalfe was instructed to conclude a treaty containing the stipulations previously agreed upon, with one exception: the article relating to the right of the British Government to decide the pecuniary claims of other States on Jaipur was to be omitted. Lord Hastings was by this time convinced that neither Sindhia nor Holkar was justly entitled to claim tribute from Jaipur. It was, therefore, quite unnecessary to insist on a stipulation which had 'proved to be so repugnant to the wishes and alarming to the fears of the Government of Jaipur.' Moreover, the amount of the subsidy originally demanded might be reduced, and 'the unqualified demand of a fort for stationing British troops' might not be necessary.[1]

In October, 1817, Metcalfe was ready to receive the *vakils* of Jaipur, but Jagat Singh still 'persevered' in a very perverse policy[2] and continued unaccountable, and judging from the past, interminable and mutually faithless negotiations with Amir Khan.

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.

2 Tod says, "...there were abundance of private and individual motives arrayed in hostility to the British offer. For example, the ministers dreaded the surveillance of a resident agent, as obnoxious to their authority and influence; and the chieftains,

Towards the close of November Metcalfe decided that an advance of Ochterlony's army towards Jaipur would 'bring the procrastinating council of the Raja to a decision in favour of the immediate conclusion of the alliance.' A treaty had already been concluded with Amir Khan (November 9, 1817), and Major-General Donkin was proceeding towards Kota. At this favourable moment Ochterlony might appear near Jaipur and utilise the implied threat of military operations for the purpose of coercing Jagat Singh into submission. Metcalfe wrote to him on November 25, 1817, "On your advance the negotiations with the several western states, which I was instructed to undertake, will devolve on you, with the exception of such as in consequence of the progress already made in them, it may be proper for me to conclude."[1]

The advance of Major-General Ochterlony 'caused considerable sensation and alarm' in Jaipur. Some *vakils* were sent to his camp 'to ward off apprehended hostilities,' and a deputation advanced in a

whom rank and ancient usage kept at court as the councillors of their prince, saw in prospect the surrender of crown lands, which fraud, favour, or force had obtained for them."

1 S. C., December 19, 1817, No. 112.

hurry towards Delhi. Amir Khan had in the meantime retreated from Jaipur territory, but he reoccupied some districts as soon as he heard that negotiations with Metcalfe had not yet begun. Naturally Metcalfe expected that his object would be accomplished without further delay. Unfortunately the progress of the *vakils* sent to Delhi was retarded by the intrigues of a chief named Thakur Lachman Singh, a partisan of Amir Khan. In January, 1818, Metcalfe began to negotiate separately with some tributary Chiefs owing allegiance to the Raja of Jaipur. "My object," he wrote on January 29, 1818, "is twofold: either to alarm the Court of Jaipur and stimulate them to the conclusion of a suitable alliance, by showing that we are not entirely dependent on their will but are able and willing to establish order without their concurrence; or if the Court should continue so senseless as not to be moved by the prospect of the dissolution of its power over the dependent States connected with it, to lay a foundation for the conclusion of separate engagements which should bring all those States under our protection."[1]

1 S. C., February 20, 1818, No. 26. A conditional engagement was concluded with the Raja of Khetri.

As a result of Metcalfe's shrewd diplomatic pressure the Jaipur *vakils* came to Delhi. The tribute question protracted the negotiations. Even on March 8, 1818, Metcalfe was not confident of success.[1] He wanted fifteen *lakhs;* the *vakils* offered two *lakhs* and forty thousand. At last the following arrangement was agreed upon: "The first year—in consideration of the depopulated state of the country—nothing. The second year—four *lakhs.* The third year—five. The fourth year—six. The fifth year—seven. The sixth year and ever afterwards—eight, until the Raja's revenue should exceed forty *lakhs*, when, in addition to eight *lakhs*, we should receive five-sixteenth of all the revenue above forty *lakhs.*"[2] Tod observes, "The Jeypur Court justly deemed one-fifth (eight *lakhs*) of the gross revenues of the crown, a high rate of insurance for protection; but when we further stipulated for a prospective increase of nearly one-third of all surplus revenue beyond forty *lakhs*, they saw, instead of the generous Briton, a sordid trafficer of mercenary protection whose rapacity transcended that of the Mahratta."[3]

1 P. C., March 27, 1818, No. 19.
2 S. C., April 17, 1818, No. 74.
3 *Annals of Amber*, Chap. IV.

The remaining articles of the treaty were discussed and arranged without difficulty.[1] It was signed in Delhi on April 2 and ratified by Lord Hastings on April 15. Article I provided for 'perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interest' between the two States. The territory of Jaipur was to be protected by the British Government (Article 2). Jagat Singh promised to 'act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government,' to acknowledge its supremacy, and to maintain no connection with other Chiefs and States. (Article 3). He agreed not to enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government (Article 4). All disputes between Jaipur and other States would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government. (Article 5). Article 6 regulated the question of tribute. Article 7 provided that Jaipur should 'furnish troops according to its means at the requisition of the British Government. Article 9 ran as follows: "The Maharaja and his heirs and successors shall remain absolute rulers of their terri-

1 S. C., April 17, 1818, No. 74.

tory and their dependants according to long established usage; and British civil and criminal jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that principality." Jagat Singh died within a few months of the conclusion of this treaty (December 21, 1818), and, says Tod, "the choice of a successor speedily evinced to the ministers the impracticability of their exercising, as in days of yore, that 'absolute power over their country and dependants' guaranteed to them by the treaty."[1]

1 For details, see *Annals of Amber*, Chap. IV.

BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH MARWAR

The Rathor clan claims a high antiquity for itself. It is supposed that the 'Rastikas' mentioned in Asoka's inscriptions are to be connected with the Rastrakutas of a later age, from whom the modern Rathors are descended. Tod connects the Rathors with the Gahadavalas of Kanauj.

Epigraphic evidence[1] seems to indicate that even as late as the close of the thirteenth century the Rathors were still wandering in Rajputana in search of land. Gradually they succeeded in establishing an independent principality of their own. The modern history of Marwar really begins with Chunda (1394-1421), whose grand son, Jodha (1438-1488), built the fort of Mandor and the town of Jodhpur. Marwar reached the zenith of its power under Maldev (1532-1562), the famous antagonist of Sher Shah. His son, Uday Singh, was a full-fledged vassal of Akbar. Henceforth the rulers of Marwar earned distinction as well as prosperity by their loyal and gallant service

1 Bithu and Tirsingharin inscriptions (*Indian Antiquary*, 1911).

to the Mughal Empire. During the early part of Aurangzib's reign Jaswant Singh of Marwar was 'the leading Hindu peer of the Mughal Court' and Marwar was the foremost Hindu State of Northern India.[1]

After Jaswant Singh's death Aurangzib occupied Marwar. For thirty years (1679-1708) the Rathors, ably led by Durgadas and Ajit Singh, Jaswant's posthumous son, waged a bitter struggle against the Mughals.[2] "A generation of time passed in Marwar in ceaseless conflict, captures, and recaptures." After the accession of Bahadur Shah Ajit Singh consolidated his authority in Marwar. As an ally of the Sayyid brothers he played a leading part in the reign of Farrukh-Siyar. In 1724 he met with a violent death at the hand of his second son, Bakht Singh.[3]

Ajit Singh's eldest son and successor, Abhay Singh (1724-1749), served for some time as Governor of Ahmedabad. The Rathor bards give the following exaggerated description of his power: "Abhi-Mal ruled over the seventeen thousand towns of

1 Sir J. N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, p. 324.

2 See Sarkar's *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. III, Chap. XXXVI, and Vol. V, Chap. LVIII.

3 For Ajit Singh's career, see Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I.

Guzerat, and the nine thousand of Marwar, besides one thousand elsewhere. The princes of Edur, of Bhooj, of Parkur, of Sinde, and of Sirohi, the Chalook Ran of Futtehpoor, Jhoojoono, Jessulmeer, Nagore, Dongerpoor, Bhanswarra, Lunawarra, Hulwad, every morning bowed the head to Abhi-Mal.'"[1] Success made him proud. He declared war on Bikaner on a slight pretext. His younger brother, Bakht Singh, who governed 'the castle and three hundred and sixty townships of Nagor,' induced Sawai Jai Singh of Amber to espouse the cause of Bikaner. As soon as war began between Marwar and Amber Bakht Singh stood against Jai Singh for the vindication of the honour of the Rathor clan. In May, 1741, Jai Singh was defeated by the Rathors in the battle of Gangwana (near the Pushkar lake). Nothing worth mention happened in Marwar during the last years of Abhay Singh's life. He died in June, 1749. His ambition, says Tod, was 'to be deemed the first swordsman of Rajwarra.' His ferocious courage was tempered only by his excessive indolence.[2]

1 *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. X.
2 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. X.

A war of succession broke out in Marwar after Abhay Singh's death. His son and successor, Ram Singh (1749-1751), inherited his arrogance and combined it with the impetuosity of the Chauhans,[1] his mother's clan. He offended his powerful and jealous uncle, Bakht Singh, who had lately (1748) been nominated Governor of Gujarat by the Imperial government. With the assistance of the Imperial *Mir Bakhshi,* Salabat Khan, Bakht Singh declared war against his nephew. Ram Singh secured the support of Ishwari Singh of Jaipur. After some indecisive engagements Salabat Khan concluded peace with Ram Singh, leaving Bakht Singh in the lurch (April, 1750). But a few months later Bakht Singh defeated his nephew and compelled him to take shelter in Jaipur. In July, 1751, Jodhpur received Bakht Singh as its ruler, but he died in September, 1752. He was succeeded by his son, Bijay Singh (1752-1792).[2]

Bijay Singh's fairly long reign may be described as a continuous struggle against the Marathas. In May, 1752, the Marathas under Jayapa Sindhia espoused the cause of Ram Singh and invaded Jodhpur

1 Tod, *Annals of Marwar,* Chap. XII.
2 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire,* Vol. I, pp. 306-321.

territory, but Bakht Singh compelled them to retreat to the Deccan. In June, 1754, Jayapa Sindhia was sent by the Peshwa's uncle, Raghunath Rao, to restore Ram Singh to the *gadi* of Marwar. Although the Peshwa was not in favour of keeping a large Maratha army confined in Marwar for any length of time, Jayapa Sindhia was obsessed by the idea of crushing Bijay Singh and winning the whole kingdom for Ram Singh. After securing some successes the Maratha general was murdered in his camp by Bijay Singh's envoy (July, 1755). Bijay Singh wanted to utilise this opportunity to drive the Marathas out of North India altogether. Madho Singh of Jaipur joined him. But the Marathas found an able leader in Jayapa's brother Dattaji, who defeated the armies of the allied Rajput Princes and compelled them to make peace (February, 1756). Bijay Singh agreed to cede Ajmer to the Marathas, to pay a war indemnity of 50 *lakhs* in three years, and to make over to Ram Singh the city of Jalor and half the territory of Marwar. "None of these terms except the first one was ultimately fulfilled." But Marwar became 'the special hunting-ground of the Sindhia family.' As Bijay Singh found it impossible to pay the large war indemnity forced

upon hm in 1756, he was constantly in dread of Maratha invasions. Moreover, his inveterate enemy, Ram Singh, had found shelter in Jaipur,[1] and Madho Singh often threatened to restore him by force. Under these circumstances Marwar passed through a long period of uneasy peace.[2]

The long rivalry between Bijay Singh and Ram Singh ruined Marwar. It was civil war in the worst sense of the term, for some of the most valiant Rathor families remained loyal to Ram Singh, who possessed some of the qualities attractive to the Rajputs. Tod says, "His person was gigantic; his demeanour affable and courteous; and he was generous to a fault. His understanding was excellent and well cultivated ... It is universally admitted that, both in exterior and accomplishments, not even the great Ajit could compare with Ram Singh." Bijay Singh was weak and unwarlike. A Rathor bard contrasted the character of the two rivals in the following words: "Fortune never attended the stirrup of Beejy Sing, who never

1 Ram Singh died in 1773.

2 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 173-188, 193-194, 521-523.

gained a battle, though at the head of a hundred thousand men; but Ram Sing, by his valour and conduct, gained victories with handful."[1] Civil war, foreign invasion and royal weakness conspired to increase the power and stimulate the ambition of the nobles. "The aristocracy in Marwar," says Tod, "has always possessed more power than in any of the sister principalities around. The cause may be traced to their first settlement in the desert; and it has been kept in action by the peculiarities of their condition, especially in that protracted struggle for the rights of the minor Ajit, against the despotism of the empire." At the beginning of Bijay Singh's reign "the crown-lands were uncultivated, the tenantry dispersed; and commerce had diminished, owing to insecurity and the licentious habits of the nobles, who everywhere established their own imposts, and occasionally despoiled entire caravans." Unable to keep them in check, Bijay Singh tried to keep them engaged by finding them occupation. He carried his arms against some desert tribes and occupied Amarkot, 'the key to the valley of the Indus.' He also occupied the rich

1 *Annals of Marwar,* Chap. XIII.

province of Godwar, which had been ruled by the Ranas of Mewar for nearly five centuries.[1]

It was in 1790 that Mahadji Sindhia turned his attention to Marwar. In that year Ismail Beg induced the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur to join him, and appeared in arms in the Ajmer district. Sindhia detached an army under the command of Lakhwa Dada and De Boigne to punish Ismail Beg and crush the Rajputs. A decisive battle was faught at Patan (in the Shekhawat territory) on June 20, 1790, in which De Boigne's skilful generalship secured a great victory for his master.

When the news of this battle reached Sindhia at Mathura, he determined to press home the advantage, and complete the subjugation of the Rajput states, which had asserted, and maintained, their independence since the battle of Tunga or Lalsot.[2] He now ordered De Boigne to invade Jodhpur, and reduce the Raja to submission. De Boigne invested Ajmer 'which, lying, as it did, half way between Jaipur and

1 *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIII. For the occupation of Godwar, see *Annals of Mewar*, Chap. XVI, and Reu, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, pp. 186-188.

2 See p. 206.

Jodhpur, was the key of the country;' but, finding that it was not possible to take it by a *coup de main*, he left a detachment to continue the siege, and marched with the rest of his army towards Jodhpur. Anxious to wipe out the shame of Patan, Bijay Singh summoned to his standard every Rathor between 14 and 60 years of age capable of wielding a sword. About 30,000 Rathors met De Boigne at Merta, a large walled city, nearly 30 miles to the east of Ajmer.[1] Again De Boigne's skill and presence of mind secured a decisive victory. (September 12, 1790).[2] The terms imposed on Bijay Singh were severe, and included, in addition to a contribution of sixty *lakhs* of rupees, the cession of the district of Ajmer, which was granted as *jaidad* to Lakhwa. For about ten years Bijay Singh did not again venture to challenge the Marathas; but in April, 1800, he joined his forces with those of Sawai Pratap Singh of Jaipur and shared with him the disastrous defeat at Malpura.[3]

1 "Merta has been rightly called the Gateway of Marwar, and here every invader of the Rathor Kingdom has been first opposed".—Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Modern Review*, January, 1944.

2 For a critical account of this battle see Sir J. N. Sarkar's article in *Modern Review*, January, 1944.

3 See pp. 215-216.

The last years of Bijay Singh's life were 'engrossed by sentimental folly with a young beauty of the *Oswal* tribe, on whom he lavished all the honours due only to his legitimate queens.' His infatuation for this concubine created many troubles, not the least harmful of which was a disputed succession.[1] At the time of his death this miserable Prince left 'his dominions curtailed, his chiefs in rebellion, his sons and grandsons mutually opposed to each other.'

Bijay Singh was succeeded by his grandson, Bhim Singh (1793-1803), who superseded the legitimate claim of his uncle, Zalim Singh. The latter was defeated and forced to seek shelter at Udaipur where, with an ample domain from the Rana, his relative on the maternal side, he passed the rest of his days in literary pursuits.[2] All other rival claimants to the throne were removed in the Mughal fashion. Of Bijay Singh's other surviving sons, Sardar Singh was murdered and Sher Singh was blinded. Sometime later Sher Singh 'released himself from life by dashing out his brains.' Sur Singh, a grandson of Bijay

1 For details, see *Annals of Marwar*, Chaps. XIII-XIV.

2 For details about Zalim Singh's character and accomplishments, see Tod's *Personal Narrative*.

Singh, 'fell a sacrifice with the others.' A single claimant alone remained to disturb Bhim Singh's repose—Man Singh, the favourite grandson of the old King,[1] placed beyond the usurper's reach within the walls of Jalor. That stronghold remained under siege for more than ten years, and at the very moment when Man Singh's surrender was becoming inevitable, Bhim Singh died.[2]

Man Singh, whom this fortunate accident placed on the throne of Marwar, was a remarkable man. During his long reign of forty years (1803-1843) he passed through many vicissitudes of fortune. Tod, who knew him personally and even intimately, has left for us a vivid description of his appearance and character. "In person," says he, "the Raja is above the common height, possessing considerable dignity of manner, though accompanied by the stiffness of habitual restraint. His demeanour was commanding and altogether princely; but there was an entire absence of that natural majesty and grace which distin-

1 Son of Bhim Singh's uncle Goman Singh.

2 *Annals of Marwar,* Chap. XIV. It was suspected that Man Singh's cause was supported by 'the high-priest of Marwar, the spiritual leader of the Rathors,' who poisoned Bhim Singh. (Tod, *Personal Narrative*).

guished the prince of Oodipur,[1] who won without exertion our spontaneous homage. The features of Raja Maun are good: his eye is full of intelligence: and though the *ensemble* of his countenance almost denotes benevolence, yet there is ever and anon a doubtful expression, which, with a peculiarly formed forehead, gave a momentary cast of malignity to it. ... The biography of Maun Singh would afford a remarkable picture of human patience, fortitude, and constancy, never surpassed in any age or country. But in this school of adversity he also took lessons of cruelty: he learned therein to master or rather disguise his passions; and though he showed not the ferocity of the tiger, he acquired the still more dangerous attribute of that animal—its cunning ... I received the most convincing proofs of his intelligence, and minute knowledge of the past history, not of his own country alone, but of India in general. He was remarkably well read. ... Whether the first gratification of vengeance provoked his appetite, or whether the torrent of his rage, once impelled into motion, became too impetuous to be checked, so that his

1 Rana Bhim Singh.

reason was actually disturbed by the sufferings he had undergone, it is certain he grew a demoniac; nor could any one, who had conversed with the bland, the gentlemanly, I might says gentle, Raja Maun, have imagined that he concealed under this exterior a heart so malignant as his subsequent acts evinced."[1] Such was the man who presided over the destiny of Marwar in the tumult and strife of the early years of the nineteenth century.

II

The treaty of 1803 with Jaipur[2] was followed by a similar treaty with Jodhpur,[3] for it was a part of Lord Wellesley's 'original plan of permanent arrangement' to use the Rajput States as 'a barrier against the return of the Marathas to the northern parts of Hindustan'.[4] Raja Man Singh's position was then so critical owing to internal troubles[5] that he did not hesitate to take advantage of an alliance with the rising

1 Tod, *Personal Narrative*.
2 See pp. 222-224.
3 Signed by Lord Lake on December 22, 1803.
4 Secret Consultations, Imperial Record Department, September 6, 1804, No. 6.
5 See Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XIV.

British power. The terms of the treaty were similar to those granted by Lord Lake to Jaipur. 'A firm and permanent friendship and alliance' was established between the two States, and it was agreed that "the friends and enemies of one of the parties shall be considered the friends and enemies of both." Jodhpur was thus definitely implicated in the Anglo-Maratha struggle. The Company promised not to interfere in the internal administration of Jodhpur, and no tribute was to be demanded from the Raja. If 'any enemy' (i.e., the Marathas) 'evinced a disposition to invade' British territory, the ruler of Jodhpur would 'send the whole of his forces to the assistance of the Company's army and ... exert himself to the utmost of his power in repelling the enemy.' As the Company guaranteed 'the security of his country against external enemies,' Man Singh agreed also to submit to the British Government any 'misunderstanding' that might arise between him and any other State. If the British Government failed to settle the dispute owing to 'the obstinacy of the party,' the Company would grant military assistance to Jodhpur, provided the Jodhpur Government paid 'the charge of the expense of such aid, at the same rate as has been settled with'

the other Chieftains of Hindustan.' He would also "act, during the time of war or prospect of action, agreeably to the advice and opinion of the commander of the English army ... employed with his troops." Moreover, he would not 'entertain in his service, or in any other manner give admission to, any English or French subject, or any other person among the inhabitants of Europe, without the consent of the Company's Government.'

Although Lord Wellesley ratified this treaty, Man Singh refused to ratify it and proposed another. He also entered into negotiations with Jaswant Rao Holkar and even helped him by giving shelter to his family. The British authorities were naturally exasperated, and the treaty was cancelled in May, 1804. Soon, however, Man Singh was confronted with a serious difficulty. Daulat Rao Sindhia demanded contributions from him. Unable to defend himself against Sindhia's powerful army, Man Singh appealed for help to Lord Lake. Lord Wellesley decided that the Company had no obligation to help the Raja, for the treaty had not come into force at all. Under the circumstances the Company had no right "of with-holding Daulat Rao Sindhia from the prosecu-

tion of any demands upon the Raja of Jodhpur excepting only in the event of their being prosecuted under the denomination of tribute payable to the Emperor Shah Alam,' for 'such exactions on the part of Sindhia would be a violation of the 12th article of the treaty of peace by which Sindhia renounced all concern in the affairs of the Emperor.' Major Malcolm, acting Resident with Sindhia, was, therefore, requested to demand from Sindhia 'an explanation of the nature and extent of those demands, or at least a disavowal of any intention to make those demands under the denomination of tribute to the Emperor'.[1] (May, 1804). Sindhia adopted a policy of hesitation. Man Singh, free from immediate danger, instructed his *vakils* to inform Lord Lake that he did not want military assistance from the Company 'in the event of either internal commotion[2] or external attack.' Yet he was anxious for a treaty. Malcolm wrote in September, 1805, that "his sole object seemed to be the attainment of the avowed countenance of the British Government, and to have the security of written

1 S. C., September 6, 1804. No. 6.

2 His claim to the throne was contested by his nephew, Dhokul Singh, son of Bhim Singh.

engagement for its never adopting the cause of his enemies."[1]

In May, 1806, Man Singh sent a *vakil* to Mercer, Resident at Sindhia's court, with the object of concluding a treaty of alliance with the Company. This proposal was rejected by Sir George Barlow on two grounds: "By the 8th article of the treaty concluded with Daulat Rao Sindhia in the month of November, 1805, the British Government is pledged not to contract any treaty with the state of Jodhpur; but independently of that consideration the system of policy adopted by the British Government in regard to all the Chiefs and States with which we are unconnected by defensive alliance opposes the expediency of extending our connection with any of those Chiefs and States beyond the limits of mere amity and concord."[2]

We have already given a brief account of the complications arising out of the dispute about Krishnakumari's marriage and the struggle between Jaipur and Jodhpur.[3] By December, 1808, Man Singh had successfully removed all causes of appre-

1 S. C., September 9, 1805, No. 63.
2 S. C., June 26, 1806, No. 33.
3 See pp. 169-179, 226-231, 234-239, 241-250.

hension from Jagat Singh, Sawai Singh, Dhokul Singh and their partisans. But he was no longer the master of his own dominions. At Tod says, Amir Khan was now the arbiter of Marwar. He stationed his garrisons in strong fortresses like Nagaur and Nawah. He partitioned the lands of Maitra among his followers. Man Singh found himself in an intolerable position.[1] After some years of suffering he requested Metcalfe, Resident in Delhi, to revive the treaty of 1803. Metcalfe gave a straight refusal, saying that "independently of the policy by which the British Government in India was guided, and which led it generally to avoid such alliance, there were now additional obstacles to a treaty with Jodhpur founded on certain articles of our treaties with Sindhia and Holkar."[2] (April, 1814). The unfortunate Raja was then compelled to agree to pay Amir Khan 18 *lakhs* of rupees by instalments.[3]

In October, 1815, Amir Khan murdered a minister and the chief priest of Man Singh[4] in return

1 Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XV.

2 Political Consultations, Imperial Record Department, April 22, 1814, No. 11.

3 P. C., October 20, 1815, No. 47.

4 P. C., November 10, 1815, No. 14.

for seven *lakhs* of rupees paid by their enemies.[1] Metcalfe reported that "either the Raja or some powerful party in the Fort (of Jodhpur) must have been accessory to the murder of the ministers."[2] According to Tod, some people thought that Man Singh had consented to the murder of the minister, but when he found that the minister's death 'incidentally involved' the death of his chief priest, his reason was affected: "He shut himself up in his apartments, refused to communicate with any one, and soon omitted every duty, whether political or religious."[3] So the Chiefs of the State compelled him to transfer all political powers to his only son, Chuttur Singh, to be exercised by the latter as Regent. Although this arrangement was 'compulsory', Man Singh 'went through the ceremony necessary on the occasion, in public, with apparent willingness'.[4] The helpless ministers were trying in vain to maintain a balance between Amir Khan and Bapu Sindhia,[5] both

1 Tod, *Annals of Marwar,* Chap. XV.
2 P. C., November 10, 1815, No. 16.
3 Tod, *Annals of Marwar,* Chap. XV.
4 P. C., June 14, 1817, No. 13; August 15, 1817, No. 40.
5 S. C., June 11, 1816, No. 28; June 15, 1816, No. 10, 11; October 12, 1816, No. 16.

of whom were plundering Jodhpur territory. They did not renew overtures for an alliance with the Company, probably due to 'the systematic discouragement' with which the Resident in Delhi had received former proposals.[1]

III

When Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris he found it necessary to take all Rajput States under British protection. In October, 1817, Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an engagement with Jodhpur. The Secretary to the Supreme Government observed, "Jodhpur is understood to be a country of small pecuniary resources, but the proverbial bravery of its inhabitants will enable that Government to bring forward a powerful body of auxiliaries for the service of the British Government and the allied States. This should accordingly be the principal description of aid to be required from Jodhpur in the event of our establishing an intimate connection with that State. A pecuniary conribution, however, to-

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.

wards the expenses of the protecting force ought, if attainable, to be required from Jodhpur".[1]

Although negotiations were opened by Metcalfe as soon as he received these instructions, no properly authorised *vakil* came to him even in November.[2] Then some *vakils* came, negotiations were carried on, and a treaty was concluded on January 6, 1818. It was ratified by Lord Hastings on January 16, 1818.

Article 1 provided for 'perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests' between the two States. By Article 2 the British Government engaged 'to protect the principality and territory of Jodhpur'. By Article 3 Man Singh promised to 'act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government', to acknowledge its supremacy, and not to have any connection with other Chiefs and States. By Article 4 he promised not to enter into any negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government. Article 5 provided that all disputes between Marwar and other States would be submitted to 'the arbitration and award' of the British Government.

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.
2 S. C., December 19, 1817, No. 112.

With regard to the tribute payable by Man Singh, it was decided that the tribute hitherto paid to Sindhia (1,08,000 Jodhpur rupees) was to be paid in perpetuity to the Company, and that the engagements with Sindhia respecting tribute should cease. (Article 6). Man Singh declared that he had never paid any tribute to any other Power except Sindhia; so "if either Sindhia or any one else lay claim to tribute (from him) the British Government engages to reply to such claim". (Article 7). "This article", Metcalfe wrote on January 15, 1818, "is intended to give us a claim to any other tribute that Jodhpur may have paid to other States besides Sindhia, if any such has been concealed from us".[1] The sums paid to Amir Khan were 'not acknowledged to be in the way of tribute'.[2]

Article 8 ran as follows: "The State of Jodhpur shall furnish 1,500 horse for the service of the British Government whenever required; and when necessary the whole of the Jodhpur force shall join the British army, excepting such a portion as may be requisite for the internal administration of the country".

1 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 102.
2 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 102.

Metcalfe wanted 'to obtain the services of a larger body of horse', but the *vakils* 'protested solemnly that this was the utmost that the resources of the State could furnish in a condition of efficiency'. The *vakils* demanded an assurance that the Jodhpur contingent should not be employed in the Deccan. Metcalfe agreed.[1]

Article 9 provided that Man Singh would remain 'absolute ruler' of his country and that the jurisdiction of the British Government should not be introduced into Jodhpur. The *vakils* requested Metcalfe to promise that the British Government would not listen to the Raja's relatives or Rajput *Thakurs* of the State if they submitted 'self-interested proposals'. Metcalfe replied that this was 'understood' in the ninth article of the treaty.[2]

1 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 102. Tod says that Man Singh disapproved "the article relating to the armed contingent of his vassals to be at the disposal of the protecting power, in which he wisely saw the germ of discord, from the certainty of interference it would lead to". No explicit reference was made in the final treaty to the contingents of the vassals.

2 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 102. In his letter to the Supreme Government, dated January 15, 1818, Metcalfe observed that some of the Chiefs of Marwar were disaffected against the government of the Prince Regent. If the latter applied for British

The *vakils* of Jodhpur also pressed some other demands, but they had to remain satisfied with Metcalfe's verbal assurances. Man Singh wanted to resume the *jagir* given under coercion to Amir Khan, to recover the fort of Amarkot occupied by an Amir of Sind, and to retain the *pargana* of Godwar secured from Mewar some years ago. Metcalfe promised that the British Government would not obstruct the Raja in these matters.[1]

At the time when this treaty was concluded, the Government was in the hands of Prince Chuttur Singh,[2] who died soon after the ratification of the treaty. Man Singh was restored, and once more Marwar suffered from his misrule.[3]

assistance against those Chiefs, Metcalfe suggested that the application should be refused. He pointed out that "the *Thakurs* have rights as well as the Raja, and we could not undertake to enforce obedience, without ascertaining that we were not about to become the instruments of oppression".

1 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 102.

2 S. C., February 6, 1818, No. 102.

3 For details, see Tod, *Annals of Marwar*, Chap. XV.

BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH THE MINOR RAJPUT STATES

When Lord Hastings decided to crush the Pindaris, he found it necessary to take the Rajput States under British protection. Adam, Secretary to the Supreme Government, wrote to Metcalfe on October 8, 1817, "The general object to be attained by forming a connection with these petty States ('of Hindustan which will be relieved from the thraldom of the military and predatory Powers by the result of our negotiations with Sindhia and Holkar or by the success of our arms, should these Chiefs compel us to wage war against them') is to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it by the measures now in progress. With this view it is desirable to conclude engagements with the States in question on conditions which should give to the British Government the entire control over their political relations and proceedings with each other and with foreign States, secure to them the enjoyment of their terri-

torial possessions and the independent exercise of their internal administration under our protection and guarantee, and render their resources available for defraying the charge that will be incurred in the establishment and support of this system.'[1]

Karauli was the first of the minor Rajput States to accept the new system. The ruler of Karauli had so long been a tributary to the Peshwa. By Article 14 of the treaty of Poona (June, 1817) Peshwa Baji Rao II surrendered to the British Government all rights and claims over his tributaries in Hindustan and Malwa. By a treaty[2] concluded on November 9, 1817, the Raja of Karauli accepted the supremacy of the British Government and promised not to enter into negotiations with any other Power without its consent. All disputes between Karauli and other States were to be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government. No tribute was to be paid, but the Raja agreed 'to furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means.' 'Perpetual alliance and unity of interests'

1 Secret Consultations, Imperial Record Department, October 28, 1817, No. 26.

2 S. C., December 5, 1817, No. 23.

was established between the two States. The Raja remained the 'absolute ruler' of his territory. The jurisdiction of the British Government was not to be introduced into Karauli.

After Karauli came Kota. In 1817 Kota was nominally ruled by Maharao Ummed Singh, who had ascended the throne in 1771, but the *de facto* ruler of the principality was the famous minister, Raj Rana Zalim Singh. Tod has left for us a detailed account of the career of this remarkable man.[1] Kota suffered from the depredations of Holkar and Amir Khan,[2] but, thanks to Zalim Singh's clever diplomacy, her distress in this respect was much less serious than that of other States. When Lord Hastings invited the Rajput States to accept the protection of the East India Company, "the eagle eye of Zalim saw at once the virtue of compliance and the grace attendant on its being quickly yielded."

In October, 1817, Metcalfe was instructed to conclude an alliance with Kota on principles similar to those which were laid down in respect of other

1 *Annals of Haravati,* Chaps. VII, VIII, IX.

2 S. C., September 6, 1804, No. 42.
Political Consultations, Imperial Record Department, January 29, 1807, No. 32; June 11, 1807, No. 16; June 25, 1807, No. 41.

States. It was expected that the geographical situation of Kota as well as "the character of Rana Zalim Singh will render him an useful adherent in the approaching operations against the Pindaris, and an efficient instrument for upholding and promoting the system which it is proposed to substitute for that which has so long desolated the central provinces of India." Apart from tribute, Zalim Singh was to be asked to employ his troops, in co-operation with the British army, against the Pindaris.[1]

In November, 1817, Captain Tod was entrusted with the task of dealing with Kota and Bundi. His primary object was to induce the rulers of these two States 'to make such dispositions of their troops and such arrangements for guarding the principal passages of the Chambal as shall obstruct the flight of the Pindaris who may take that direction on the advance of the British troops.' Tod was instructed to lead the two States 'to act as much as possible from their own sense of expediency' without interfering in the details of their military arrangements. Metcalfe had already opened negotiations with Zalim Singh, which Tod

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.

might continue, if necessary, but he was reminded: "The co-operation of the States of Kota and Bundi in the measures for the immediate object of destroying the Pindaris will not depend on the previous conclusion of permanent engagements of alliance but is a duty incumbent on them and all other States which the British Government has a right to demand."[1]

Tod went to Kota and was very favourably received by Zalim Singh.[2] A treaty was concluded in Delhi by Metcalfe on December 26, 1817. The general conditions of the treaty were similar to those which were incorporated in the treaties with Udaipur, Jaipur and Jodhpur.[3] With regard to the question of tribute, it was decided that the money hitherto paid by Kota to the Marathas (the Peshwa, Sindhia, Holkar, and Puar) should be paid to the British Government. It was, therefore, necessary for the British Government to protect Kota against future claim from other States. Article 8 of the treaty ran as follows: "No other Power shall have any claim to tribute from the principality of Kota; and if any

1 S. C., November 28, 1817, No. 3.
2 S. C., January 9, 1818, No. 55.
3 See pp. 183-187, 296-297, 318-320.

one advances such a claim the British Government engages to reply to it." Article 9 provided for military assistance: "The troops of the principality of Kota, according to its means, shall be furnished at the requisition of the British Government."

Raja Bishen Singh of Bundi rendered valuable assistance to Colonel Monson during his retreat in 1805 and applied to Lord Lake 'to connect himself with the British Government.' Lord Lake supported his prayer, and Malcolm wrote to the Supreme Government on July 2, 1805, "In the event of hostilities occurring with that Chief (Sindhia) it is His Excellency's (Lord Lake's) opinion that the Raja of Bundi, though his possessions are small, may, from their local position and natural strength, prove an useful dependent to the British Government, and the conduct of that Chief (particularly at the period of the retreat of Colonel Monson's Detachment) was such as to give undivided proofs of his sincerity in the wish of meriting the protection of the British Government."[1] But on December 24, 1805, the Company concluded a treaty with Holkar, by which it

1 S. C., September 12, 1805, No. 133.

promised[1] 'to have no concern with the ancient possessions of the Holkar family in Mewar, Malwa, and Haravati, or with any of the Rajas situated to the south of the Chambal.' Holkar continued his depredations in Bundi; the Raja helplessly appealed for assistance to the Resident in Delhi, who 'thought it his duty to abstain from raising any hope.'[2] On October 20, 1810, the Governor-General informed the Raja, in reply to one of his letters, that the acceptance of his overture was incompatible with the principles which regulated the conduct of the British Government: "It is the fixed principle of the British Government not to interfere in the concern of other States excepting only in the degree required by the positive and legal treaties already existing ...." In spite of such discouragement the Raja renewed his application in 1814.[3] But Lord Hastings had not yet decided to renounce Lord Minto's policy towards the Rajput States.

When Lord Hastings initiated his new policy

1 Article 3.

2 P. C., January 29, 1807, No. 121; June 11, 1807, No. 16; August 29, 1808, No. 59.

3 P. C., April 25, 1815, No. 44.

the case of Bundi naturally claimed favourable consideration. In October, 1817, Metcalfe was informed that the Governor-General was 'willing to afford it the protection of the British Government on the simple condition of allegiance and of employing its military force with zeal and spirit in the common cause.'[1] Tod was then entrusted with the duty of concluding a treaty with Bundi.[2] By Article 4 of the treaty of Mandasor (January 6, 1818) Holkar ceded to the British Government 'all claims of tribute and revenues of every description' which he had upon the Rajput States, including Bundi. Sindhia's claim on Bundi, as calculated by Tod, amounted to about eighty or ninety thousand rupees per year;[3] but he asserted that he received Rs. 1,05,000 per annum. At first Lord Hastings was under the impression that Sindhia's share of tribute from Bundi amounted to Rs. 10,000 only. So he was willing to exempt Bundi from the payment of tribute. But Metcalfe know better and asked Tod to include in the treaty the con-

1 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.
2 S. C., November 28, 1817, No. 5.
3 S. C., March 13, 1818, No. 19.

dition that Bundi would pay to the British Government the amount which it had so far paid to Sindhia.[1]

Tod arrived at Bundi on February 8, 1818, and a treaty was concluded two days later. The conditions were, in response to the orders of the Supreme Government, "few and simple, providing for protection and guarantee on the one hand, and political dependence and subordinate co-operation on the other."[2] The Raja was exempted from the payment of the tribute due to Holkar, but he was required to pay to the British Government 'the tribute and revenue heretofore paid to Sindhia,' amounting to Rs. 80,000 per annum. Raja Bishen Singh felt 'intense gratitude' for this settlement.[3]

In 1812 Raja Surat Singh of Bikaner wanted to open negotiations with the British Government, but he was not encouraged.[4] Six years later a treaty was concluded with him by Metcalfe (March 9, 1818). Bikaner was exempted from the payment of tribute, "both because that State has not heretofore been sub-

1 S. C., December 19, 1817, No. 105.
2 S. C., February 13, 1818, No. 21.
3 Tod, *Annals of Haravati*, Chap. IV.
4 P. C., August 28, 1812, No. 115.

jected to the payment of any fixed tribute and on account of the inadequacy of its resources to meet such a demand."[1] Apart from the usual clauses regarding protection and subordinate co-operation, the treaty contained three interesting stipulations. By Article 6 the Raja undertook to suppress all robbers and plunderers in his territory and to restore the property plundered by his subjects from British territory up to the time of the conclusion of the treaty. By Article 7 the British Government engaged to help the Raja in restoring his authority over his rebellious vassals and subjects. The Raja agreed to pay the expenses incurred by the British Government for this purpose.[2] By Article 10 the Raja engaged to take effective measures for the protection of all trade routes within his dominions, in order that these might be 'rendered passable and safe for the transit of trade to and from the countries of Kabul and Khorasan.'

1 S. C., May 1, 1818, No. 16.

2 The following observations were made by the Supreme Government on this clause: "It is manifest that, unless the authority of the Government of Bikaner be firm and efficient, it will not have the means of fulfilling the most important stipulations of the treaty, while, on the other hand, it is strictly equitable that the British Government should be paid any expenses it may incur on this account". (S. C., May 1, 1818, No. 16).

The little principality of Kishangarh was an offshoot from Jodhpur. On March 26, 1818, Metcalfe concluded a treaty with Kulian Singh, Raja of Kishangarh.[1] No tribute was demanded, for Kishangarh had never paid fixed tribute to any State. But the Raja engaged to 'furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government according to his means.' This article, Metcalfe informed the Supreme Government, was framed 'with reference to an expectation that the resources of the State, which are at present confined, will hereafter improve.'[2]

The three small principalities of Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur were offshoots from Mewar. The rulers of these States no longer acknowledged the authority of the Rana of Udaipur. Pertabgarh was tributary to Holkar. Dungarpur paid tribute to Sindhia, Holkar and the Puars of Dhar. Holkar's claim on these States was renounced in favour of the British Government by the treaty of Mandasor. When Metcalfe concluded the treaty with Mewar, the Rana's *vakil* claimed the restoration

1 S. C., April 17, 1818, No. 77.
2 S. C., April 17, 1818, No. 77.

of the Rana's sovereignty over the Chiefs of these States.[1] But the British Government had already decided to grant them independent recognition.[2]

In 1814 Ummed Singh, Regent of Banswara, who managed affairs on behalf of his father who had 'retired from the cares of government,' sent a *vakil* to Metcalfe 'to solicit the protection of the British Government.' He had already applied for protection to the Governor of Bombay and the Resident at Poona, who had referred him to the Resident in Delhi. The *vakil* proposed that a British force should be stationed in Banswara to protect the Raja against foreign and internal enemies, and that three-eighths of the revenues of the State should be paid to the British Government. The revenue at that time amounted to four or five *lakhs*, but an increase to seven or eight *lakhs* might be expected if peace was restored in the State. It appeared that "the aid principally required at the present moment would be against chiefs and subjects acting in rebellion."[3] The Governor-General declined to accept this offer, mainly on the ground

1 S. C., February 20, 1818, No. 29.
2 S. C., March 6, 1818, No. 7.
3 P. C., April 15, 1814, No. 38.

that the Raja of Banswara was a tributary of Holkar, Puar, and Sindhia.[1]

Ummed Singh renewed his proposal in March, 1815,[2] but no attention was paid to him till October, 1817, when Metcalfe received instructions for bringing all Rajput States under control.[3] Lieutenant Dyson, an officer working under Sir John Malcolm in Malwa, was deputed to enquire about the conditions prevailing in Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur. His report on these States is a veritablbe mine of information.[4]

On September 16, 1818, Metcalfe concluded a treaty with the *vakil* deputed by Ummed Singh. This treaty was ratified by Lord Hastings on October 10, 1818. Banswara was required to pay 'tribute to the British Government to the extent of three-eighths of the revenue' and to 'furnish troops on requisition, according to its means, for the service of the British Government.' Article 5 was rather unusual: "The affairs of the principality of Banswara shall be settled

1 P. C., April 15, 1814, No. 39.
2 P. C., May 23, 1815, No. 54.
3 S. C., October 28, 1817, No. 26.
4 S. C., October 31, 1817, No. 96.

according to the advice of the British Government, in which the British Government will pay all practicable attention to the will of the Maha Rawal." Metcalfe wrote to the Supreme Government on September 22, 1818, "The fifth article was introduced in order to secure to us the right of interposing our advice and authority for the settlement of the disturbances which at present prevail in the State of Banswara."[1]

But the Maharawal denied that he had sent any *vakil* to Delhi with authority to conclude a treaty with the British Government.[2] So the previous treaty was regarded as invalid, and a new treaty was concluded on December 25, 1818, by Captain Caulfield, an assistant of Sir John Malcolm. In addition to the clauses incorporated in the previous treaty, this treaty contained some important provisions, obviously included at Malcolm's instance. By Article 5 the Maharawal engaged to pay to the British Government all arrears of tribute due to the Puar Raja of Dhar or any other State. By Article 11 he engaged never to entertain in his service any Arab, Makrani or Sindhi, or any other foreign soldier. Henceforth the army of

1 S. C., October 10, 1818, No. 4.
2 S. C., October 31, 1818, No. 97.

the State was to be composed solely of 'the military class of the inhabitants of the country.' By Article 13 authority was given to the British Government to collect through its own officers the town duties of Banswara, if the State failed to make punctual payment of the tribute.

A treaty was concluded with Pertabgarh on November 25, 1804, by Colonel Murray, who then commanded the British army in Gujarat and Malwa. That treaty was cancelled by Lord Cornwallis. The State suffered much from Holkar's depredations. Lieutenant Dyson observed in a memorandum dated June 20, 1818, "The principal object of the Raja seems to be to get rid of the connection with Holkar... The excesses committed by Holkar's troops have caused a rooted hatred towards them in all ranks ... Some of the dependent chieftains have taken advantage of the distress of the Government and have thrown off almost all obedience to the Raja."[1] Two obstacles, however, delayed the conclusion of the negotiations opened by Malcolm. In the first place, Holkar's claim to tribute had to be settled.[2] Secondly,

1 S. C., November 7, 1818, No. 60.
2 S. C., November 7, 1818, No. 61.

some security for the payment of tribute had to be decided upon. When these preliminaries were settled, Captain Caulfield concluded a treaty at Nimach on October 5, 1818.

This treaty had some special features. Instead of the usual clauses regarding perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation we have the following stipulation: "The Raja promises to give up all connection with other States and to the utmost of his power prove his obedience to the British Government who, in return, agree to assist him in re-establishing good order throughout his district, and to protect him from the claims and trespasses of all other States." The Raja promised to pay to the British Government all arrears of tribute due to Holkar, amounting to Rs. 1,24,657-6 as. only. If punctual payment was not made, the British Government was authorised to collect the dues through an agent of its own from the town duties of Pertabgarh. Moreover, the annual tribute so far paid to Holkar was to be paid to the British Government. By Article 4 the Raja agreed to maintain 50 horsemen and 200 foot soldiers who were to be at the disposal of the British Government. Article 5 gave to the British Government the right of

interfering in the internal administration of the State "in the settlement of all predatory tribes, and in the re-establishment of tranquillity and good order." The British Government engaged to help the Raja in maintaining his authority over his subjects. The Raja undertook not to 'levy any unusual duty on the merchants or on merchandize throughout his territories.'

Captain Caulfield concluded a treaty with Dungarpur on December 11, 1818. There were the usual clauses regarding perpetual friendship and subordinate co-operation. Article 5 conferred on the British Government the right to interfere in the internal administration of the State. The ruler agreed to pay to the British Government, in addition to all arrears of tribute due to the Puars of Dhar, an annual tribute 'to be regulated by the prosperity of his country but never to exceed three-eighths of the actual revenue.' In addition, a military force was to be supplied on requisition from the British Government. All foreigners were to be excluded from the army, which was to be composed only of the 'natives of the country.' If the tribute was not punctually paid, the British Government could collect the dues, through

an agent of its own, from the town duties of Dungarpur.

In 1809 the Raja of Jaisalmer informed the Governor-General that he was prepared to co-operate with the British Government if the latter undertook an expedition against the troublesome Amirs of Sind. Naturally Lord Minto rejected this offer.[1] A treaty was concluded with the ruler of Jaisalmer by Metcalfe on December 12, 1818. Article 1 provided for 'perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests' between the two states. Article 2 provided that the 'posterity' of the reigning prince, Mulraj, would succeed to the principality. Article 3 ran as follows: "In the event of any serious invasion directed towards the overthrow of the principality of Jessulmere, or other danger of great magnitude occurring to that principality, the British Government will exert its power for the protection of the principality, provided that the cause of the quarrel be not ascribable to the Rajah of Jessulmere." Article 4 provided for subordinate co-operation. No tribute was to be paid.

Major-General Sir David Ochterlony was appo-

1 S. C., August 5, 1809, No. 4; November 28, 1809, No. 7.

inted Resident in Rajputana. A treaty was concluded under his order by Captain Alexander Speirs with Sirohi on September 11, 1823. Article 4 of the treaty conferred upon the British Government the right to interfere in the internal administration of the State. Article 8 provided for the payment of annual tribute which was not to exceed three-eighths of the revenue. By Article 9 the British Government was authorised to regulate customs duties within the State. Article 10 provided for military co-operation.

The whole of Rajputana now lay prostrate at the feet of Britain.

By the same author

PESHWA MADHAV RAO I

Published in April, 1943

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